the 2017-2018 arab opinion index: main results in brief · 2018-05-17 · 1 the 2017-2018 arab...
TRANSCRIPT
1
The 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief The 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index is the sixth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.
The 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index is based on the findings from face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,830 individual respondents in 11 separate Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples. The overall samples guarantee probability-proportional-to-size (PPS), ensuring fairness in the representation of various population segments. With an aggregate sample size of 18,830 respondents, the Arab Opinion Index remains the largest public opinion survey in the Arab world. The fieldwork was carried out by an overall team of 840 individuals, equally balanced on gender, who conducted 45,000 hours of face-to-face interviews. The team covered a total of 700,000 kilometers across the population clusters sampled.
The sections below give selected highlights of the findings of the 2016 Arab Opinion Index.
Section 1: Living Conditions of Arab Citizens ● Only 22% of respondents reported that their household income was sufficient for them to make
savings after all of their necessary expenditures were covered. A further 46% reported that while their household incomes were sufficient to cover necessary expenditures, it was not enough to sustain savings. These families are designated as those living “in hardship.” Fully 30% of citizens in the Arab region live “in need,” in that their household incomes do not cover their necessary expenditures whatsoever. When comparing to the baseline year of 2011, households considered “in need” has reduced 11%, which is a significant difference.
Figure 1: Self-reported Household Income Level
22
20
20
21
18
15
46
49
48
42
40
42
30
29
29
32
37
41
2
2
3
5
5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
My household’s income covers expenditures sufficiently and allows us to save
My household’s income covers our expenditures but does not allow us to save
My household’s income is not sufficient for necessary expenditures and we face difficultiesDk /declined to answer
2
● Of those respondents whose households live “in need”, 55% resort to borrowing from a variety
of sources, including family and friends as well as banks and financial institutions, to cover their expenditures. Another 17% rely on handouts and charitable assistance from friends and family, while 15% on assistance from charitable organizations.
● 64% of respondents evaluate the level of safety/security in their home countries positively, while 35% view the level of safety/security in their home countries negatively. This reflects an increasingly positive perception of the levels of safety and security throughout the region.
● 39% of respondents evaluate their home countries’ economic situations positively, compared to 59% who have an overall negative view of their home countries’ economic circumstances. This measure has remained stable across successive polls of the Arab Opinion Index.
Figure 2: How would you describe the general economic situation in your home country?
Figure 3: How would you describe the general political situation in your home country?
54
12
9
8
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
33
41
44
45
61
28
14
26
23
8
9
30
4
35
30
32
28
44
45
49
39
33
48
35
1
12
12
14
4
26
39
23
37
57
42
24
8
5
2
1
1
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Morocco
Mauritania
Egypt
Palestine
Sudan
Iraq
Jordan
Tunisia
Lebanon
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad Dk /declined to answer
3
● Similarly, 39% of respondents evaluated the political situations within their home countries positively, compared to 55% who had negative views of their home countries’ political situations. This represents a stalling of a previous improvement in Arab public perceptions of their home countries’ political situations, which was especially notable during the 2015 survey.
● When asked to identify the most pressing problems for their countries to tackle, 33% of respondents provided answers which focused on economic issues: unemployment, poverty, and price inflation. A further 10% offered answers which centered on safety, security and stability while 22% gave answers which concerned political issues, such as governance, democratic transition, the insufficiency of public services, and financial and administrative corruption.
● 26% of Arabs want to immigrate to other countries. While a desire for economic improvement was the most cited incentive to emigrate across the Arab countries surveyed, approximately one-fifth of would-be emigres cited political reasons and concerns over safety and security. This was highly dependent on the subjective circumstances in the country surveyed; while the majority cited economic factors for their desire to emigrate, half of Iraqis and over a quarter of Palestinians cited security and political concerns as their desire to leave their home countries.
67
9
9
7
6
3
2
1
1
1
0
10
16
61
44
56
41
34
15
13
15
13
11
29
1
17
32
24
32
31
40
32
43
44
49
31
1
5
15
10
12
18
39
48
37
40
39
24
15
9
3
10
13
4
6
4
2
1
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Kuwait
Jordan
Mauritania
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
Iraq
Palestine
Lebanon
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad Dk /declined to answer
4
Figure 4: Do you wish to immigrate to another country?
● Respondents in the Arab region provided a variety of different answers when asked to name the country which posed the largest threat to their national security. Israel was the most cited threat to the national security of their home countries. The second most-cited country was the United States. Finally, the third-most cited country in 2017-2018 was Iran.
