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The Technical Cooperation Program

Australia - Canada - New Zealand - United Kingdom - United States of America

TTCP TECHNICAL REPORT

Analysis Support to Strategic Planning

June 2013

TR – JSA – 2 – 2013

Dr Ben Taylor

This document contains Information authorized under the auspices of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) for unlimited release and distribution.

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CONTENTS

1 Introduction 3 2 Background 5

2.1 The TTCP Guide ....................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Subsequent Developments...................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Institutionalization of Capability Based Planning in 2011.................................................. 6

3 Principles of the Capability Based Approach 8 3.1 Capability .................................................................................................................................. 8 3.2 Capability Based Planning (CBP)........................................................................................... 9 3.3 Applicability of the CBP Approach ....................................................................................... 9

4 Components of the Capability Based Approach 14 4.1 Design principles .................................................................................................................... 14 4.2 Main components of a CBP system...................................................................................... 14 4.3 First steps in Implementation ............................................................................................... 30 4.4 Bounding the CBP problem .................................................................................................. 31

5 Organization and Governance of Strategic Planning Analysis 36 5.1 Decision Maker Engagement ................................................................................................ 36 5.2 Inward Looking and Outward Looking Analysts ............................................................. 36 5.3 Focus of strategic planning analysis .................................................................................... 37 5.4 Process Ownership................................................................................................................. 37 5.5 Process Leadership................................................................................................................. 38 5.6 Corporate Memory................................................................................................................. 38 5.7 Exploitation of analysis.......................................................................................................... 39 5.8 Analysts analyze and decision makers decide ................................................................... 39

6 Success Stories 41 6.1 The Warm Base ....................................................................................................................... 41 6.2 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)............................................................................. 43 6.3 United Kingdom Capability Audit ...................................................................................... 43 6.4 StratBOI.................................................................................................................................... 45 6.5 UK Force Development: ADC/F2S2..................................................................................... 47 6.6 Canadian Tools: CATCAM/SC2RAT/Concurrency........................................................... 49 6.7 Strategic Cost Models ............................................................................................................ 50 6.8 Australian Success stories ..................................................................................................... 52

7 Summary and Conclusions 57 8 Acknowledgements 59 9 References 60

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1 Introduction

Operations Research (OR) and Operations Analysis (OA)1 have long beenapplied to the higher level of strategic defence planning. For the purposes of thispaper, strategic planning is taken to be the interpretation and application ofpolicy and conception and programming of investments to create a futuredefence force structure better suited to national needs. This definition isdeliberately loose, and in subsequent Sections the boundaries for this kind ofanalysis will be discussed.

Environmental ambiguity, increasing interdependency and constrainedresources will continue to make strategic planning both an imperative and achallenge, and analytical support welcome. While the label capability basedplanning2, or CBP, may or may not be used in strategic planning in any givennation, this approach is being used by many countries to support planning, andthe concept of capability is widely accepted. The title Analysis Support to StrategicPlanning is used for this paper to avoid appearing to prescribe a specific method,rather a more general conceptual approach is described – one that can beadapted for many types of analyses across all TTCP nations. Nevertheless theconcept of capability is seen as important, and the paper argues that there ismuch to be gained by taking a capability based approach to conducting analysisin support of strategic planning. This approach aligns well with the trend [1] inboth public and private sectors to move from an input centric view of the worldto an output centric one. In defence terms this means moving from considering adefence force as being the sum of its people and assets to considering the set ofdesirable effects it can achieve for its nation i.e., from assets which can becounted to impacts which can be generated.

This paper will outline the underlying principles of the capability basedapproach as currently practised within TTCP nations which can be extended toproviding analytical support to strategic planning, the key design features to

1 OR and OA have specific and different meanings in some countries. Here they are taken to besynonymous, along with the more general term “analysis”.

2 The term “Capabilities Based Planning” is more widely used in the USA.

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consider when implementing such an approach, and illustrations of somehighlights of successes from across the TTCP nations.

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2 Background

2.1 The TTCP Guide

In 2004, TTCP published a Guide to Capability Based Planning (CBP) [2]. Thisdocument captured the perspectives of the participants of a workshop held inCanberra in November 2002. Many of the contributors were participants in theirnational planning processes and they shared experiences and best practices. Thepaper outlined the major components of a capability based planning system andpresented a generic model, but did not provide concrete examples of nationalpractices. The paper has subsequently been criticized for not providing sufficientguidance on how to introduce a CBP approach into national planning and howto integrate it with existing governance and process.

This new paper is intended to address these shortcomings, and to reflect on andcapture ten years of progress in CBP across the TTCP nations.

2.2 Subsequent Developments

The TTCP Guide has had an impact extending beyond the TTCP scientificresearch communities. The Guide was provided as a read ahead to a US MilitaryOperations Research Society (MORS) workshop on Capabilities Based Planningin 2004 [3]. The plenary briefing of the TTCP work given at the workshopindicated that the American, Australian, British and Canadian acquisition and/orforce planning processes aligned to the generic model in the paper. Thefollowing year the paper was also provided as an input to a NATO Research andTechnology Organization (RTO) [4] conference.

At a second MORS hosted CBP workshop in 2006 [5], refinement and extensionof the work was presented showing how the CBP process aligned with capabilityengineering3; the former providing a view across the entire portfolio ofcapabilities while the latter provides options for implementing capabilities ofinterest [12].

3 Capability Engineering has largely been defined by research efforts linked through TechnicalPanel 4 of the TTCP JSA Group.

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Subsequent NATO [6 8] and TTCP [9] events have afforded NATO members andthe TTCP nations additional visibility into the CBP approach and insight intonational implementation models. A TTCP workshop was held in Ottawa in 2011,which included representatives of NATO Allied Command Transformation(ACT) and guest speakers from outside of TTCP government service. This lastworkshop provided the point of departure for this paper by bringing together anumber of participants with widely diverging views and experiences of CBP.

Since the original 2002 workshop, each of the TTCP nations has undergone oneor more reviews of its defence strategy and structure, and all have taken acapability based approach in doing so, even if the term has not been used. Itwould be disingenuous to claim that the capability based approach has founduniversal acceptance or that, in practice, the implementations have matchedpromises and achieved all that they sought to do. Subsequent sections of thispaper will look at selected success stories and best practices to provide insightsto those developing new or improved approaches.

It should not be considered that the TTCP and NATO working groups have amonopoly in development work in this discipline. De Spiegeleire [10] haspresented a broader overview of the development of the capability basedapproach and has identified developing trends that the current paper reflects.Indeed the body of knowledge captured in this paper constitutes the basis of DeSpiegeleire’s TTCP school of CBP. Other related approaches have developedelsewhere, notably in France, but are beyond the scope of this paper.

2.3 Institutionalization of Capability Based Planning in 2011

Looking across the TTCP (and NATO) defence institutions it is clear that thereare many different organizational and governance models for national defenceplanning. In some nations there is a single office or authority with a mandate todetermine the future size and shape of the defence force; in other cases suchresponsibility is shared. Likewise, in some cases the planning process isconducted under civilian leadership, while in others it is overseen by themilitary. A comprehensive discussion of military civilian management ofdefence in modern western democracies is beyond the scope of this paper; itshould suffice to recognize the importance history and culture play. Thegovernance arrangements considered healthy and non controversial in somenations are considered anathema in others. What is significant to note is that inall countries there is some level of leadership within each defence enterprise

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responsible for defence force planning and that there is some form ofrelationship between those decision makers and supporting analysts. In somenations the relationship is a seamless one with analysts constituting part ofcentral staff organizations; in other cases the analysts are part of a distinctorganization but nevertheless have an understood role in the planning process.This suggests that there cannot be a one size fits all model defining therelationships between analysts and decision makers; it will be very nationspecific. In rare cases the relationships are unclear, and the role of analystswithin the process is not necessarily agreed by all parties. This is unhealthy andcan contribute to inefficiencies and wasted expertise and effort.

For analysis to become institutionalized, the process needs to be stable,understood and repeatable, with evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.When the advice sought and the mechanisms by which it is produced andpresented change with each execution of the process, then the process is far frominstitutionalized. There are other signs of institutionalization such as, forexample, when each succeeding cycle of officers responsible for the analysisseeks to improve it rather than to redesign it, or where senior leaders lookforward to engaging with the latest analytical products rather than beingpredisposed to challenge the analysis. Institutionalization is a precursor tocapturing and leveraging corporate memory and becoming a learningorganization [11].

Some nations have achieved this stability while others have not.

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3 Principles of the Capability Based Approach

3.1 Capability

Each nation has one or more definitions of capability, most of which can bereduced to a common concept. To have a capability is to have the ability to dosomething. This implies integrating resources and methods for theirorganization and employment – inputs to capability – to generate a desired endresult or effect. This is illustrated in Figure 1 [10]. Furthermore, capability iscontext specific, and the assessment of capability is thus different to assessmentof performance, which is absolute and context independent.

Figure 1: The nature of capability

This concept of a capability is scalable. The ability to deliver a small tacticaleffect against a single enemy combatant is a capability just as much as the ability

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to employ all the levers of national power to defeat a hostile state ortransnational organization.

3.2 Capability Based Planning (CBP)

CBP involves interpreting policy and defining the capabilities that you wish to beable to demonstrate and employ in the future, and then working back to find thechanges that have to be put in place to get there. The focus is on managingoutputs within policy and economic constraints. This has a profound impact onthe decisions that need to be taken and the kinds of analysis required.

The separation of requirements and solutions provides a means to encourageplanners to consider alternative solutions. Instead of “our frigates are gettingold, how many new ones should we get and with what technologies on board?”we ask “what is our future sea control capability requirement and how best canwe meet it after the frigates are retired?” This is a fundamental change inthinking and opens up planning to far more choice and potentially more efficientuses of declining resources.

One of the greatest hurdles to CBP implementation is the battle for the meaningof capability. Instances have been observed in all of the TTCP nations wherestaffs have used phrases like “future fighter capability” or “next generationfrigate capability”. Whether such phrases are used by accident or by design isirrelevant; the end result is equipment based planning and not capability basedplanning.

3.3 Applicability of the CBP Approach

The CBP approach start with what you want to achieve and work back to whatyou need – is a deceptively simple one. Deciding how and where to apply it, andthe boundaries around any implementation are major challenges. Some of theseissues are discussed below.

3.3.1 Systematic or Case by Case?

As noted above, CBP is scalable. Authors have described how the CBP approachcan be applied to single capability areas on a case by case basis [14] or to allcapabilities at the same time [2]. Various “fleet mix” studies looking at a specificarea, such as air defence or anti submarine warfare (ASW), are in effectcapability studies. In such cases effectiveness measures are established for the

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fleet and bounded options explored. Such studies are common and have beenundertaken in different forms across most nations for many years. The capabilitybased approach to planning discussed in this paper could be used to shape thedesign of such studies and a series of such studies could be undertaken fromtime to time to provide advice on how each of the capability areas could bedelivered in the future. If nothing else, employing a common scheme fordefining inputs for “fleet mix” studies would facilitate aggregating inputdemands.

