Centeno v. Villalon- PornillosG.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

FACTS:

The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.

Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1, 500.00.

It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Hence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law.

MTC and RTC rendered a judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes and contended that to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

ISSUE: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?

RULING: No, Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes,"

only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. The constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.

Therefore, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.

Considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

Decision is Reversed and set aside.

Alonzo, Clariz Anzel Pauline B.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III

G.R. No. 156052 Feb. 13, 2008

Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:

Whether or Not DOH has the power to implement the Mil Code

Held:

Yes. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it.

As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands,50 health information was already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the predecessor of DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with the duty to protect the health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the dissemination of hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing and combating dangerous communicable diseases."

Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."52

To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health implications."53

When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information.

Bagnate, Honey Lee B.

Social Justice Society vs. Mayor Lito Atienza,G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008

FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December 28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the owners and operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating their businesses within 6 months from the ordinance’s effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and Shell.

Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the said ordinance. They argued that they are fighting for their right to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. Are the contentions of the oil companies tenable?

RULING: No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated police power of local government units “to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the society.” It explained that “based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.

When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.” (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.

The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

NOTES: In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)

In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and Shell, and instead reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)

In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration of the three big oil players. The Court stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. It said that it already passed upon the basic issues in its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments of the oil firms were a mere rehash of their arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min. Res., GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)

Dapluza, Alfredo C.

Republic vs. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.,

664 SCRA 233(2012) G.R. No. 185124. January 25, 2012

NATURE: A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the 12 August 2008 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and 22 October 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196.

FACTS:

1. NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters (Lot No. 3080, Lot No. 455 and Lot No. 3039). On 11 July 1995, NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of Lot No. 3039.4.

2. In its second amendment of its complaint before the Court, NIA deposited with the Philippine National Bank Php 19,246.58 representing provisional value for the properties and prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession.

3. The respondents in its Answer, stated the following:

a. NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity;

b. It was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to theirs, where the project could pass through;

c. Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan;

d. NIA’s valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at P5 million; and

e. NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties valued at P250,000.

4. On 11 September 1996, the RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish the just compensation to be paid to the owners, composed of the Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson and two (2) members of the parties to the case.

5. Respondents-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda, Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas filed their Answer-in-Intervention with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counter-Claim, adopting the allegations in the Answer of the other respondents and pointed out that Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two acquired from the Rural Bank of Kabacan and that the four other respondents-intervenors were joint tenants-cultivators of Lot Nos. 3080 and 3039.

6. On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of the expropriation proceedings, later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in favor of NIA.

7. On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners’ Report to the RTC stating inherent features of the pertinent area such as area size and trees or cultivations found and that the members could not agree on the market value of the subject properties and recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the ones coming from the parties. In response, on 22 October 1996, the RTC issued an Order revoking the appointments of Atty. Agdeppa and Engr. Mabang as members of the committee and, in their stead, appointed Renato Sambrano, Assistant Provincial Assessor of the Province of Cotabato; and Jack Tumacmol, Division Chief of the Land Bank of the Philippines–Kidapawan Branch.

8. On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Commissioners’ Report to the lower court stating that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated should be P65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the value of the cultivations therein.

9. On 03 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report which added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot Nos. 3039 and 3080.18 Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land.

10. The RTC then ruled in 31 August 1999 that it expropriated in favor of NIA the petitioners lands, to which it must pay the appropriate values to the respondents as adopted from the commissioner reports including for the removed earth fill. NIA, in its appeal to the said court assailed the said decision in its adoption of the commissioners report for just compensation, the payment of the excavated soil and the delivery of payment to the defendants-intervenors who acquired ownership of the land still titled in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan.

11. On 12 August 2008, the CA through its Twenty-First (21st) Division, promulgated a Decision23 affirming with modification the RTC Decision, deleting the inclusion of the value of the soil excavated from the properties in the just compensation since the property owner was entitled to compensation only for the value of the property at the time of the taking and affirming the trial court’s ruling that recognized defendants-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No. 3080 basing on the conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank of Kabacan in the expropriation proceedings and the latter’s Manifestation that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not just compensation is valid provided by the affirmed decision of the CA

2. Whether or not payment to pertinent owners of Lot No. 3080 for just compensation is valid.

RULING:

1. The Court affirmed the findings of the CA, which sustained the trial court’s Decision adopting the committee’s recommendations on the just compensation to be awarded to herein respondents and the deletion of the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation.

2. The Petition is meritorious on the second issue. The case is remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of just compensation.

RATIONALE:

1. Factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court. The rule admits of exceptions, though, such as when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are contradictory, or when the findings are not supported by the evidence on record. These exceptions, however, are not present in the instant case. The pertinent findings are the following CA decision:

“A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the second set of Commissioners, with Atty. Marasigan still being the Chairperson and Mr. Zambrano and Mr. Tomacmol as members, was not arbitrary and capricious in performing the task assigned to them. We note that these Commissioners were competent and disinterested persons who were handpicked by the court a quo due to their expertise in appraising the value of the land and the improvements thereon in the province of Cotabato. They made a careful study of the area affected by the expropriation, mindful of the fact that the value of the land and its may be affected by many factors. The duly appointed Commissioners made a second ocular inspection of the subject area on 4 September 1997; went to the BIR office in order to get the BIR zonal valuation of the properties located in Carmen, Cotabato; interviewed adjacent property owners; and took into consideration various factors such as the location of the land which is just less than a kilometer away from the Poblacion and half a kilometer away from the highway and the fact that it is near a military reservation. With regard to the improvements, the Commissioners took into consideration the valuation of the Provincial Assessor, the age of the trees, and the inputs and their productivity.