Section 2: Perceptions of State Institutions and Governmental Effectiveness
● Results from the 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index reflect a generally low level of public confidence in Arab governments and civilian government institutions. People showed the least confidence in political parties. In contrast, the Arab public generally has a high level of confidence in their militaries as well as police/general security.
51
41
35
30
28
28
26
18
16
8
5
26
48
58
64
69
72
70
73
82
84
91
94
73
1
1
1
2
0
0
1
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sudan
Morocco
Jordan
Iraq
Tunisia
Mauritania
Palestine
Egypt
Lebanon
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Yes No Dk /declined to answer
5
Figure 5: Respondent confidence in state institutions.
● 48% of the Arab public is evaluates the performance of the legislature positively, in their respective countries, whereas 42% evaluate the performance of the legislature negatively. This question specifically addressed the ability of the legislature to hold the executive accountable.
Figure 6: Respondent evaluations of the performance of the legislature: Legislature holds the executive responsible for its policies and actions.
● In general, Arab public opinion regarding government performance is polarized. 55% of the Arab public has a negative view of their governments, while 43% have a positive view. It is important to note that there is wide variation on this issue by country.
● There is a clear consensus among the Arab public that corruption is widespread across their countries: 91% of the Arab public believes that corruption is widespread in their home countries,
68
36
26
22
14
22
39
42
33
28
6
15
17
21
23
3
9
12
22
31
1
1
3
2
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Army
Police /General Security/ Gendarmerie
The Judiciary
Government/ government Ministries
Councils/ Parliaments
High degree of confidence Confident to some extentLack Confidence to some extent Completely lack ConfidenceDK /Declined to answer
14
17
18
18
15
34
37
35
32
35
24
25
24
24
24
18
14
18
17
13
10
7
6
9
13
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
6
compared to only 6% who believe that corruption is not widespread at all. Similarly, Arab public opinion is divided over the sincerity of Arab governments in tackling corruption. There has been little significant change in the perception of corruption, and its prevalence, over previous years.
Figure 7: How prevalent is corruption in your home country?
● Only 28% of the Arab public believes that the rule of law is applied universally in their home countries, without prejudice. 52% of the Arab public maintains that the rule of law is applied in their home states but that some groups are shown favorable treatment. Finally, 18% of Arabs expressed the opinion that the rule of law is not applied in their home countries at all. Similarly, 38% of the Arab public believes that the principle of a fair trial is not upheld in their home countries.
Figure 8: Assessment of the rule of law
45
46
47
53
56
56
31
33
33
30
29
28
15
14
12
8
7
7
6
4
6
5
4
3
3
3
3
4
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Very widespread Widespread to some extent Limited Prevalence
Completely not Prevalent DK /Declined to answer
7
Figure 9: Assessment of the prevalence of a fair trial.
28
24
25
21
22
19
52
54
54
53
50
48
18
20
21
22
22
26
2
2
1
4
5
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
The state applies the rule of law fairly and equitablyThe state applies the rule of law but favors some groups of citizens over othersThe state dose not apply the rule of law at allDK /Declined to answer
8
Section 3: Arab Public Attitudes towards Democracy ● Respondents to the 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index define democracy in a variety of different and
meaningful, coherent ways. 33% of the overall group of respondents gave answers which emphasized the safeguarding of citizens’ political and civil liberties; 21% defined democracy as the guaranteeing of equality and justice between citizens; 9% gave answers that emphasized either safeguarding safety and security; and 5% the improvement of economic conditions. Another 14% of respondents provided answers which emphasized such points as the peaceful transition of power and institutional checks and balances.
18
16
16
14
13
41
42
42
39
42
22
23
23
22
21
16
17
18
21
19
3
2
1
4
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Upheld to a large extent Upheld, to some extentNot Upheld, to some extent Completely not UpheldDK /Declined to answer
9
Table 1: Definitions of democracy according to respondents.
Reason Country
Preservation
of
civil/public
liberties
Equality,
justice
for all
citizens
Democratic
system of
government
Safety,
security
and
stability
Improved
economic
situation
Positive
attitudes
towards
democracy
Implementation
of religious
edicts
Other
Don’t
Know/Refuse
to Answer
Total
Kuwait 49 22 17 7 0 0 0 0 6 100
Jordan 48 16 14 10 6 1 0 1 4 100
Sudan 48 22 9 5 6 1 0 1 9 100
Lebanon 39 19 20 10 4 0 0 2 6 100
Palestine 37 19 15 9 4 1 1 0 14 100
Iraq 35 11 11 16 5 3 0 1 19 100
Egypt 30 24 24 10 5 3 0 1 5 100
Mauritania 20 42 23 1 0 1 1 1 12 100
Tunisia 19 18 14 21 15 4 0 1 9 100
Saudi Arabia
19 5 10 10 3 1 4 3 46 100
Morocco 19 32 3 6 8 19 1 0 14 100
Total 33 21 14 9 5 3 1 1 13 100
● A full 76% of Arabs believes that democracy is the most appropriate system of governance for
their home countries, when asked to compare democracy to other systems (such as authoritarian regimes, representative democracies where electoral competition is limited to either Islamist or non-Islamist/secular political parties, or to theocracies). Additionally, a majority of Arabs disagree with a set of widespread statements which are often employed in public discourse to discredit democracy.