The problem with a case by case approach is that there are always boundaryissues and dependencies to consider. Of necessity there will be assumptionsabout related capabilities and resource allocation. For example, an ASW fleetmix study is going to need to make assumptions about the budget available forASW programmes, the air force and navy force generation systems, the demandson ASW assets in other capability partitions, and the level of capability incommand and control, intelligence, anti surface and anti air warfare and logisticsupport in the maritime environment. Hence there may be a better balance ofresources which could be achieved within the maritime domain, and even acrossthe entire joint force, that cannot be uncovered and/or explored by decomposingchallenges, bounding the scopes of studies, and making assumptions. Synthesisis often as important as analysis.

Some form of all encompassing evaluation covering all capabilities is thusprobably necessary to ensure that trade offs are visible and senior leadership arecomfortable with the priorities and levels of resources assigned to differentcapability areas. It is probably a procedural necessity as well, as most nationshave some form of episodic programme and/or funding review4, and suchreviews are likely to require data on all capabilities generated to commonassumptions, something that only a single over arching analysis can generate.

In practice, a mixed approach is generally adopted and advised. A single studythat is both broad in scope and very detailed is likely to fail throughinsurmountable complexity. It is better to have a single broad, but relativelyshallow, study executed periodically to steer the development of the force at the

4 E.g., Canadian Investment Plan review, UK Strategic Defence and Security Review and USQuadrennial Defence Review

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macro level while specific capability areas are investigated in appropriate detailas required to support decisions. The advantages of developing anddisseminating an overarching analytical game plan are obvious.

3.3.2 Systemic or Marginal Planning?

Many national applications of CBP provide for a stage to identify where there arecapability gaps. Often these are “bottom up”; for example, derived from alessons learned process or narrow focus studies. The gaps can then be used tojustify detailed examination and new investment to address these capabilitydeficiencies. Such implementations are essentially exercises in finding the mostdeserving case for unallocated funding.

Organizations typically do not examine in detail instances where overcapacityexists, or where low priority capabilities are being maintained. Such occasionsprovide the opportunity to invest against gaps by freeing up resources withoutjeopardizing policy. However, organizations are often reluctant to identifywhere there might be over capability, even if there is clear evidence that theresources could be better employed elsewhere for several reasons; some justified,some not. As mentioned, capabilities are often not discrete, and an apparentover capacity may not be realisable as savings as the same resources may also beallocated to another capability where no affluence exists. More commonly,organizations are reluctant to offer “savings” as these may be applied elsewhere,outside their own programmes or sphere of influence.

Both of the above approaches could be considered illustrations of marginalplanning. The plan is assumed to be essentially correct and analysis focused onadjustment opportunities. An alternative would be to undertake a morecomprehensive, systemic analysis and planning exercise where the future forcein its entirety is considered ‘on the table’ and a review undertaken to considerbetter force structures. Such exercises often accompany periodic defence policyreviews5. They indicate the potential of what could be achieved over the longerterm and can illustrate how far short of the potential force the current plan willfall. Clearly, scrapping large parts of the force structure and rebuilding will have

5 Such as the US Quadrennial Defence Reviews or UK Strategic Defence and Security Review

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costs and risks associated with it but the alternative – keeping everything thathas previously being approved – may contribute to missing opportunities.

An emergent mature practice involves a hybrid approach where certain parts ofthe force structure are ring fenced and ‘off the table’ while the remaining parts ofthe current force are ‘on the table’ along with new investment options to meetidentified capability deficiencies. Senior leaders are given the opportunity tomake as little or as much change to the as is force as they wish, but have theevidence upon which to make those decisions.

3.3.3 Portfolio or Projects

A CBP system could be implemented just looking at capital investment inmilitary equipment. It would be assumed that personnel, organizations, logisticsand infrastructure would be aligned with the new fleets of platforms before theywere brought into service. This approach is deeply flawed as it subverts thecapability paradigm (that we focus on what is achieved and not on theequipment in order to let us introduce innovative solutions to militaryproblems). Since limiting CBP to capital equipment is discredited in most, if notall countries, an approach is taken by which the costs and personnel implicationsof everything associated with a capability are all considered. Projects6 across allof the inputs to capability are identified and tracked so the costs and risksassociated with capabilities can be known and managed7. Defence managersneed to provide effective management of the whole programme associated witha capability; otherwise inputs may be misaligned leading to inefficiencies (e.g.,taking delivery of platforms for which no training system exists).

6 Project and Programme have specific and different meanings across nations. For the purposes ofthis paper a project is an investment in one or more capability inputs that will contribute to acapability. Programme is a grouping of multiple projects that will deliver the means to deliverone or more capabilities.

7 The costing of capability remains a challenging problem. Projects tend to deliver tangibleplatforms or systems which in turn can contribute to multiple capabilities (such as a warship thatcontributes to anti air warfare, anti surface warfare and anti submarine warfare). Apportioningthe cost of a platform across multiple capabilities is going to be somewhat arbitrary. So, whileforce elements and platforms can be costed with some accuracy, many capabilities can not.

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A further development would be to manage a portfolio of capabilities through anoverarching programme. The difference here is that rather than managingcapabilities independently, a group is managed together. This can delivereconomies by taking common or shared approaches and also tacitly manageoverlaps and redundancies between different elements of the force. For example,a naval portfolio comprising multiple ship types and their supportinginfrastructure can deliver a range of anti air, anti surface, anti submarine andcommand and control capabilities in different ways than if niche ship types wereused for each capability. Decisions as to the direction of the portfolio as a wholewould be taken against a richer context than decisions on individual capabilities.Managing through a relatively small number of large integrated portfolios ispreferable to managing through a much larger number of separate capabilityprogrammes. Finding the right balance is a challenge for each nation.

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4 Components of the Capability Based Approach

4.1 Design principles

Having introduced the broad concepts of a CBP system it is now necessary toconsider the components of such a system in a little more detail.

There are many components to a CBP system; a number of them are described inthe following sections. Each instantiation of a CBP system will have its owndesign choices made. The key things to consider are whether the system willdeliver the required kind of advice and whether the components fit togetherwell.

The first issue is one of tailoring the analysis to the needs of the decision makerand avoid offering answers to the wrong kind of question. For example, ifdecision makers are only seeking to make decisions about capital projects (whichis not a recommended approach), then all options offered to them will need tolook like capital projects. If leaders wish to use the CBP approach to consider allforms of defence expenditure, then the capability set is going to need to includenon operational institutional elements and capability options that are quitedisparate in nature. Similarly if the leaders are seeking to take an “everything onthe table” review of the future force, then the analysts should not be excludingoptions to cut back from extant capability areas.

The second issue is about designing the level of detail in each step of theanalytical process. Each step should be designed taking into consideration thesources of information it will have access to and the subsequent steps it willsupport. If unnecessary levels of detail are collected, then time and effort arebeing wasted, but on the other hand once data are aggregated in some way, thereis no good way to put extra detail back in. The available data sources, the levelof detail associated with existing tools to be used, and the level of detail requiredby the decision makers, will determine the level of detail needed at each stage ofthe process.

4.2 Main components of a CBP system

The previous section indicated that the component pieces of a CBP system mustwork together to deliver the required kinds of advice. This section looks at themain components and discusses each in turn.

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4.2.1 Analysis Process

Strategic analysis is both complicated and complex, i.e., there are many movingparts and dependencies. Additionally it is sensitive to starting conditions andassumptions and must cater to an evolving environment. Due to the nature ofthe problem and the analytical rigour needed, an incremental process whichdevelops a number of provisional products along the way offers the mostpractical approach. The generic steps of the CBP process are depicted in Figure2, and the provisional products shown represent the outputs of the steps in theprocess. Often initial policy assumptions may not be complete and/or explicit. Aphased approach provides the opportunity for periodic review and ratification.

Strategic analysis starts with review and interpretation of the overarchingguidance, identifies capability gaps and affluences, explores options and endswith an affordable capability development plan.

Figure 2 is an updated version of the key figure published in [2] following theJSA TP 3 workshop in 2002. A subsequent workshop held in 2011 concludedthat the model remained valid and still accurately characterized what eachnational process sought to do. Even though different names may be employedand in practice may not even be acknowledged as a single continuous process, itwas agreed that national instantiations follow all of these stages, albeit withvariations in the level of detail and scope of each stage. That is to say that thegeneric process is tailored to suit national requirements. For example, thebalance of investment stage could focus around comparing a maritime basedstrategy, a land based strategy or a balanced strategy or it could involve acomplex optimization exercise covering many hundreds of competing initiativesseeking a cost effective and affordable future force structure robust enough tocater to a range of financial and policy variables.

While Figure 2 represents the agreed model, it should be recognised that this isjust a generic template. Specific instances will vary and add subtlety to theprocess. For example, if a nation is undertaking very thorough analysis of futureeconomic, social, political or technological trends then that may influencepriorities directly and shape a number of assumptions about the future operatingenvironment as well as the scenario set.

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Government Guidance

Government Guidance

Future Security Environment

Future Security Environment

Defence PrioritiesDefence Priorities

ScenariosScenarios

Capability Goals

Capability Goals

Operational Concepts

Operational Concepts

Capability AssessmentCapability

Assessment

Identify Capability Mismatches

Identify Capability Mismatches

Force Development Options

Force Development Options

Balance of InvestmentBalance of Investment

Affordable Capability Development Plan

Affordable Capability Development Plan

Resource ConstraintsResource

ConstraintsDefence PrioritiesDefence Priorities

Current and Planned Capability

Current and Planned CapabilityCapability

PartitionsCapability Partitions

Figure 2 Generic Process Chart of Capability-Based Planning

One of the most powerful arguments for systematizing the process is that theplan produced at the end can then be traced and shown to be driven bygovernment guidance. The Government sets out the ends and may providedirection with respect to ways. It either provides, or endorses, certainassumptions, policies and constraints, and this leads to a plan which is thedefence institution’s response to that guidance and details implementationmeans.

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A phased approach allows for activities to be suspended and “mid courseguidance” to be injected. If leadership just want to conduct an inventory andassessment of the future ‘health’ of the defence force then the process can betruncated at the “Capability Assessment” stage. Analysis to this point providesinsight as to what is good (and bad) about the current trajectory for the defenceforce. Decision makers may choose to review policy direction and intervene,introducing further guidance as to the priorities for force development followingwhich the downstream processes may be initiated in order to execute thatguidance.

4.2.2 Capability Partition Scheme

If the capability based approach is to be used solely to support ad hoc studies ofareas requiring attention then an overarching ontological framework is notrequired. Capabilities can be defined as study requirements dictate. This doesmake study synthesis more challenging and defers integration questions.However if, conversely, a systematic approach is to be adopted, then a schemethat decomposes the entire strategic policy domain into defined capabilitypartitions is required. Such a scheme is typically presented in the form of ahierarchical tree. A partition scheme is required because without one there is noway to characterize and categorize the analysis problem and facilitate supportingsubsidiary analyses and, therefore, no way to aggregate insight and providedecision makers with a composite picture e.g., where the force was relativelystrong or weak. Capability partitions also divide the complex problem into moremanageable pieces simplifying the analysis and allowing for the tools and datarequirements to be customized, fitting the task at hand.