The Court then concluded that it could not be said that the schedule of market values in Ordinance No. 173 was the sole basis of the Commissioners in arriving at their valuation. Said ordinance merely gave credence to their valuation which is comparable to the current price at that time. Besides, Mr. Zambrano testified that the date used as bases for Ordinance No. 173 were taken from 1995 to 1996.”

On the deletion of the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation, there is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. The

Court further adds “ To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements”.

2. The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated. The Court have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the said rural bank. The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, i.e.,

“SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims.—If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.”

Fernandez, Rolando M.

Brgy. Sindalan v Court of AppealsGR No. 150640, March 22, 2007

Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road because respondents’ property was allegedly the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.  Hence, this petition.The issue in this case is whether the taking of a portion of respondents’ property would be for a public purpose, and thus, a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.The taking of a portion of respondents’ property was not for a public purpose.The first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. Expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation.”       Here, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of respondent spouses. The expropriation will actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way.Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them.  However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner.  To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal.  Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose. The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation.  Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good—which is public use—and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation.  Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well. For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for condemnation, such that when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.

Francisco, Marissa

CREBA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

G.R. No. 160756 March 9, 2010

FACTS:  

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA) is an association of real

estate developers and builders in the Philippines. It filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act (RA) 8424 and the revenue

regulations (RRs) issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to implement said provision

and those involving creditable withholding taxes. It impleaded former Executive Secretary

Alberto Romulo, then acting Secretary of Finance Juanita D. Amatong and then Commissioner

of Internal Revenue Guillermo Parayno, Jr. as respondents. CREBA assails the validity of the

imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding

tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. CREBA argues that the

MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if there is no realized

gain. CREBA also seeks to nullify Sections 2.57.2(J) (as amended by RR 6-2001) and 2.58.2 of

RR 2-98, and Section 4(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) of RR 7-2003, all of which prescribe the rules and

procedures for the collection of CWT on the sale of real properties categorized as ordinary

assets. Petitioner contends that these revenue regulations are contrary to law for two reasons:

First, they ignore the different treatment by RA 8424 of ordinary assets and capital assets and

second, respondent Secretary of Finance has no authority to collect CWT, much less, to base

the CWT on the gross selling price or fair market value of the real properties classified as

ordinary assets.

ISSUES:  

1. Whether or not the imposition of the MCIT on domestic corporations is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the Secretary of Finance has an authority to order collection of CWT.

RULING: 

No. Under the MCIT scheme, a corporation, beginning on its fourth year of operation, is

assessed an MCIT of 2% of its gross income when such MCIT is greater than the normal

corporate income tax imposed under Section 27(A). If the regular income tax is higher than the

MCIT, the corporation does not pay the MCIT. Any excess of the MCIT over the normal tax shall

be carried forward and credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately

succeeding taxable years.

The SC ruled that MCIT is not violative of due process and thus is not unconstitutional. MCIT

was devised as a relatively simple and effective revenue- raising instrument compared to the

normal income tax which is more difficult to control and enforce. It is a means to ensure that

everyone will make some minimum contribution to the support of the public sector.

The Secretary of Finance is granted under Section 244 of RA8424,the authority to promulgate

the necessary rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the law.

Such authority is subject to the limitation that the rules and regulations must not override, but

must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.

Nora S. Luquias

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. YMCAG.R. No. 124043 October 14, 1998

Facts:Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an assessment to private respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the assessment. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

Issue:Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA subject to income tax

Held:Yes. Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC.Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives.

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken” (Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117359, p. 15 July 23, 1998).

Verbalegis non estrecedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that it “is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income.” This is without merit since the exemption provided lies on the payment of property tax, and not on the income tax on the rentals of its property. The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the above provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Unfortunately for respondent, the Court noted that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted to prove that it met the said requisites.

The Court appreciates the nobility of respondent’s cause. However, the Court’s power and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government.

Maulit, Jose Noel G.