10
Figure 10: A majority of respondents disagree with a set of statements which characterize democracy negatively.
Figure 11: Assessment of different systems of governance.
● A majority of Arab citizens, 57%, would accept an electoral victory and rise to power of a political party which they disagreed with, while 35% stated that they would be opposed to the ascendancy of a political party with which they disagreed.
12
8
4
6
5
30
26
14
18
21
32
38
42
43
43
16
18
28
23
21
10
10
12
10
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
My society is unprepared for democracy
Democracies are characterized by indecisiveness anddiscord
Democracy is incompatible with Islam
Economic performance suffers in a democracy
Democracies are not effective in the maintenance ofsecurity and public order
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
45
13
7
6
5
31
18
20
15
12
9
27
30
26
30
8
34
34
44
44
7
8
9
9
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Democratic system
A government based on Islamic Sharia
Electoral system with competition limited toIslamist parties
Electoral system with competition limited tonon-religious/secular parties
An undemocratic/authoritarian system ofgovernment
Very appropriate Appropriate Inappropriate to some extent
Completely inappropriate DK /Declined to answer
11
Figure 12: Would you accept the election of a political party you disagreed with?
● When asked to rate the level of democracy in their home countries on a numeric scale from 1 to 10--with 1 being “completely undemocratic” and 10 being “democratic to the greatest extent possible”--respondent evaluations averaged to 5.5. Across individual countries, there was wide variation, from 7.5 to 3.7.
Figure 13: Democracy Scale Average by Year
● When asked if the citizens of their home country were free to criticize their government without fear of retribution, 37% of the Arab public said this was impossible to do. Indeed, in some countries, such as in Palestine and Sudan, majorities expressed the view that they were not free to openly criticize their own governments without fear (59% and 68% respectively).
Figure 14: Temporal comparisons of the ability to criticize the government.
57
54
55
57
54
53
35
40
40
35
32
36
8
6
5
8
14
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Accept Oppose DK /Declined to answer
5.5
5.3
5.5
5.25.04.5
2017 /20182016201520142012 / 20132011
12
Figure 15: Cross country comparisons.
● We also asked the question of how much they are able to criticize the government using a sliding scale, with 1 being the least ability and 10 being the most ability. The average number was 5.6 regionally, with respondents in Saudi Arabia being predictably the least able to criticize the government, and respondents in Lebanon and Tunisia being the most.
Figure 16: Criticism of the Government Scale by Country
57
56
57
60
63
37
39
38
30
27
6
5
6
10
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Yes No DK /Declined to answer
81
74
71
66
60
58
56
54
40
38
26
57
17
26
28
31
33
33
39
46
33
59
68
37
3
1
3
7
9
5
27
4
6
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Tunisia
Lebanon
Jordan
Iraq
Mauritania
Morocco
Egypt
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Palestine
Sudan
Aggregate
Yes No DK /Declined to answer
13
How does public opinion gauge the 2011 Arab uprisings?
In the context of identifying public attitudes toward democracy, we also gauge public opinion on the Arab uprisings of 2011, the main demand for which was to end tyranny. Thus, to assess the views of citizens on the revolutions at the moment of their happening, without asking about subsequent developments, we asked: "Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed revolutions and popular protests, in which people took to the streets in demonstrations. What is your assessment of that?".
Results showed that 49% still consider the uprisings to have been positive, and 39% consider them to have been negative.
Figure 17: Across all countries, a slim majority continues to hold a positive view of the original, 2011 uprisings.
6.7 6.6 6.46.1 6.1 6.0
5.65.3
4.74.2
3.1
5.6
0.0
10.0
14
Figure 18: Country comparisons for 2017/2018
● 49% of the Arab public still views the Arab Spring revolutions positively, compared to 39% that said it was negative. 30% of the sample declined to answer.