An ideal partition scheme would have clear definitions and create unambiguousboundaries between the capabilities so they can be studied in isolation. Thisideal is not achievable in practice as the modern military includes many multirole systems and common enablers. However that is not to say that there are notbetter ways than others of organizing the partition scheme. Vencel, Cook andMatthews [15] have developed a set of heuristics for assessing partition design.However, regardless of any measures of “goodness”, any scheme is going tohave to be communicated and accepted by the organizations using it.

Parts of an illustrative capability partition scheme are included at Figure 3. Thisfigure shows the top level of the framework (Tier 1) and how one of its elementsis broken down to Tiers 2.

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Figure 3: Illustrative capability partition scheme

Tension often exists between the operational view (what gets done) and thefunctional view (who does it) of military operations. This can have significantconsequences. For example, an analysis conducted across three majorenvironmental partitions “effects generated from the air”, “effects generatedfrom the sea” and “effects generated from the land” would tend to reinforce theArmy/Air Force/Navy organizational structure divisions. If, in lieu, a scheme of“effects generated in the air”, “effects generated in the maritime environment”and “effects generated on the land” was adopted this would promote a Joint,pan service view in each environment. In the first case, Army ground based airdefence artillery units would be kept separate from Air Force fighter aircraft; inthe second case they would be considered together as part of the Joint air defencecapability. The former thus reinforces organizational stovepipes while the latterhelps break them down.

One approach to developing a functionally based capability partition scheme isto adapt an existing task list. This approach has some merits in using establishedlanguage, leveraging a previously endorsed and accepted product and providinga link between force planning and force employment/lessons learned. Howeverit presents another set of challenges and it can prove a trap. Tasks at the tacticallevel often presuppose the unit or system that would undertake them.Furthermore task lists will tend to reflect what the current force is expected to beable to do, not what the future force might need to be able to do. Thus task lists

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are very much a product of the current doctrine and force structure and so mayoverly constrain thinking about the future and limit leadership choices,especially if defined at a very low tactical level.

The concept of capability (the ability to do something) is related to that of anactivity (something that is done to achieve an end result). Organizations usingactivity based performance management systems may find that they have a richsource of potential inputs to a capability partition scheme design. This will beespecially true if the partition scheme is required to cover non operationalmilitary capability areas (such as training, maintenance or defence diplomacy),or the predominantly civilian areas of the defence institution. Activity basedmodelling and costing exercises will typically prove very useful in supportingcapability based strategic planning.

Capability partition schemes require support from a strong central authority.While taking input and suggestions from contributing organizations the schememust be internally consistent and logical. Nations that have delegated partitiondesign to functional authorities have often ended up with an unbalanced schemewhich can result in skewed analysis and reporting. Achieving broad buy in fromstakeholders to the partition scheme is none the less essential for a successfulanalysis exercise.

As with all parts of a CBP process it is important to retain a focus on the needs ofthe analysis to be presented to senior decision makers. If they require a highlevel look across the major components of the force in order to give broad forcedevelopment guidance, then a relatively simple scheme without many layers willsuffice. If on the other hand the process is to be used to inform project leveldecisions, then a much more detailed scheme with more layers will be needed.

Partition schemes are an area where the idiom “the excellent is the enemy of thegood enough” is particularly true. While there will always be the occasionalawkward fit and desire to change, it needs to be remembered that the partitionscheme is simply a framework upon which to base a senior leadership discussionand that a stable framework may be more important than a perfect framework.A stable and familiar framework will enable increasingly mature discussionsover time.

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4.2.3 Inputs to Capability

Most nations have a scheme for describing the various inputs to capability;people, equipment, organizations, doctrine, information etc. Most, including thewidely known US DOTMLPF8, use an acronym representing the inputs but theAustralian construct FIC – Fundamental Inputs to Capability – expresses directlywhat it is; the set of resources brought together and integrated to generate acapability. The Australian Capability Development Manual [13] expresses thiswell: “Capability in the defence context is the combined effect of multiple inputs.It is not the sum… but the synergy … that determines the level of capability.”

At the simplest level, if a set of capability inputs is just used as a placeholder foreverything that must be brought together then the exact make up of the set is notimportant. However, if the capability inputs are aligned to functionalauthorities, or other organizations that serve as their ‘champions’ then the setbecomes a powerful construct for ensuring that the right organizations areengaged when assessing capabilities or developing options to change them.Either way, the important idea is that various inputs are combined to generatethe ability to achieve a desired end state. This has one important consequencefor usage; a military platform or unit does not in itself represent a capability. Anaircraft, ship or armoured vehicle can only deliver useful effects and contributeto military ends when united with trained people, placed within a doctrinalframework specifying roles and command and control relationships, providedwith situational awareness and supported with an appropriate logistics system.The use of a formalised set of capability inputs promotes a common languageand understanding allowing stakeholders to align subordinate plans andcoordinate capability generation activities.

4.2.4 Future Operational Context

It has been asserted previously that a capability–based approach is aboutforecasting then “backcasting”; determining what effects need to be created inthe future and then working back to put in place plans to create a force that candeliver them. To do this, some form of future operational context and agreement

8 DOTMLPF: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel, Facilities

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on assumptions is needed, most commonly encapsulated in a set of planningscenarios.

Once again nations differ in their approaches. Some look at a number ofdifferent ways in which the world might evolve9 while others just consider thefuture to be the present projected forwards with subtle changes to availablemilitary technology. In any event, the analysis must consider how the plannedforce will operate in the future and that requires developing hypotheticalmilitary operations that would fit within one or more of the futures beingconsidered. Furthermore some nations plan at just one target time horizon,typically 10 or 20 years into the future, while others look at a number ofintermediate time frames. In many situations a primary target time horizonexists so the extra effort to analyze the intermediate times may not be costeffective.

As well as developing planning assumptions as to the possible trajectories alongwhich the world will evolve, it is necessary to decide how far into the future tolook. There is no point in projecting futures out further than there is a desire toplan. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.2.6.

Scenarios should not be written so as to be prescriptive in terms of the forcerequired. For example stating that specific types of ship or aircraft are presentrather prejudges the issue as to whether they are needed. Scenario descriptionsneed to provide enough detail to capture key shared assumptions and to allowmore detailed analysis to be undertaken without forcing a particular course ofaction. Among the key information required are; a timeline of events before andafter a crisis occurs, assumptions as to the behaviour of allies, any coalition oralliance command arrangements, and local infrastructure available for use.

Scenarios can be closely tied to real world contingency planning. While feasible,and potentially a time saving, this may create security classification problemsand limit the ability to study operations that are not closely tied to today’srealities. Scenarios could also be entirely fictional (e.g., Red Land vs. Blue Landon a fictional continent). The problem with this approach is that such scenariosmay lack credibility in some eyes and there can be challenges in providing low

9 There are numerous approaches used to develop and categorise alternative futures. These arebeyond the scope of the current paper.

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level data, such as geospatial data, to support war gaming and detailed analysis.The preferred approach is to have a set of scenarios that while credible and set inthe real world are allowed to be further from the here and now than currentcontingency plans would allow.

It is clearly advantageous to have one agreed set of scenarios that are endorsedfor use in planning by senior leadership. This helps to establish level of ambitionand provides a level playing field to permit like with like comparisons to bemade. Ideally the set of scenarios will provide sufficient contextual detail tosupport lower level (capability and even project level) analysis. The alternativeis that different capabilities will be assessed under different assumptions andcontexts making it very difficult for leaders to make well informed, coherentdecisions.

In some nations there are mature catalogues of scenarios that are centrallymanaged. In some cases these have endorsed data, assumptions and modellingavailable as the start point for analysis. This is important since decouplingscenario analysis from the strategic planning exercise allows for a body ofscenario analyses to be developed continually over time. This is preferable overdeveloping new scenarios for each strategic planning exercise. Over timescenarios may be dropped from use as they become outdated; but it is preferableto consider as many scenarios as possible to provide robustness to the analysis.Having one dominating scenario risks leading to making decisions based on asample size of one – a risky way to plan. On the other hand, there is no rightnumber to use. Every additional scenario brings some additional perspective,and a more varied and ambitious defence policy will require more scenarios toprovide a thorough test. The time and resources available for analysis ultimatelylimit the number of scenarios that can be considered and hence the benefit ofhaving a standing scenario analysis cell working through scenarios over time. Ascenario characterization approach to show how well the scenario set tests policywill assist in developing plans for scenario sets and their analysis [16] [17].Although the scale and scope of the scenarios sets used differ between nations,the numbers of scenarios being used is typically in the 8 15 range. Fewer wouldfail to capture the range of military challenges and more would be analyticallytoo demanding for the added benefit.

It is important to remember that there are military activities that are required butwhich don’t fall into the pattern of discrete conflicts. Assets are required forstanding defence of the homeland or strategic bases overseas, strategic

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deterrence forces, strategic intelligence gathering, provision of search and rescueand other softer forms of influence such as forward presence and cooperationwith allies. Either a baseline posture scenario is required (i.e., a scenario thatcovers activities outside of any discrete mission) within the analysis, or othermechanisms will be required in force structure analysis to ensure that sufficientcapacity exists to cover these activities and garrisons.

4.2.5 Planning assumptions

A number of overarching planning assumptions are needed to support theanalysis of scenarios and combinations of scenarios. Examples include tourlengths and tour intervals for forces being rotated through scenarios, policies forthe maximum or minimum level of effort to be employed, policies on the level ofambition regarding leadership and command in multi national operations, andthe policies regarding participation in multiple concurrent operations. Theseissues tend to be especially important in driving the required numbers of units orplatforms.

4.2.6 Time Frame

It is necessary to establish one or more time frames for assessment of the futuremilitary force and to ensure that all data and assumptions reflect, as far aspossible, the selected time frames. The selected time frames must underpin theobjectives of the planning process. It takes time to introduce new capabilitiesinto service and to reorient force structure. If the focus is on establishing aroadmap to a future force 20 years into the future and there is a desire to makesubstantial changes to the current force, then the analysis needs to concentrate onthat time frame. If, on the other hand, the focus is very near term with short termfixes for current problems, then analyses set in the present may be moreappropriate.

Selection of an inappropriate time frame introduces a risk that the analysis will,at a minimum, not provide appropriate decision support and, at the worst,produce flawed advice. For example, a 20 year investment plan based entirelyon analysis of current or recent operations risks producing a force that in 20years time will be 20 years out of date.

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4.2.7 The Programmed Force and Force Element Sets

It is essential to have an agreed start point for an analysis of the future force. Theprogrammed force represents the force that will be in existence at some point inthe future. If current developmental plans proceed unchanged then this will bethe resultant future force. Rather than track every individual and every piece ofequipment – an exercise in futility it is normal to consider a number of buildingblocks or force elements (FE). FEs can be of any size but typically representmajor air and maritime platforms and land forces at sub unit level. Smallerspecialist units or other service providers, support organizations or headquarterscan be included if required. Units not represented within the FE set will have tohave their costs and assets attributed to FEs, if it is important to know the totalcosts of a force structure, or be excluded from the analysis. Ultimately it iscombinations of force elements that deliver capability, so it will be necessary tounderstand how the FEs map to capability, i.e., which capabilities each FE cancontribute to.

Where analysis will consider the ability of a force to respond to a crisis in atimely manner, it will be necessary to collect data on the availability andreadiness10 of different FEs. The former is largely a function of sheer numbers(capacity) and associated concurrency assumptions. The latter involves posture;there are resource implications associated with maintaining FEs at highreadiness. Not all FEs of the same type need (or probably can) have the samelevel of readiness. Some may be kept at a short notice to move while others areundergoing refit or training and yet others may be moth balled or maintainedonly as part of the reserve component. The reserve component of the militaryitself adds additional complexity to force structure analysis as reservecomponent FEs may have different costs, constraints on use and levels ofeffectiveness compared to similar regular force units.

4.2.8 Analytical Tools and Methods

It is possible to conduct capability based analysis by inspection; with subjectmatter experts working together or in groups providing judgements as to how

10 Readiness is another concept for which there are different national terms. For the purposes ofthis paper it means the time it will take a unit to prepare to deploy

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well a force can deliver the required capabilities. Structured exercises canprovide useful capability surveys if appropriate subject matter expertise isdrafted in. However such approaches lack rigour and repeatability, and someparts of the analysis would likely benefit from use of more sophisticated toolsand objective evidence based analysis. Some of the primary classes of tools andmethods are discussed below:

Operational Assessment Tools

Tools may be required to assess whether existing, programmed and or optionalforces can achieve required objectives. Depending upon the approach taken thismay range from theatre level through to tactical mission level studies and caninclude a range of simulations and war games. The subject area need not beexclusively combat related; complementary communication system models,deployment models and logistic system models may all be exploited. Matureexamples of all of these types of tools are in use within the TTCP nations,although there are gaps in some specialist functional areas where subject matterexpert judgement must still be used.

Concurrency Tools

As well as assessing fit against individual scenarios, it may be necessary to test aforce structure against the demands of multiple concurrent demands. This canbe achieved using static tools, where the force is tested against specificcombinations of scenarios, or dynamic tools, where the force is tested against anumber of pseudo random generated scenario occurrences and time lines. Atthe simplest level, these tools will assume that specific sets of force elements(user supplied) are required for each scenario. More complex tools will allowsome Force Elements to be substituted for others (e.g., for some purposes certainwarship classes may be considered interchangeable). More sophisticated toolscan recommend alternative force structures optimized to best satisfy futuredemands under different Policy variations. Mature examples of all of these typesof tool are in use within the TTCP nations.

Cost Models

Cost is a recurrent constraint in all nations. However, if the analysis is requiredsimply to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a future force then it may notbe necessary to incorporate any cost information. Subsequently, once theanalysis involves comparing options for addressing capability shortfalls, then

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cost data will be required. Some nations have developed enterprise wide,centrally managed cost models that capture all costs within the defenceinstitution and attribute them to different organizations and units, allowing thearticulation of through life cost of ownership of Force Elements. Such costs,especially when expressed as Equivalent Annual Costs11, provide a basis forcomparison of force structure options.

Optimization methods

Optimization methods are very powerful ways of building a portfolio ofinvestment options. They can simultaneously consider a range of factors such asthe synergies between different force elements, the demands of concurrentoperations, levels of risk in acquisition projects and whole life costs. Thisstrength is at the same times a weakness as by its very nature the process lackstransparency. Stakeholders cannot easily trace the rationale behind individualrecommendations and it may be that the most cost effective all round portfoliostill includes deficiencies that some think should be addressed.

Optimization techniques may best be used when analysts have established theircredibility with decision makers through the use of other techniques that aremore transparent. For example, decision makers could be offered analysis ofdifferent future force structures designed for specific themes, such as one that isdesigned for expeditionary operations and another designed for homelanddefence. An optimization tool could be used in subsequent years to develophybrid options that can be shown to be better than any ‘hand built’ themedoptions. Optimization can then be seen as a potential positive enhancement ofan understood process. Even so such methods will always need carefulexplanation.

Some nations have made successful uses of optimization techniques, while othershave had difficulties or not used them.

11 Equivalent Annual Costs (EACs) are annualized long term ownership costs, equivalent to thelong term lease costs of a FE. They provide a good basis for comparing long term force structureoptions as they are independent of individual platform life cycles.

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Strategic Foresight Tools

Over the past couple of decades, future research, as the study of possible andlikely future trends and courses of actions, has increasingly become a part ofstrategic corporate and governmental planning [18, 19]. Future research enableslong term predictions and, consequently, the possibility of anticipating andshaping potential future capabilities and outcomes.

Going beyond traditional forecasting (i.e., statistical) techniques, these toolsincorporate expert consultations and isolated studies in specific context in orderto allow inclusion of expert judgements, ethnography, and social sciences inpredicting future scenarios. The name stems from incorporating insight withinthe realm of conventional forecasting . The extent of the use of strategicforesight tools in TTCP nations is limited, but may expand as more rigorousplanning scenario sets are demanded by national leadership.

Decision Support Tools

A wide range of decision support tools can be used to assist decision makers inarriving at decisions. Many of them fall into the class of Multi Criteria DecisionAnalysis (MCDA) tools, which are used widely in many organizations. Suchtools are dependent upon data from other tools or subject matter expertjudgement. They do provide a transparent means to capture and recordjudgments and prioritize options.

A wide range of analytical tools exist to visualize rich data sets. In some casesthese generate the key charts that for some decision makers represent the entireanalytical process. Unfortunately a chart that conveys clear and unambiguousmeaning to one leader can be confusing to another, so there are no simple bestpractices to follow. Nevertheless, getting the right kind of information presentedin the right way is a key to eventual success and the analysts must be prepared toexplore different ways to communicate the results of analysis. Once a preferredformat is established the potential exists for interactive tools to be built so thatdecision maker “what if?” questions can be assessed immediately duringmeetings.

Judgement vs. Models

One of the easiest analytical models to set up and run is a panel of subject matterexperts. They are asked a number of questions and they provide their opinions.

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In the early stages of establishing a strategic planning analysis process,quantitative models and data may be in short supply and the judgement panelmay be the only course of action.

The panel also brings a certain level of credibility and transparency to theprocess as those trusted and respected amongst the military community arethose providing all of the inputs.

Judgement panels do have three serious drawbacks:

• Firstly, the inputs they give are not repeatable. A different panel askedthe same question may not have given the same advice.

• Secondly, those with recent operational experience tend to have difficultygiving a judgement in the context of future scenarios. While there are notableexceptions, many officers will view the future as being just like their most recentdeployment only with better equipment. This may not be a good model.

• Thirdly, it is very difficult to go back and get judgement panels to explore“what if ?” questions asked by decision makers.

The alternative is to use models and simulations to generate quantitative results.This takes time and money and even when complete and functioning correctly(verified) stakeholders may not trust the outputs, so the model needs to bevalidated.

The mature approach is to mix expert judgement with models with thejudgement being used in areas where no validated models are available. In timehowever better models need to be developed and used in as much of the processas possible so that the analysis process is repeatable and responsive to decisionmaker demands.

4.2.9 Working with pre existing data

In many cases there may not be time to generate data from scratch once ananalytical process is approved and starts to execute. Existing data sources mustbe used. Where current this is a positive advantage, but there may be issues witholder data. Analysts must be open about the limitations of data and applyappropriate caveats to their recommendations. It is recommended thatrepositories of data are maintained by analytical organizations so that muchpreparation can go ahead even before a process formally starts.

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Similarly pre existing assumptions about future operations and threats may needto be challenged by analysts. History is full of examples of militaryestablishments planning on refighting the last war. This tendency has not goneaway.

4.2.10 Force Elements and Capabilities

The capability based approach to planning requires that the focus is on theeffects that are achieved, rather than on the assets employed. It is fairly easy tofollow this discipline until the point where you need to assess whether theprogrammed force can achieve capability goals, as at this point an assessment oftangible force elements executing some kind of task needs to be made. Worse,you cannot create cost estimates for possible new or enhanced capabilitieswithout making assumptions as to the systems, people, organizations etc. thatwill be brought together to deliver the capability. Thus you cannot cost acapability or assess the effectiveness of a capability without turning it intotangible force elements.

This reality needs to be embraced and not denied. The capability partitionscheme remains the key lens through which the programmed force, and possibleforce development options, are assessed and reported to decision makers.Proposed changes to the programmed force must be described in terms oftangible projects but justified by the capability impact e.g., “it is recommended topurchase a specific number of anti air warfare destroyers equipped with thespecified missile and the command systems as this is the lowest cost method ofclosing a major shortfall in our maritime air defence capability against lowaltitude/high speed threats while maintaining interoperability with key allies”.

4.2.11 Priorities and Constraints

Analysts need to take into account a range of external priorities and constraintswithin the analysis; otherwise the credibility of their work may be challenged.Some examples follow:

In some nations certain scenarios are considered to be a higher prioritythan others. This distinction must be reflected in the analysis.

Certain projects may be viewed as politically sensitive, either within themilitary establishment or the wider public political arena. “Ring fencing”

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specific units, bases, platforms etc and ensuring that they appear in anyrecommended future programme will be necessary12.

There might be independent manpower limits that must be respected inany future force structure.

There might be policy guidance on the number of concurrent operationsthat would be undertaken. Concurrency tools must reflect those policies.

There might be assumptions about key allies – their participation and thecapabilities that they will “bring to the fight”. These might need to berepresented within the analysis, or the analysis conducted on theassumption that they are present.

4.3 First steps in Implementation

The principles of the analytical approach outlined in the preceding sections canbe implemented in many ways. Analysts do not have control over the time linesand schedules for strategic planning processes. Instead, they need to manageexpectations and to balance the rigour and details of the process with theavailable resources and anticipated deadlines. Inevitably there are also resourceconstraints so the analysis leadership needs to manage a trade off betweenrigour, time and cost. Analysts need to be transparent about their decisions andassumptions, and be aware that it is better to under promise and over deliverthan the reverse.

An analytical process and tool set to support strategic planning decisions willalmost certainly be developed over multiple iterations. Initial steps need toavoid over ambition as an early failure may mean that there is no subsequentiteration. Analysis leads need to be very clear with decision makers as to thelimits of their advice.

Resources and time are always constrained, so hard design decisions need to betaken early. Example issues to consider include:

12 The ability to remove the constraints and determine the opportunity costs that the constraintsimpose is also of value!