● The Arab public is neatly divided in terms of its outlook towards the future path of the Arab Spring: 45% maintain that these revolutions will ultimately achieve their aims, even if they are now going through a difficult phase. In contrast, 34% of Arabs believe that the Arab Spring has been aborted before the revolutions could achieve their aims, and that the former regimes have returned to power. This is a marked decline from 2014, when two-thirds of the Arab public was openly optimistic about the Arab Spring eventually achieving its aims. Some reasons for this growing
20
18
29
33
16
19
23
22
12
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
Very positive positive, to some extentnegative, to some extent Very negativeDK /Declined to answer
33
32
32
25
24
18
17
14
11
7
3
20
46
40
27
30
21
41
28
32
23
17
12
29
10
15
12
17
12
17
18
18
18
13
22
16
8
9
27
18
17
15
18
24
30
59
33
23
3
4
2
11
26
9
19
12
18
4
30
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Egypt
Kuwait
Tunisia
Morocco
Mauritania
Lebanon
Sudan
Palestine
Iraq
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Very positive positive, to some extent negative, to some extent
Very negative DK /Declined to answer
15
disenchantment include creeping authoritarianism and the spread of chaos in many of the Arab Spring countries.
Figure 19: Views of the Arab Spring over time.
45
45
48
60
34
39
35
17
9
7
9
10
13
10
8
13
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
The Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aims
The Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to power
Neither of the two statements
DK /Declined to answer
16
Section 4: Civic and Political Participation
● Despite the fact that citizens in the Arab world support democracy, their political and civic participation is limited. To assess this issue, we tested three operationalizations of political participation, including: political apathy, their trust in existing political parties, and whether or not they plan on participating in upcoming elections.
● The results show a decrease in concern for politics, as it has been reduced to 31% versus 69% who self-identify as politically apathetic.
● Public opinion was split regarding participation in elections. Those who said they do not want to engage in elections has risen to 46%, although this figure hovered around 27% in the surveys from 2011 to 2013.
● Trust in political parties has also decreased over the years. ● Although Arab public opinion supports democracy and gauges the level of democracy in their
countries negatively, it is clear that political apathy has become increasingly the norm. This is perhaps to be expected if we are to consider that the common citizen does not have space to criticize the government. Egypt is a prime example of this dynamic.
Figure 20: Level of political apathy in the Arab world over time.
Figure 21: “Do you intend on participating in upcoming legislative elections?”
33
3939343131
676161
666969
0
20
40
60
80
20112012 /20132014201520162017 /2018
AggregateConcerned with politics Unconcerned with politics
17
Figure 22: Levels of trust in political parties over time.
● Membership of and participation in civil and voluntary organizations remains extremely limited across the Arab region, with no more than 16% of respondents reported that they are members of such groups in any given country. When taking into account the level of active participation in the activities of such groups, the level of effective participation would likely fall further still.
Figure 23: Political Participation.
49
52
56
58
58
59
46
40
36
32
27
27
5
8
8
10
15
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012/2013
2011
Yes NO DK /Declined to answer
5
8
7
7
9
5
24
23
21
22
25
18
25
24
29
26
26
20
41
41
39
39
31
40
5
4
4
6
9
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
High degree of confidence Confident to some extentLack Confidence to some extent Completely lack ConfidenceDK /Declined to answer
18
● Additionally, a majority of Arabs (52%) have no affiliation with a political party in any way, nor do they feel that their views are represented by any existing political group or bloc. Respondents who reported that they were either members of political parties or that there was a political party which they felt was representative of their views, were concentrated in Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon.
Figure 24: Representativeness of Political Parties.
Figure 25: Political participation and apathy in Egypt
16
17
9
84
82
90
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Voluntary/ charitable organization
Family-based association
Religious association
Yes No Declined to answer
Members 12
Non-members, intend to join soon
4
Non-members whose views are
represented by an existing group
21
Non-members whose views are
not represented by an existing group
52DK /Declined to
answer 11
19
Level of political apathy in the Arab world over time. “Do you intend on participating in upcoming legislative
elections?”
● When it comes to following political news, we find that countries which have high rates of political apathy and no room for criticism are the ones that follow political news the least (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Alternatively, in countries with more open political systems, people are more concerned with following political news.
Figure 26: “Do you follow the news on the internet or social media belonging to satellite channels?”
● While 68% of respondents reported using the internet, to varying extents, fully 31% indicated that
they never use the internet. The results from the 2017-2018 poll show a continuing, statistically significant increase in internet penetration in the Arab region. The vast majority of Arabs who use the internet also have accounts on Facebook, at 82%, while 26% have accounts on Twitter. The relative popularity of various social media can be seen in the chart below.