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– What tools and data do we have?

– What tools and data can we get?

– What additional tools do we need to build? And do we have the time andskills required?

– The trade space between rigour and speed;

– The level of fidelity of the analysis;

– Scenarios – how many and covering what range of challenges?

Each of these requires careful thought and a common understanding betweenanalysts and stakeholders. The analyst may need to perform a challengefunction, making sure that the agreed plan is not only feasible, but alsorepresents a proper analysis of the problem and challenge to the status quo.

4.4 Bounding the CBP problem

To be effective the right questions must be asked and analysis effort mustaddress the substantive concerns, which may not necessarily be those that wereinitially posed when the process started, or the easiest ones to answer. Analystsmust be agile and prepared to adapt their plans to support decision makers.They may also (ideally will) have the opportunity to help frame the issues thatdecision makers are wrestling with and thus identify the determinations thatmust be made and the analysis required to support informed decisions.

4.4.1 Identifying the real question

A key area of uncertainty and a critical component of the framing exercise lies indefining what is considered to be fixed and what is considered a variable. Alsoimportant is identifying national levels of ambition and the grey area between“must be able to ...” (fixed ambition) and “aspire to be able to …” (variableambition). If levels of ambition are not spelled out in policy, then eliciting themfrom decision makers will be a critical activity. The concept can be applied at thestrategic level (e.g., “to be able to conduct limited operations with allies close tohome bases” vs. “to be able to independently conduct two major regionalconflicts simultaneously”), or at a single tactical capability level, (e.g., “to be ableto conduct limited ASW actions against submarines approaching criticaldomestic installations” vs. “to be able to conduct indefinite expeditionary ASW

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operations in any or all oceans of the world”). It is important to raise capabilitydiscussions to this broader level of discussion to avoid the trap of qualitativediscussions of platforms. This can lead to decisions based upon single platformperformance issues and not force structure capability issues. For example, whileFighter X may be technically better than Fighter Y in a technical comparison, canwe afford a big enough fleet of X to support our ambitions for expeditionary airpower employment? If not then perhaps we need to consider changing our levelsof ambition or looking for a cheaper platform, such as Fighter Y, in each caseassessing the risk of so doing.

Consider the following questions:

Our budget is declining. How can we adjust our force to best meet ourlevel of ambition13?

Our level of ambition is fixed. What will it cost to be able to meet it?

Our ambition and force structure are fixed. Nothing can be cut from ourcurrent force. How do we best spend our remaining capital budget?

Our level of ambition is unaffordable. What level of ambition will ourprojected budget support?

Provide proposals to remove 10% from the defence budget and advise onthe risks to our level of ambition.

Each of these is a plausible question or problem and each is, in fact, similar toreal questions posed within TTCP member nations within the last decade. Eachwill require a very different orientation and different classes of options to beexplored and developed. Yet each can be addressed with the same core set ofanalytical tools and data and can be tackled with the same generic analyticalprocess as previously described. The capability based approach to planning is avery flexible one that can be applied to different problem sets at the strategiclevel. At its heart is a core concept: that there are different ways to combineinputs to achieve desired end results if these are described in terms of desired

13 Level of ambition typically covers the range of operations to be undertaken, the levels of forceto be employed and the degree of concurrent activity to be sustained.

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outcomes and functional requirements. This provides flexibility to embraceinnovation and allow more choice to decision makers.

4.4.2 Risk and Uncertainty

CBP analysis can be conducted as a purely deterministic process. All projectscan be assumed to deliver within schedule and budget, all military systems toperform according to specification and the behaviour of friends and enemies tobe entirely predictable and readily modelled. Such an analysis can be useful butat the same time deceive and constrain thinking. More robust analyses willincorporate a degree of uncertainty and inform decision makers as to theprobability of achieving a given aim rather than presenting a scientificallyordained optimization and portraying it as a black and white issue. The use ofany form of optimization tool needs to be carefully handled to avoid theappearance of unwarranted precision. Do decision makers want a single “bestbet” option, an expression of the risk of non achievement of aims associated witha number of different options or both? Making risk assessment and riskmanagement a central part of the process will have a fundamental impact on thedesign of the tools, data requirements and the process. It will also requiredecision makers to be explicit about the kinds of risk that they are concernedabout and the attitude they have toward risk in those areas, an example of whichmight be their attitude toward contracting out for services or retaining capacitywithin the military[20, 21].

4.4.3 Force Generation and Readiness

A major issue in determining the design of a CBP process is deciding how farbeyond the operational military force the exercise should go. If any kind ofconcurrency analysis is being undertaken then it is necessary to understand howquickly units can be prepared for deployment and the cycles that units will rotatethrough when sustained operations are being undertaken. This allows for theimpact of the force generation system to be captured (e.g., that there must be xunits at home training or recuperating for each one in theatre) but does notaddress whether the system could be changed or whether greater military valuecould be achieved by changing the balance between the deployable military force(e.g., combat units, transports, expeditionary logistic units) and the nondeployable elements (e.g., schools, bases, non operational headquarters).

Many CBP exercises conducted have tended to either assume that the nondeployable military organizations (and the civilian defence institution) can be

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scaled up and down proportionally with the deployable force elements, or haveremoved them from consideration altogether. Given the climate of decliningdefence budgets and pressure for review of all defence expenditures, there is anincentive to broaden the scope of analysis and to arrive at a better balancebetween all components of the defence institution. Research into suchapproaches is being undertaken in Canada and elsewhere [22].

4.4.4 Defence Institution

If analysis of the entire military force, both deployable and non deployable, isundertaken, then the next logical extension would be to include the entiredefence establishment. In most nations the central functions of the defenceestablishment are performed by a mixed civilian/military organization. Theincreasing reliance placed on intelligence and information has contributed toblurring traditional distinctions between deployable and non deployable andbetween military and civilians. Some parts of the core will support ongoingoperations or the preparations for future operations and so may be covered byexisting parts of the capability partition scheme. Others will certainly not be,which means that the partition scheme needs to be broadened to include theseother functions such as acquisition, policy development, research and financialmanagement if a comprehensive analysis is planned.

4.4.5 Whole of Government and Beyond

The boundary between the traditional defence mission and broader nationalsecurity and public safety is also becoming increasingly blurred. When futureoperational scenarios are focussed on combat missions they could be consideredto be entirely military operations. Recent years have seen the broadening ofdefence planning to encompass domestic peacetime activities [23] and thegrowth of organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security (USA)and Public Safety Canada dedicated to public safety and public security. As aresult, there is now a larger, and more diverse, group of players in domesticsecurity. The military may find themselves planning to operate in unfamiliarroles alongside a range of other governmental and non governmental agencies.

With the leadership for this broader defence and security arena possibly lyingoutside of the traditional Defence institutions, another group of agencies areexploiting the concepts of CBP to support broader national security planning [24,25]. The challenges in extending CBP to the public safety/public security sectorare both similar and amplified. Typically, governance structures and

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accountability frameworks are less mature. Given the diversity of stakeholdersand differences in mandates, priorities, capacities and organizational cultures, atleast initially, CBP will serve more as an organizational principle than as arecognized process. The traditional defence model assumes a common (rational)actor – a shared worldview and integrated structure. The public safety/publicsecurity realm calls for a more overtly pluralist approach and the addition of anadditional apportionment/mediation activity allowing partner organizations theopportunity to interject proposals into their decision cycles, reconcile personaltargets and organizational plans and, on completion, register their intentions.

In the Netherlands this trend has gone past the defence and security arena tolook at planning from a whole of government perspective [10]. The principlesand basic model remains the same; set out your future objectives, work outwhether you are likely to be able to achieve them and work back to identifythings you can do now to put you in better shape for the future. By looking atnational challenges from a whole of government perspective, the full gamut ofthe levers of power can be considered; financial, economic, diplomatic, social,industrial and of course defence policies.

In summary, CBP principles and the model can be applied to the Whole ofGovernment. They provide a tool to integrate planning although the extensionof the scope of the planning domain creates procedural challenges and additionaltransactional costs.

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5 Organization and Governance of Strategic Planning Analysis

5.1 Decision Maker Engagement

Analysts must be very cognisant of the broader institutional process theysupport and ask themselves what logical process they need to implement to linkthe inputs and assumptions coming from that process to the analytical advice fedback to it. In some cases the design of the process is in whole or part laid downby external agencies and in others the analysts may have more of a free hand inengaging with the decision makers to develop the process.

As well as understanding the formal process, analysts must develop anunderstanding of the broader institutional context, key players, their agendasand their expectations. The management of relationships between analysis teamsand other stakeholders is important at all times. The analysts must be seen asimpartial, objective and never favouring particular outcomes. The personal styleand knowledge of the lead analyst(s) who have direct exposure to decisionmakers is a critical success factor. It should be anticipated that the process andits recommendations will be attacked by those who don’t view the likelyrecommendations as favourable to them. If the recommendations or optionscannot be attacked then the process, the data, the tools, the assumptions and thestaff can be. The lead analysts must be able to defend the entire process andaddress criticism in a professional manner. Achieving the correct rapport withthe decision makers and other interested stakeholders is partly a matter of goodcommunication and partly personality driven. Ensuring that everyone hasvisibility of what is being done and what will be delivered, as well as avoidingany suggestions that there are ‘hidden’ steps in the process that will shape theproducts is also essential.

5.2 Inward Looking and Outward Looking Analysts

Analysts can be overly focussed on the analysis that they wish to undertake andneglect developing a thorough understanding of the decisions to be supported.Simple, timely and relevant analysis is better than elegant, detailed but lateanalysis. Analysts have on occasion done themselves a disservice by being tooambitious. Analytical processes need to be designed to fit within the broaderplanning processes that they support and analysts need to understand thosebroader processes, and associated constraints, so that they can adjust theirproducts to fit.

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To provide very senior decision makers with advice requires communicationwith them in such a way as to express information compatible with the nature ofthe decisions to be made. This requires aggregating small details into a strategic‘big picture’ and a discussion of abstract ideas and issues that cannot be observeddirectly in the field. Unfortunately it is tempting to expand analysis into everhigher levels of detail and to expect senior leaders to form the big picture forthemselves, simply because many people are more comfortable with concretedetails. This tendency has led to senior decision makers being swamped in detailand turning against the analysis processes that were supposed to help them.

5.3 Focus of strategic planning analysis

Bureaucracies have a tendency to systematize processes and this has alsopresented problems where analysis effort has not been scaled according to need,but according to other drivers. This has resulted in unnecessary effort beingexpended re investigating decisions that have already been taken14, and notenough effort looking at truly strategic choices. Some nations have had moresuccess getting the level of detail in analysis right than others.

5.4 Process Ownership

If the intention is to have an institutionalized strategic planning analysis process,then it will need to have a process owner who can sponsor or direct work toprepare and improve the analysis capacity, as well as ensure access to thenecessary subject matter experts when the analysis is underway. The processowner is likely to be operating under some mandate issued from very seniorlevels within the institution, and will have specific outcomes in mind for theexercise.

The process owner could be a senior official responsible for the strategicplanning exercise. Depending on the exact scope of the process and nationalorganization this could be a head of Force Development, head of Capability

14 For example suppose a military force had ageing fighters and warships but had already gainedapproval for a plan to buy a new aircraft. It would be wasteful to spend as much effort provingthat the new aircraft was the right choice as is spent on the serious problem of the ships simplybecause the air domain is seen as being required to do as much analysis as the maritime domain.

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Development, head of Strategy or similar. The ownership could be shared by asmall group of leaders who have shared responsibility for delivery.

It is also possible for a science or analysis function to own the process on behalfof the defence institution. This would create a very different dynamic betweenthe senior decision maker groups and the analysis process than if the decisionmakers were also the process owners. One benefit of the approach is tostrengthen the intellectual independence of the analysis process. Thedisadvantage of that separation is the potential perception of the analysis being‘done to’ the decision makers rather than being ‘done for’ them.

Whoever is seen by the institution as the process owner is the key client of thelead analysts.

5.5 Process Leadership

The process leader is responsible for managing the actual execution of theanalysis process and the engagement with stakeholders. This may be the sameindividual as the process owner or have delegated authority from the processowner. The process leader could be a lead analyst rather than one of thesupported decision makers, as the analysts will have the detailed knowledge ofthe process and can make informed decisions as to schedule or process change.

5.6 Corporate Memory

Another reason for an analyst to hold the role of process leader is that thecorporate memory of the analysis process is likely to build up within the analysiscommunity. If military staffs are typically posted on a 2 3 year cycle and majorstrategic reviews take place every 4 years, then each officer will be involved onlyonce in any particular role. Civilian analysts may see 3, 4 or more reviews, aseven with promotions they may remain in the strategic planning community formany years. Furthermore, the slower turn over rate within civilian organizationsmeans that knowledge retention in those organizations is easier.

The organization responsible for the corporate memory needs to ensure properarchiving of data, models and documentation so that it can be reused. It shouldalso be consulted by the process owner (who may know far less about theprocess) in the early stages of planning for a new cycle of analysis.

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5.7 Exploitation of analysis

The process owner should consider how the analysis, and the broader strategicplanning process that it supports, will be exploited. Is there a commitment toaction that is shared by the decision makers and/or the more senior levels ofleadership? Part of this commitment may come from the mandate under whichthe process leader is working, but part of it may come through institutionaldesign. In some nations the focus of management has moved from inputs(people, platforms) toward outputs (capabilities, outcomes). An outcome basedorganization is more likely to be empowered to act upon analytical advice thanan input based one, but the issue of defence institutional design and outcomemanagement is beyond the scope of this paper.

5.8 Analysts analyze and decision makers decide

Institutional frictions will emerge if participants in the analysis process oversteptheir bounds. The analysts need to avoid any perception that they are usurpingthe decision makers’ authority to make decisions. Analysts should not presentrecommendations as “the answer”, unless invited to do so, rather decisionmakers should be presented with options or at least an assessment of the riskassociated with a preferred option. This gets to the heart of the nature ofoperations research, described as “the discipline of applying advanced analyticalmethods to help make better decisions” [27]. Within this definition the word“help” is the key; it is not for the analyst to make decisions, but to assist theresponsible decision makers.

Similarly analysts should seek to prevent decision makers, or their staffs, fromoverstepping into the analytical lane. Having third parties doing their ownadditional analysis and producing new charts etc. can cause confusion. Suchactions, regardless of motivation, can derail the analysis process and limit thecredibility of the analysts and the analytical process.

Decision makers also need to recognise that their duty is to take the products ofanalysis as inputs into their deliberations. They should therefore satisfythemselves as to the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis offered to themand understand the rationale behind conclusions and recommendations offered.The ultimate decisions as to the priority areas for attention and the selection ofcourses of action remain their prerogative. The design of decision makingprocesses to lead to good quality decisions is beyond the scope of this paper but

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is an established area in academic literature [28]. The availability of quality dataand analysis represent only one of the desirable inputs to a good decision.

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6 Success Stories

The previous sections have avoided giving specific examples. This is a deliberatedecision aimed to avoid giving the impression that there is one best or correctway to implement analytical support to strategic planning. Each organizationneeds to develop its own instantiation, to plot its own route and to create aprocess and set of tools that works for it. This section provides some examples ofspecific key developments from among the TTCP nations.

The examples selected illustrate the range of approaches taken in differentnations. There should be no inference that any approaches not included here areinferior or not fit for purpose. Neither do the examples here necessarily representthe current practices of the nations that developed them.

6.1 The Warm Base

Having data, models and scenarios in place in advance is advantageous andallows for richer analyses to be achieved more quickly. Having the ‘warm base’of existing material does require some deliberate planning, and imposes someupfront opportunity costs as effort being applied to prepare material for later useis not being directed at addressing immediate demands. Depending on the wayin which an analytical agenda is decided, resources are tasked and work funded,this may require an external sponsor who sees value in the approach.

Investment in a warm analysis base pays dividends in providing a start point formany types of analyses, both planned and emergent i.e., those unexpectedurgent jobs which arise. A further bonus is that all analyses sharing a commonpoint of departure inherit common assumptions, and that makes it easier tointegrate and compare results from separate studies.

Maintaining one central repository of models, data and scenarios is very likely toprove cheaper in the long run than the alternative; having multiple organizationsmaintain local models, scenarios and data. If nothing else, centralizedmanagement can promote visibility and provide a focal point for corporatememory.

In the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Analysis of DefenceCapability (ADC) study and the rapid analysis of a number of scenarios in the1997 8 Strategic Defence Review, afforded the catalyst for the creation of a warmbase of scenario analysis in the late 1990s. The subsequent Future Force

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Structure Study (F2S2) in the early 2000s required, as input, force packages for asmany different scenarios as possible, which prompted the development oflimited analyses of a range of smaller scenarios to provide data to test forcestructure alternatives. Since ADC and F2S2 were recurring annual (laterbiennial) analyses, they established the conditions whereby a repository ofapproved scenarios and scenario simulations were created.

In the United States, the Analytic Agenda (now called Support to StrategicAssessments (SSA)) provided a warm base for high level analysis. Unlike theUK example where a warm base evolved as a consequence of a rolling analysisprogramme, the US approach was deliberate and targeted at generating acommon set of analysis products for use across multiple Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) and Service organizations, jointly owned by OSD (Policy), OSD(Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) and the Joint Staff.

The purpose of SSA is to support deliberations by Department of Defense (DoD)senior leadership on strategy, planning, programming, and resourcing matters,including force sizing, shaping, and capability development. The data, modelsand scenarios provide a genesis for studies that support the development andimplementation of defence strategy and policy and the DoD planning,programming, budgeting, and execution system.

SSA products include current baselines, near to long term scenarios, concepts ofoperation (CONOPS), forces, and baselines based upon plausible challengesrequiring DoD resources and capabilities. SSA product development is acollaborative and interactive phased process. SSA analyses are intended toinclude three spirals to capture initial thoughts/harvest initial insights and toallow for review and broad approval of each product before progressing to thenext.

The three levels of product are:

Summary View: Explanation of rationale of scenario and key assumptions

Macro View: Exploration of concepts of operations and estimates of keyforce element requirements

Detailed View: Specification of baseline simulations or war games for usein specific component analyses and broad risk assessment of baselineapproach.

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6.2 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

The QDR is a legislatively mandated review [33] of US DoD strategy andpriorities. They have been conducted every four years since 1997 with a publicreport released on completion [34]. The QDR is a very important strategicplanning exercise. It sets a long term course for DoD as it assesses the threatsand challenges that the nation faces and re balances DoD s strategies,capabilities, force structure and investment plans to address current and futurechallenges.

There is a strong analytical component to every QDR. It is executed as acollaborative exercise across the Department with participation from a number ofMilitary and OSD organizations. While each QDR focuses on different issuesaccording to the priorities of the day, the fact that its occurrence is predicablemeans that organizations can prepare for it and plan and manage it as a surgeactivity. This avoids the issues involved setting up an ad hoc organization andthe related risks of loss of knowledge and data as that organization is disbanded.One of the strengths of the QDR is that it is a firmly institutionalized processwhich both builds upon, and contributes to, the warm base of US analyticalresources, including SSA products.

The QDR is a strong example of an institutionalized strategic planning exercisethat requires an analytical component. Analysis leaders have to plan, prepare,execute and deliver on issues, and to a schedule imposed from the highest levels.

At face value the QDR may not seem to be a capability based exercise, but thefundamental premise – establishing the future outputs of the US defenseinstitution and then making changes to program priorities to achieve betteralignment with future need – is nonetheless present.

6.3 United Kingdom Capability Audit

In 1999 the United Kingdom undertook a fundamental reorganization of itsdefence requirements staff under the Smart Procurement Initiative. This resultedin a new organizational and governance structure designed to manageinvestment in equipment along capability lines rather than Service orenvironmental lines. These new groups and committees needed a new kind ofanalysis to be oriented to support decision making and the result was thedevelopment and introduction of the Capability Audit process. The aim was toestablish a capability demand baseline and identify the gaps between future

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projected capability requirements and the capabilities to be offered by the thenapproved future UK force structure. The aim was very similar to the ADCprocess described in Section 6.5, but conducted at a much higher level of fidelity.The process and the rationale behind its design are captured at [35].

The capability audit generates an assessment of the ability of the future force tomeet capability goals in different scenarios and different time frames, asillustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Capability Audit output

The capability audit process recognized that having a common level of analyticalsophistication across all capability areas would be unachievable and creating a‘super model’ of everything would not only be undesirable but unaffordable.Rather, each Directorate was required to determine their own analyticalapproach using embedded or external analysts and leveraging the existing UKanalysis capability. Thus some areas were assessed by judgement and others bysophisticated low level analysis tools. The scenarios themselves were commonto those used to underpin the Force Development analyses for ADC and F2S2described in Section 6.3, providing for commonality between the twocommunities and exploiting the ‘warm base’ of scenario analyses.

The Capability Audit results were analyzed to identify key gaps and draw theattention of senior decision makers. By mandating a common overarchingprocess and a centrally maintained capability partition scheme, individualcapability managers were empowered to develop appropriate analysis methodsto perform their capability assessment through their research programmes. Thecapability audit process provided only part of the capability management

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process, with other techniques and processes used to develop and select coursesof action. This illustrates that a strategic planning process need not be describedand managed as an integral whole. Indeed participants may not be fullycognisant of the full process. In this UK example an objective process identifiedimbalances in the future force, but more subjective techniques were used todetermine the priorities for response and then select courses of action.

Capability Audit was successfully institutionalized within the UK MOD and,although always evolving, was performed every 1 2 years until the 2010 StrategicDefence and Security Review.