41
52 52
3333 30
59
48 48
6767
70
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 /2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 /2018
EgyptConcerned with politics
Unconcerned with politics
77 73
6157 52 53
17 1222
30 45 44
6
1517
12
3
30
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 /2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 /2018
EgyptYes NO DK /Declined to answer
75
50
40
36
33
32
31
30
27
26
23
37
24
49
56
62
66
67
68
69
73
74
76
62
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Kuwait
Palestine
Iraq
Sudan
Mauritania
Lebanon
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Saudi
Egypt
Aggregate
Yes NO DK /Declined to answer
20
● The most used language while browsing the internet was predictably Arabic, with English being the second most used.
Figure 27: Comparison of news sources.
Figure 28: Frequency of internet use: internet penetration has increased considerably during the life of the Arab Opinion Index.
Figure 29: Social media users: frequency of various social media channels.
88
70
70
65
61
57
53
46
45
39
36
57
9
1
2
10
8
13
25
18
2
1
8
1
0
2
2
2
9
2
9
4
15
5
6
11
22
25
24
32
20
10
16
32
47
22
1
1
2
1
1
7
2
5
2
5
3
6
4
2
1
4
11
10
18
1
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Lebanon
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Tunisia
Palestine
Morocco
Mauritania
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Aggregate
Satellite T.V Radio
Daily newspapers (print and online) Online news sources
Friends and family /Word od mouth Refused to answer
56
47
36
26
18
5
6
14
12
11
2
3
5
5
5
5
5
6
7
8
31
37
38
48
55
1
2
2
2
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Daily or semi-daily Several times a week Several times a month
Infrequently I do not use the internet Dk/Declined to answer
21
Figure 30: The languages most used in browsing the internet
The most used language The second most used
language Arabic 83 14
French 9 15
English 7 43
Kurdish 1 0
Other 0 1
Refused to answer 0 --
No second languages -- 28
100 100 المجموع
Section 5: Religion and Religiosity in Public Sphere and Political Life
● Based on self-reporting, a majority of the Arab public is “Religious to some extent” (65%). This compares with 11% of the Arab public who define themselves as “Not religious,” and 21% as “Very religious.”
Figure 31: Self-identified religiosity.
82
39
27
26
11
17
60
73
73
88
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Snap chat
Telegram
Yes No Declined to answer
22
● When asked to define the attributes which define religiosity, most respondents provided answers that focused on an individual's morality and values rather than the observance of religious practices (38%). This value has not changed significantly since 2011.
Figure 32: Most cited factors defining an individual as religious: changes over time.
● While most Arabs describe themselves as religious, the majority of respondents nonetheless oppose edicts which pass negative judgement against members of other faiths, or which declare followers of differing interpretations of Islam to be apostates. Most respondents, while religious, refuse to accept that non-religious people are by definition bad people. Finally, most respondents
21
20
24
24
21
19
65
65
63
64
67
66
12
12
9
8
8
11
2
3
4
4
4
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Very religious Religious to some extent
Not religious /A non-believer Dk/Declined to answer
38
38
39
41
38
27
28
29
30
29
19
19
19
17
19
5
6
6
4
5
7
6
6
4
5
2
10
2
2
2
3
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
Carrying out religious obligations/rituals Being honest and trustworthy
Treating others kindly Staying close to relatives and treating them well
Help the poor and needy All of these
Other traits Dk/Declined to answer
23
do not discriminate on the basis of religiosity, between religious and non-religious individuals, when conducting their social, political and economic/business interactions. The issue has become more polarized, however, since the percentage of people who profess no preference decreased from 70% to 61%.
● Most Arabs oppose the involvement of clerics in voter choice or in governmental policy. Similarly, a majority of Arabs are opposed to the employment of religion either by governments in order to win support for their policies, or by electoral candidates to win votes.
● Arab public opinion is split almost in half in their attitudes towards the general “separation of religion from the state,” although only a simple majority (around 52%) supports the principle of separation of religion from political life. This means Arab publics do not want a fully secular system, and do agree there is space for religion in political life.
Figure 33: "No religious authority is entitled to declare followers of other religions to be infidels."
Figure 34: "In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal with religious individuals?"
47
45
34
29
28
22
21
17
16
13
8
25
28
49
39
42
45
39
57
26
47
34
66
43
11
3
15
18
17
16
15
23
24
30
22
18
10
1
8
6
8
5
3
11
6
13
3
7
3
2
4
5
1
18
4
23
8
10
1
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Tunisia
Egypt
Lebanon
Iraq
Jordan
Morocco
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Mauritania
Kuwait
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
24
31
35
35
38
35
26
7
9
9
8
7
61
54
55
52
56
70
1
2
2
2
2
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
I prefer to deal with religious individuals I prefer to deal with non-religious individuals
I have no preference Dk/Declined to answer
25
Figure 35: "The government has no right to use religion to win support for its policies."
Figure 36: "It would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics."
28
29
33
33
29
44
45
44
40
41
16
16
15
14
16
5
6
5
5
4
7
4
4
8
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
21
23
22
24
19
26
31
30
30
27
27
17
25
25
27
25
27
16
16
16
16
15
14
26
7
6
5
9
13
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
26
Section 6: Arab Public Opinion and Intra-Arab Relations
● A total of 77% of the respondents to the 2016 Arab Opinion Index supported the sentiment that the various Arab peoples formed a single nation, in contrast to only 19% who agreed with the statement that “the Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous bonds.”
Figure 37: Respondents generally agree that the various Arab peoples constitute a single nation.
● Arab public attitudes towards the foreign policies of regional and global powers towards the Arab
region are broadly negative. Around 79% of respondents held negative views of US foreign policy towards the Arab countries; 64% had negative views of Iran’s Arab policies; and 55% expressed negative views of Russia’s policy towards the Arab states. During 2017-2018, Arab public attitudes towards US foreign policy recorded their most negative levels.
35
40
37
39
44
35
42
37
42
42
35
36
19
19
18
14
14
17
4
4
3
5
7
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, separated by artificial borders
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if each people has its own specificities
The Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous links
Dk /Declined to answer
27
Figure 38: Foreign policy assessments.
● When asked to look at specific US foreign policy areas, vast majorities of Arabs had negative views
of US policy towards Palestine (87%, up from 79% last year); Syria (81%) and Iraq (82%).
Figure 39: Assessment of US foreign policy.
● When asked to look at specific Russian foreign policy areas, approximately half of Arab respondents have negative views of Russian policy towards Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
30
18
11
7
7
3
24
26
25
19
14
9
12
12
17
18
16
13
19
20
28
37
48
66
15
24
19
19
15
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Turkish foreign policy
Chinese foreign policy
French foreign policy
Russian foreign policy
Iranian foreign policy
US foreign policy
Positive Positive, to some extentNegative, to some extent NegativeDk /Declined to answer
1
2
2
2
2
5
6
7
7
7
23
26
25
29
26
64
55
57
51
47
7
11
9
11
18
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
US policy towards Palestine
US policy towards Syria
US policy towards Iraq
US policy towards Yemen
US policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
28
Figure 40: Assessment of Russian foreign policy.
● When asked to look at specific Iranian foreign policy areas, over half of Arabs have negative views
of Iranian policy towards Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
Figure 41: Assessment of Iranian foreign policy.
● When asked to look at specific French foreign policy areas, strong majorities (between 57% and
59%) of Arabs have negative views of French policy towards Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
4
7
4
4
3
22
20
19
23
16
32
25
29
29
28
24
31
28
26
21
18
17
20
18
32
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Russian policy towards Palestine
Russian policy towards Syria
Russian policy towards Iraq
Russian policy towards Yemen
Russian policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
7
7
6
8
3
22
18
16
19
11
27
25
25
26
27
29
35
37
34
26
15
15
16
13
33
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Iranian policy towards Palestine
Iranian policy towards Syria
Iranian policy towards Iraq
Iranian policy towards Yemen
Iranian policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive
29
Figure 42: Assessment of French foreign policy.
● In contrast, the Arab public is roughly equally split in its perceptions of Turkish foreign policy in
Syria and Iraq: roughly 43% view Turkey’s Syria positively, compared to another 42% who view it negatively. In Iraq, the comparable figures are 41% (positive views) and 41% (negative views). Meanwhile, 53% of the Arab public had positive views of Turkey’s policies towards Palestine, compared to 34% who had negative views of Ankara’s policies.
Figure 43: Assessment of Turkish foreign policy.
4
5
4
5
4
28
25
24
23
24
30
29
28
29
24
19
21
21
23
19
19
20
23
20
29
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
French policy towards Palestine
French policy towards Syria
French policy towards Iraq
French policy towards Yemen
French policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
18
11
9
7
10
35
32
32
28
30
21
24
23
28
17
13
18
18
21
12
13
15
18
16
31
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Turkish policy towards Palestine
Turkish policy towards Syria
Turkish policy towards Iraq
Turkish policy towards Yemen
Turkish policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
30
● Fully 90% of Arabs believe that Israel poses a threat to the security and stability of the region.
Figure 44: Assessment of foreign threats.