6.4 StratBOI

The Strategic Balance of Investment (StratBoI) [28] is a UK example of anoptimization methodology that seeks to establish a ‘best fit’ force structure. Itaddresses the multi purpose dimension head on. Many force structure analysesconsider the demands of individual scenarios in isolation and then seek toidentify possible force structures that can satisfy all or most of the demands ofconcurrent and diverse operations. By performing a simultaneous optimizationacross all the tasks required across multiple scenarios, StratBoI explores a muchbroader option space. This can lead to the selection of seemingly sub optimalassignments to specific tasks, but ultimately to more capable overall forcestructure options.

The StratBoI method is illustrated in Figure 4. It requires as inputs a set ofscenarios decomposed into tasks that must be performed and so relies upon a‘warm base’ as discussed in previous sections. The tool allows for thesimultaneous consideration of:

Mission and scenario requirements, which includes enabling tasks such asengineering and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition andReconnaissance (ISTAR);

Mappings of Force Element capabilities to tasks, allowing for ForceElements that can undertake multiple tasks either simultaneously or indifferent modes of operation;

Whole Life Costs;

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Logistics requirements, including sustainment and deployment of forceson operation;

Concurrency of scenarios;

The ratio of deployable force compared to the total fleet size in the forcestructure.

Figure 4: Strategic BoI Methodology

Numerous associated tools have been produced which allow further attendantanalysis of the results to be undertaken and the results presented to decisionmakers. Collectively these afford a rich understanding of sensitivities to keypolicy, capability, programme and cost assumptions.

The analysis capability built around StratBoI was a key part of the analyticalcontribution to the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). A

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key contributor to its success was the ability to explore quickly variations in anypolicy, or other, assumptions.

6.5 UK Force Development: ADC/F2S2

Earlier UK Force Development strategic analyses undertaken before the arrival ofStratBoI and the 2010 SDSR were conducted through two principal studiespreviously mentioned, Assessment of Defence Capability (ADC) and the FutureForce Structure Study (F2S2).

ADC had been under development since the mid 1990s and F2S2 followedaround 2000. ADC assessed a number of major capability areas against multiplescenarios in multiple time frames. Initially four capability areas were identified:force generation, force projection, combat operations and force sustainment.Subsequently other capability areas were added.

ADC identified areas where the forces identified for a mission were under orover capable and recommended changes. A simple colour scheme was used topresent the findings;

Blue: Significant affluence of capability

Green: Capability fully delivered

Yellow: Some shortfall in capability delivery

Red: Significant shortfall in capability delivery

Grey: Capability not required

If there were shortfalls that could not be rectified by adjusting the employedforces then recommendations could be made as to capability areas that neededdevelopment and where there appeared to be capability affluences.

An indicative ADC output is illustrated in Figure 5.

While ADC considered the ability to deliver capability in the context ofindividual scenarios, F2S2 examined the ability of the force structure to meet theneeds of multiple concurrent scenarios. It employed a tool called CHIMERA todo this. Inputs to CHIMERA included a force structure model, the rotation ratesof units required to sustain an enduring deployment, rules specifying

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permissible scenario combinations and the force packages required for a numberof different scenarios. Through considering and assessing the ability of theproposed force structure to satisfy the demands of a large number of differentscenario combinations, CHIMERA exposes the probability that types of forceelements could be in short supply and consequently the probability that therequirements of some classes of scenario combinations could not be met.CHIMERA also had an optimization mode which, given entry of the equivalentannual cost of ownership of each force element type, is capable of suggesting aforce structure rebalancing by trading never used or infrequently used forceelements for those in short supply. A schematic of the CHIMERA analysisprocess is illustrated at Figure 6.

Figure 5: Indicative ADC output

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Figure 6: CHIMERA analysis

6.6 Canadian Tools: CATCAM/SC2RAT/Concurrency

The Canadian force development organization conducts strategic analysis andfuture force structure studies with fewer dedicated resources than the UnitedKingdom or United States. This has resulted in the development of a suite oftools that rely more upon subject matter expert judgement to assess futurescenarios rather than upon creation of complex simulations or war games. Threetools have been designed to work together to give a complete analysis capability.These are:

CATCAM [30]: Determines the relative importance of capabilities tosuccess of a mission. The tool captures staff assessments as to thelikelihood of capabilities being required and the criticality of their beingsuccessfully delivered for different phases or lines of operation of ascenario. Judgments are quantified and the end results are aggregatedacross scenarios to generate an overall numeric value relating to acapability. This permits Canadian force developers to consider capabilitypriorities independently from specific scenarios.

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SC2RAT [31]: Determines the ability of a force structure option to deliverthe required capabilities for a scenario. Force elements are assigned todeliver capabilities in priority order (this order is derived fromprevious/supporting CATCAM analysis) and gaps are identified i.e.,capability demands for which no force element is available to satisfy. Thetool can handle situations where force elements assigned to one capabilitycan also deliver other capabilities (e.g., a frigate assigned to antisubmarine warfare may also be able to provide underwater surveillanceand maritime component command and control or, more generically, tocontribute to Search & Rescue).

Concurrency [32]: Determines the capacity of the force structure tosustain multiple concurrent operations. The concurrency tool takes asinput defined cases of concurrent activities, the force elements requiredfor each one and unit rotation policies required to support enduringoperations. It then identifies those force elements that would beunavailable or available only by adjusting rotation policies e.g., shorteningrotation intervals or employing units on a ‘rest’ phase of the cycle foroperations. The tool is similar in scope to the UK CHIMERA, but does nothave an optimization function.

This tool set allows Canada to perform similar kinds of analyses to the UK ADCand F2S2 analyses but exploits spreadsheet calculations using military judgmentinputs, rather than complex simulations. As with all analyses based on subjectmatter judgement rather than quantitative methods, there are trade offs andchallenges e.g., selection of experts and repeatability.

6.7 Strategic Cost Models

Funding informs planning. Strategic analysis can never avoid the issues of costsand a large proportion of the graphs produced to inform senior decision makersinclude costs as one axis. Canada (Strategic Cost Model, SCM [36, 37]) and theUnited Kingdom (Force Structure Cost Model, FSCM [38]) have producedcosting models that can produce cost estimates for force elements on a consistentbasis. Furthermore these models have been developed by (or in conjunctionwith) finance experts, encapsulate prescribed costing conventions, are endorsedby their respective national financial staffs and, in the Canadian case, are used bythem.

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Although very different in the detail of their implementations, the two modelsshare a common basic approach. In each case budget data is parsed and relatedto force elements using apportionment rules. The “cost” of a force elementtherefore aggregates resource expenditure contributions from all organizationsassociated with that unit. These might include:

Recruitment and training organizations

Equipment acquisition and maintenance organizations

Bases

Operating costs

Higher level headquarters, support and overhead organizations

The sum total of the costs of all of the force elements should add up to anapproximation of the defence budget15.

In the UK, historical costs and forward projections of costs are averaged to createan Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC). An EAC can be thought of as equating to theannual cost to lease a unit indefinitely, including the costs of replacing all of theunit’s equipment and people.

EACs are time independent and therefore provide a good indicator of the longterm costs associated with ownership, and hence value for money, avoiding thedistortions of project cost profiling, which drive affordability concerns. Thisencourages a long term view and avoids planning pitfalls such as instanceswhere lifecycle effects distort the apparent costs of ownership. For example, aplatform that has been paid for appears to be cheap, which neglects the fact thatin all likelihood it will need to be replaced sooner than one still underprocurement.

Databases of EACs allow strategic planning for forces 10 20 years into the futureto be undertaken on a consistent costs basis. And again, these databases canprovide a warm base to support ancillary analyses and encourage validation anduse of common costing assumptions.

15 And in both the Canadian and UK cases they do.

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6.8 Australian Success stories

Australia has had a long involvement in the development of CBP techniques andtheir application. The application of a structured scientific method tocomplicated force planning has proven to be beneficial in supporting seniordecision makers for many years. Australian experience in the implementation ofCBP has spanned many of the areas outlined in this paper – from ground upreviews of Force Structure, minor updates and reviews of force options, and instudies of individual capability areas.

The Australian government has indicated its intention to conduct major episodicreviews at 5 year intervals, unless strategic circumstances change. Minor reviewsand updates will occur in intervening periods to manage the delivery of thestrategy. CBP methods are developed and applied for each of these types ofactivity. Capability studies are undertaken to provide the evidence base neededto address more specific capability issues requiring more thorough analysis andto develop the requisite skills, capabilities and analytic methodologies within theCBP process.

CBP in Australia draws upon a wide range of specialist inputs across theoperations divisions of the Defence Science and Technology Organization(DSTO). With a limited number of staff supporting the conduct of majorreviews, evidence is drawn from lower level studies to plan and facilitatereviews as required. The experience developed in each of the lower level studiesand review types provides the warm base for providing analytic support.

CBP is a general method and the implementation in Australia has variedsignificantly depending on many factors such as the sponsor, the scope of thereview and the time and resources available to conduct the review or study.These activities are not generally framed as CBP exercises, but the generalisedmethodology, or parts thereof are usually applied.

Considerable effort has gone into the development and understanding of suitablepartitioning schemes and analytic frameworks for applying the CBP methods.

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The SCMILE16 services framework is one such development that has had somesuccess in highlighting high level interdependency for capability planners.

The CBP process articulates some fundamental steps in capability planning suchas the setting of capability goals. The desired capability “ends” is a key measureagainst which to assess the capability, and defining these and embedding theirdevelopment in the planning culture has been challenging.

Capability assessment techniques have been developed over many years and areat the core of the DSTO’s OR capability. Both soft and hard OR techniques havebeen applied to the capability assessment process over many years. Recentimplementations of CBP have sought to identify risk based assessments ofcapability, both of the ability to deliver to a plan and of the sufficiency of thecapability to that will be delivered.

A number of decision support and visualisation tools have been developed andapplied to CBP problems used over an extended period. Some align closely withthe UK Capability Audit tools where capabilities are assessed against a set ofscenarios. The assessment methods range from subject matter experts makingqualitative judgements in tabletop exercises, to the utilization of analysis frommore quantitative capability studies that have been undertaken prior to thereview or update. Wherever possible an evidence base is sought to validatejudgements, but this is not always possible. Analytical tools have beendeveloped to facilitate the elicitation of the data being sought, such as thatillustrated in Figure 7, as well as for the synthesis of capability data.

The Australian experience has been that CBP is an iterative and evolving process.A valuable lesson from this process has been the need to provide analyticsupport to revise capabilities and strategies when government guidance changes,either in the aspirations or the funding levels. Whilst the CBP process modelshows a single feedback loop, experience has shown that there are manyfeedback paths. In particular, the consideration of the resourcing and fundingaspects have necessarily been included in the capability assessment and reviewcycles to attempt to develop affordable and achievable programmes. To assist in

16 Sensing, Command and Control, Mobility (physical), Information mobility, Logistics &support, Engagement.

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this process, additional decision support tools such as Project Viewer andProgram Viewer have been developed.