● Over three quarters of the Arab public agree that the Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs, and
not the Palestinians alone. Most Arabs also disapprove of the various peace treaties signed between a number of Arab states and Israel: this applies to respondents’ views of the Oslo Agreements (Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization), the Camp David Accords (Israel and Egypt) and the Wadi Araba Agreement (Israel and Jordan).
82
70
47
34
22
15
13
8
14
19
23
23
19
15
2
5
12
18
25
23
26
2
3
9
9
13
30
25
6
8
13
16
17
13
21
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Israel
USA
Iran
Russia
France
Turkey
China
Certainly Yes, to an extent No, to an extent
Certainly Not Dk /Declined to answer
31
Figure 45: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country.
An overwhelming majority (87%) of Arabs would disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 8% accepting formal diplomatic recognition. In fact, one half of those who accepted recognition of Israel by their governments made such recognition conditional on the formation of an independent Palestinian state. When asked to elaborate on the reasons for their positions, respondents who were opposed to diplomatic ties between their countries and Israel focused on a number of factors, such as Israeli racism towards the Palestinians and its colonialist, expansionist policies.
90
89
85
80
80
77
75
72
72
67
64
77
9
10
14
7
13
10
13
23
17
21
26
15
1
1
1
1
4
9
9
4
6
7
9
5
1
11
3
5
3
2
5
5
1
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Jordan
Tunisia
Egypt
Saudi
Lebanon
Mauritania
Morocco
Kuwait
Sudan
Iraq
Palestine
Aggregate
The Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs and not the Palestinian people alone
The Palestinian cause concerns the Palestinians solely
Neither of the above two statements
Dk /Declined to answer
32
Figure 46: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country?
Respondents who opposed diplomatic recognition of Israel justified their positions with a number
reasons, first and foremost of which related to Israel’s colonialist nature, racist and expansionist
policies, and persistence of appropriating Palestinian land. Their reasoning had much less to do
with cultural or religious explanations.
Table 2: Reasons for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel over time
2017 /2018 2016 2015 2014
Because it is a settler colonialist state and occupies
Palestine 31.7 27.0 24.5 23.4
Because it is an expansionist state that wants to
dominate or occupy other Arab countries 10.1 13.0 13.0 2.4
Because it is a terrorist state and supports terrorism 7.4 7.6 10.4 1.2
Because it is an entity that deals with Arabs in a
hateful and racist way 6.3 8.2 10.3 12.2
Because the state arose by ethnically cleansing
Palestinians and continues to persecute them 8.3 8.1 6.9 5.5
Because it opposes Palestinian rights and continues
to legitimize what it did to the Palestinian people 5.3 5.8 5.6 7.5
Because it is an enemy to our country specifically
and to the Arab people more generally 3.4 3.3 4.7 11.5
Because it threatens the stability and security of the
region 3.4 3.2 3.4 2.5
Oppose for religious reasons 6.6 5.2 3.3 4.9
I do not respect the peace agreements 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.3
I do not agree with the existence of the state of Israel 1.1 0.4 0.3 --
Other 0 0.2 0.0 3.4
Don’t know/Refuse to respond 6.8 6.4 6.4 18.4
8
9
9
6
6
9
87
86
85
87
87
84
5
5
6
7
6
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
33
Those who accept diplomatic recognition of Israel 7.9 9.5 8.9 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Section 7: Arab Public Opinion towards ISIL
● Almost all respondents (98%) indicated that they were aware of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL, also known as the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” and “the Islamic State”). ● An overwhelming majority of 92% of the Arab public does has a negative view of ISIL, with 2%
expressing a “positive” view, and 3% “positive to some extent”. ● Crucially, favorable views of ISIL were not correlated with religion: respondents who identified
themselves as “Not religious” were just as likely to have favorable views of ISIL as those who identified as “Very religious”. Similarly, no relationship could be shown between respondents’ opinions of ISIL and their views on the role of religion in the public sphere. In other words, public attitudes towards ISIL are defined by present-day political considerations and not motivated by religion.
Table 3: Views of ISIL in combination with religiosity.
Would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics
Agree Disagree
Positive/varying extents 5 4
Negative/varying extents 95 96
Total 100 100
To keep up with modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest
Agree Disagree
Positive/varying extents 6 3
Negative/varying extents 94 97
Total 100 100
Figure 47: General view of ISIL
34
● To explore Arab public opinion about factors contributing to the emergence of ISIL, the Arab Index included a number of new questions. When asked to explain the reasons behind ISIL’s popularity among its support base, 13% of respondents stated that this was due to its “military accomplishments”. This was followed by 16% who attributed ISIL’s popularity amongst its supporters to its claimed adherence to Islamic principles; 11% to the group’s willingness to confront the West; and 10% to the group’s ability to defend the Sunni Muslim community. Ultimately, a majority of Arabs credit ISIL’s military accomplishments and its stances on current political issues as the source of its authority and popularity.
● When asked to explain which factors would drive citizens of Arab countries to join ISIL, a number of varying reasons were given. These were rooted in the government policies and political instability of their home countries (42%) and economic difficulties (24%), while 6% explained the enlistment of Arabs into ISIL on social grounds, such as inequality, marginalization and social exclusion. A further 18% credited “brainwashing” and “propaganda” as the reasons for Arabs to join ISIL, while a final 6% described the chance to fight foreign powers and/or sectarian militia in Syria and Iraq as the motive for young Arabs to fight ISIL.
2
2
3
4
3
3
4
7
0
0
7
9
9
13
85
80
80
72
3
5
1
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
Very positive Positive, to some extentNeutral Negative, to some extentVery Negative Dk/declined to answer
35
Table 4: ISIL recruitment.
Explanations for ISIL recruitment Tunisia Jordan Palestine Lebanon Egypt Morocco Iraq Kuwait Sudan Mauritania aggregate
Domestic Reasons
Economic: unemployment, poverty
40 35 27 26 24 19 18 18 18 11 24
Domestic political concerns
2 4 18 15 24 6 10 16 14 9 12
Social reasons: inequality, marginalization
2 5 7 11 6 8 5 4 10 7 6
Domestic Reasons 43 44 51 52 54 33 33 38 42 27 42
Personal Reasons
Extremist individuals 2 3 2 5 8 12 8 7 10 6 6
Sense of adventure 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1
Personal Reasons 3 4 2 5 8 15 10 7 10 8 7
To Combat External Threats
To fight foreign powers 0 2 4 6 3 5 4 5 12 4 5
To fight local sectarian militia in those countries
2 0 1 3 1 4 2 2 3 1 2
External Threats 2 2 5 9 4 9 7 7 14 5 6
Propaganda reasons 17 25 19 15 13 19 23 14 23 9 18
Religious reasons 17 17 18 14 17 13 25 19 7 18 16
Others 3 2 0 1 1 0 1
Don’t know/declined to answer 16 6 4 6 5 10 1 15 4 33 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
● When asked if the existence of ISIL was either the result of internal factors endemic to the region or the result of foreign activity, only 29% of respondents expressed the view that the group’s existence resulted from the internal conflicts extant in the Middle East, compared to 59% who attributed ISIL’s existence to the policies of foreign powers. When presented with another two statements regarding the origins of ISIL, 42% of respondents were prepared to attribute the rise of ISIL to the extremism inherent in Middle Eastern societies while 38% attributed the rise of ISIL to the policies of Arab regimes.
Figure 49: Respondents asked to select which statement on the nature of ISIL best represents their views.
29
29
38
20
59
58
50
69
2
3
3
7
9
10
8
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
ISIL is the product of conflicts and forces within the regionISIL is the product of foreign interventionNeither of the above two statement Dk/declined to answer
36
Figure 50: Respondents asked to select which statement on the nature of ISIL best represents their views.
● The Arab public offers a diverse set of remedies when asked to suggest the best means by which to combat ISIL, when given the chance to define their first and second preferences for the means to tackle ISIL in particular, and also terrorist groups more broadly: direct military action was the most widely selected first choice, with 18% of respondents; ending foreign intervention in Arab countries was selected as the first choice by 17% of respondents; and 13% proposed resolving the Palestinian cause.
Figure 51: Proposed remedies to ISIL/terrorism more broadly, first choice made by respondents.
38
43
48
42
35
35
9
11
7
11
12
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2017 /2018
2016
2015
ISIL is thereligious extremism and fanaticism of the Middle East
ISIL is the product of policies of Arab regimes
Neither of the above two statement
Dk/declined to answer
18
17
13
12
9
7
7
4
3
1
1
8
0 10 20 30
Intensifying military efforts against terrorist groups
Ending foreign intervention in the region
Resolving the Palestinian cause
Supporting democratic transition in the Middle East
Solving economic issues (unemployment, poverty)
Purging extremist interpretations of Islam
Finding a resolution to the Syrian crisis which meets the aspirations ofthe Syrian people
Ending sectarian policies in the relevant countries
Spreading a culture of tolerance
Findings a resolution to the Libyan crisis which meets the aspirations ofthe Libyan people
Others
Don’t know/declined to answer