Figure 7: Data elicitation tool example

Program viewer has evolved from the earlier project viewer prototype and uses asimilar approach to display the financial information as project viewer. It hasbeen developed to provide multiple perspectives of a common data set. Thecommon data set resides on a data server and the data model is compatible withthe Department of Defence Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 2.0 standard. Ithas been developed to provide a visualisation of the transition states of theprogram and relevant sub programs linking the force in being to the futureforce, including projections of workforce and operating costs. Capturinginterdependency information during review processes assists stakeholders indeveloping and understanding the potential implications of force structureoption changes in terms of costs (capital and people), schedules and capabilities.These are important developments that ensure that affordability is considered asearly as possible in the CBP process in addition to having a better understandingof the capability risks inherent in a force design. An example from a ProgramViewer prototype is shown in Figure 8.

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Dashboard area summarises alerts to potential issues, including: - Schedule dependency constraints - Cost exceeding budget constraints - Capability gaps

Dependency constraints between milestones

Structured display of projects, supporting both high-level and low-level detail Project milestones visible

Cost and budget comparison

Figure 8: Program Viewer prototype

For more specific capability assessment processes operational level visualisationtools such as scenario viewer have been developed. Scenario viewer allows thelocations and properties of units participating in an operation to be displayedthrough a graphical user interface. An example from scenario viewer can be seenin the Figure 9.

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Figure 9: Scenario viewer screenshot

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7 Summary and Conclusions

Strategic planning and supporting analysis will likely continue to remain animportant capability in its own right. Decision support will be required to assistin addressing the challenges that environmental ambiguity, increasinginterdependency, and constrained resources pose. This paper has outlined theprinciples of, and issues arising from adoption of, a capability based approach toproviding analysis support to strategic planning. It has discussed best practicesand provided illustrative experiences of TTCP nations. However, a caution is inorder. This paper depicts a point in time and describes a ‘work in progress’.Analysis Support to Strategic Planning continues to evolve; with the constantbeing the value of continuous dialogue within the analysis community andperiodic documentation.

If the approach to defence planning discussed in this paper were easy to conceiveand execute then it would have been turned into a shrink wrapped process manyyears ago. In fact there are many challenges, many of which are discussed in thispaper. Those seeking to deliver analytical support to strategic planning throughthe capability based planning paradigm need to be aware of the challenges andseek to minimize their impact.

The capability based approach to planning is not without its challenges. Some ofwhich are as follows:

It is apt to be shaped through the biases of human participants, especiallywhere key analysis stages are conducted by expert panels withoutchallenge from quantitative methods;

there are limitations imposed by using scenarios which contain notreatment of uncertainty (e.g., fixed environment, fixed enemy forces,fixed enemy behaviour) as the basis for analysis;

it is strategic in format but sometimes regresses to tactical in application;

a small number of critical and very expensive force elements maydominate the analysis and make it impossible to make meaningfulassessments of secondary capabilities and force elements;

it is difficult to capture the transactional costs of making changes to thestatus quo;

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Adoption of the capability based approach to strategic planning is not aguarantee of success. This paper has identified that it is a conceptual approachwith very many possible implementations and many complex relationships tomanage. While there are examples of the approach delivering new insights andallowing a more cost effective joint force to emerge, there are also other instanceswhere the exercise has resulted in no decisions or decisions subsequently foundto be unaffordable. In the author’s experience, the unsuccessful episodes canoften be traced to flawed assumptions, inadequate planning or human biasesbeing allowed to shape conclusions. This paper is intended to highlight some ofthese issues to minimize their reoccurrence.

Notwithstanding the challenges, the capability based approach has achievedsuccess in allowing national defence planning to move away decisively fromservice centric platform replacement in anticipation of a major conventional wartoward a joint force capable across the spectrum of national challenges. Therecord of this achievement can be found among various national studies, mostlyclassified, but also in changing organisations, attitudes and processes. Thecapability based approach to analytical support to strategic planning should beadopted as the institutional norm. This would militate against a gradual return toa service and platform focus. To do so requires efforts on behalf of the analyticalcommunity to ensure that the process is clearly articulated, supported withrobust tools and transparent in execution.

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8 Acknowledgements

This decision to write this paper was taken by the TTCP JSA TP 3 panel at aworkshop in Ottawa, hosted by Canada’s Strategic Planning OperationsResearch Team (SPORT) in May 2011. The author is grateful for thecontributions made by colleagues at that workshop and other previous events.The opinions expressed within the paper are those of the author alone and maynot represent those of the workshop participants. Participants are tabulatedbelow and are Canadian where not otherwise indicated.

SPORT Panel Members GuestsJohn DonohueMark RempelEmile Pelletier

Ben TaylorChad YoungPaul Whitbread (AS)Keith Goodman (UK)

Dan Chiu (US OSD Pol)Stephan de Spiegeleire (HagueCentre for Strategic Studies)Paul Davis (US RAND)LCol Brian NewmanBrian GreeneDenis Shine (AS)Gp Cpt Shaw James (NZ)Don Lowe (AS)Nitin Thakur (AS)Handson Yip (NATO ACT)François Van Zeebroeck (NATOACT)Doug Hales

The author is especially grateful to Doug Hales for recording notes of themeeting, Peter Dortmans (AS) for providing an Australian perspective on thedraft, and to Sheryl Boxall (NZ) for feedback on early drafts.

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9 References

1 See for example, The Treasury, 2004,Managing for Outcomes,http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/researchpolicy/wp/2004/0415/01.htm#_toc1.

2 Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3, Guide to CapabilityBased Planning, 2004.

3 MORS Workshop on Capabilities Based Planning, Washington, Oct 2004.

4 RTO MP SAS 055, presented at NATO SAS 055 Workshop, Norfolk, Apr2005.

5 Taylor B.W., Capability Based Planning, Developing the Art, Dstl CP19322,April 2006.

6 Submissions to NATO SAS 072 workshop, Oslo 2008 e.g., Taylor, B.,Petryk, R, Blakeny D, Christopher G, Beard A., Producing an IntegratedCapability Roadmap for the Canadian Forces, NATO Unlimited, RTO MPSAS 072 9, Oct 2008.

7 Briefings to NATO SAS 076 Capability Portfolio international conference,Paris 2009; e.g., Taylor, B.W., Portfolio Management in Canada, Stockel P.E.,UK Capability Assessment Analysis, Brittain J., The UK Capability Portfolio,Campbell A, NATO Planning Under Uncertainty – Capability Planning andArchitectures.

8 Analytic Implications of the NATO Defence Planning Process, RTO MP SAS081, 2010.

9 TTCP JSA TP 3 workshops in Washington (2003, 2006, 2011), Auckland(2004, 2010), Ottawa (2005, 2008, 2011), Portsdown (2006), Canberra (2007),Porton Down (2008) have all touched upon aspects of this topic.

10 De Spiegeleire, S., Ten Trends in Capability Planning for Defence and Security,RUSI Journal, 156(5), 20 28, 2011.

11 Senge, P., The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the LearningOrganization, Doubleday, 1994, ISBN978 0385260954

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12 Taylor, B.W., Capability Based Planning and Capability Engineering: Where’sthe Join?, DSTL/CP21827, 2006.

13 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Capability Development Manual, 2005,DPSJAN006/05.

14 Davis, P.K., Analytic Architecture for Capabilities Based Planning, MissionSystem Analysis, and Transformation, RANDMR 1513 OSD, 2002.

15 Vencel, L., Cook, S. & Matthews, D., A Systems Analysis of the DCPGCapability Domain Architecture Part One: Characteristics of an IdealizedDomain and Domain Set. DSTO Technical Report, Edinburgh, Australia,2002.

16 Schoemaker PJH, Strategic Management Journal, 14(3) 193 213, 1993.

17 Bender, A., Scenario Generation for Capability Option Analysis, Presentationat Defence Operations Research Symposium, Canberra, September 2011.

18 Friedman, G., The Next 100 Years, A forecast for the 21st Century, DoubledayPublishing Group, New York, 2010 and Friedman’s work through Stratforhttp://www.stratfor.com/about_stratfor

19 European Commission,Mapping Foresight Revealing how Europe and otherWorld Regions Navigate into the Future, European Foresight MonitoringNetwork, Luxembourg Publications Office of the European Union,Belgium, 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/research/social sciences/pdf/efmnmapping foresight_en.pdf

20 Kerzner, L., Unifying Capability Integration Analysis, DRDC CORA TM2011 022, September 2011.

21 Thomason, J.S., IDA’s Integrated Risk Assessment and Management Model(IRAMM), IDA Paper P 4470, June 2009.

22 Young, C., Billyard, A.P., Donohue, J.J., The Staircase Model A Concept ToFocus Understanding of the Generate Domain for Capability Based Planning,DRDC CORA LR 2010 157, July 2010.

23 Canada First Defence Strategy. Available at:http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first premier/index eng.asp

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24 Chouinard, P., and Hales D., Implementing Capability Based Planning withinthe Public Safety and Security Sector, DRDC CSS TM 2011 26, December2011.

25 DHS, Capabilities Based Planning: Overview,http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/grant_docs/Capabilities_Based_Planning_Overview_12_17.pdf.

26 Box, G.E.P. (1979) Robustness in the strategy of scientific model buildingin Robustness in Statistics (R.L. Launer and G.N. Wilkinson, Eds.),Academic Press.

27 http://www.learnaboutor.co.uk/ accessed 21 March 2012.

28 See for example McNamee, P. and Celona, J., Decision Analysis for theProfessional. SmartOrg, Inc., 4th edition, 2007

29 Hoehl, M.L., Force Development: The Linear Programming Approach. NATORTO SAS 072 12, 2008.

30 Pelletier, E., A User Manual for CATCAM: Fourth Edition. DRDC CORATechnical Note TN 2009 055, October 2009.

31 Pelletier, E., Petryk, R., SC2RAT: The Scenario Capability + CapacityRequirements Assessment Tool: A Tool from the Capability Based Planning Toolsuite. DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum TM 2011 213, November2011.

32 Pelletier, E., The Concurrency Analysis Tool: A Tool from the StrategicCapability Roadmap version 1.2 Tool suite. DRDC CORA TechnicalMemorandum TM 2009 050. November 2009.

33 United States Legal Code Title 10, Sec. 118 (a), available athttp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE 2011 title10/pdf/USCODE 2011title10 subtitleA partI chap2 sec118.pdf.

34 http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.

35 Beare, G., and Taylor, B W.,Measuring Capability, Paper Presented toInternational Symposium on Military Operations Research, August 2001,available at www.ismor.org.uk.

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36 Chouinard P and Wood I.D.H, The Department of National Defence StrategicCost Model: Development, DRDC CORA TR 2007 14, September 2007.

37 Solomon, B., Chouinard P., and Kerzner L, The Department of NationalDefence Strategic Cost Model Volume II Theory and Empirics, DRDC CORATR 2008 03 October 2008.

38 Barradale, D, Use of Costs within High Level Balance of Investment, Briefing toTTCP JSA TP 3 workshop, Auckland, April 2010.

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