Philex Mining Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueG.R. No. 148187 April 16, 2008

FACTS:Philex Mining Corp. entered into an agreement with Baguio Gold Mining Co. for the former to manage and operate the latter’s mining claim, known as the Sto. Nino Mine. The parties’ agreement was denominated as “Power of Attorney” which provides inter alia:4. Within three (3) years from date thereof, the principal (Baguio Gold) shall make available to the managers (Philex Mining) up to eleven million pesos (P11,000,000.00), in such amounts as from time to time may be required by the managers within the said 3-year period, for use in the management of the Sto. Nino Mine. The said eleven million pesos (P11,000,000.00) shall be deemed, for internal audit purposes, as the owner’s account in the Sto. Nino project. Any part of any income of the principal from the Sto. Nino Mine, which is left with the Sto. Nino project, shall be added to such owner’s account.5. Whenever the managers shall deem it necessary and convenient in connection with the management of the Sto. Nino Mine, they may transfer their own funds or property to the Sto. Nino project, in accordance with the following arrangements: (a) The properties shall be appraised and, together with the cash, shall be carried by the Sto. Nino project as a special fund to be known as the managers’ account.(b) The total of the managers’ account shall not exceed P11,000,000.00, except with prior approval of the principal; provided, however, that if the compensation of the managers as herein provided cannot be paid in cash from the Sto. Nino project, the amount not so paid in cash shall be added to the MANAGERS’ account.(c) The cash and property shall not thereafter be withdrawn from the Sto. Nino project until termination of this Agency.(d) The managers’ account shall not accrue interest. Since it is the desire of the principal to extend to the managers the benefit of subsequent appreciation of property, upon a projected termination of this Agency, the ratio which the MANAGERS’ account has to the owner’s account will be determined, and the corresponding proportion of the entire assets of the Sto. Nino Mine, excluding the claims, shall be transferred to the managers, except that such transferred assets shall not include mine development, roads, buildings, and similar property which will be valueless, or of slight value, to the managers. The managers can, on the other hand, require at their option that property originally transferred by them to the Sto. Nino project be re-transferred to them. Until such assets are transferred to the managers, this Agency shall remain subsisting. The compensation of the manager shall be fifty per cent (50%) of the net profit of the Sto .Nino project before income tax. It is understood that the managers shall pay income tax on their compensation, while the principal shall pay income tax on the net profit of the Sto. Nino project after deduction therefrom of the managers’ compensation.

Ph i l ex M in ing made advances o f cash and p rope r t y i n acco rdance w i t h pa rag raph 5 o f t he agreement. However, the mine suffered continuing losses over the years which resulted to Philex Mining’s withdrawal as manager of the mine and in the eventual cessation of mine operations.

The parties executed a “Compromise with Dation in Payment” wherein Baguio Gold admitted an indebtedness to petitioner in the amount of P179,394,000.00 and agreed to pay the same in three segments by first assigning Baguio Gold’s tangible assets to Philex Mining, transferring to the latter Baguio Gold’s equitable title in its Philodrill assets and finally settling the remaining liability through properties that Baguio Gold may acquire in the future.

The parties executed an “Amendment to Compromise with Dation in Payment” where the parties determined that Baguio Gold’s indebtedness to petitioner actually

amounted to P259,137,245.00,which sum included liabilities of Baguio Gold to other creditors that petitioner had assumed as guarantor. These liabilities pertained to long-term loans amounting to US$11,000,000.00 contracted b y B a g u i o G o l d f r o m t h e B a n k o f A m e r i c a N T & S A a n d C i t i b a n k N . A . T h i s t i m e , B a g u i o G o l d u n d e r t o o k t o p a y p e t i t i o n e r i n t w o s e g m e n t s b y f i r s t a s s i g n i n g i t s t a n g i b l e a s s e t s f o r P127,838,051.00 and then transferring its equitable title in its Philodrill assets for P16,302,426.00.  T h e p a r t i e s t h e n a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t B a g u i o G o l d h a d a r e m a i n i n g o u t s t a n d i n g i n d e b t e d n e s s t o petitioner in the amount of P114,996,768.00.

Philex Mining wrote off in its 1982 books of account the remaining outstanding indebtedness of Baguio Gold by charging P112,136,000.00 to allowances and reserves that were set up in 1981 andP2,860,768.00 to the 1982 operations.

In its 1982 annual income tax return, Philex Mining deducted from its gross income the amount of P112,136,000.00 as “loss on settlement of receivables from Baguio Gold against reserves and allowances.” However, the BIR disallowed the amount as deduction for bad debt and assessed petitioner a deficiency income tax of P62,811,161.39. Philex Mining protested before the BIR arguing that the deduction must be allowed since all requisites for a bad debt deduction were satisfied, to wit: (a) there was a valid and existing debt; (b) the debt was ascertained to be worthless; and (c) it w a s c h a r g e d o f f w i t h i n t h e t a x a b l e y e a r w h e n i t w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o b e w o r t h l e s s . B I R d e n i e d petitioner’s protest. It held that the alleged debt was not ascertained to be worthless since Baguio Gold remained existing and had not filed a petition for bankruptcy; and that the deduction did not consist of a valid and subsisting debt considering that, under the management contract, petitioner was to be paid 50% of the project’s net profit.

ISSUE:WON the parties entered into a contract of agency coupled with an interest which is not revocable at will

HELD:No. An examination of the “Power of Attorney” reveals that a partnership or joint venture was indeed intended by the parties.

In an agency coupled with interest, it is the agency that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an interest of a third party that depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both principal and agent. In this case, the non-revocation or non-withdrawal under paragraph 5(c) applies to the advances made by petitioner who is supposedly the agent and not the principal under the c o n t r a c t . T h u s , i t c a n n o t b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ’ r e l a t i o n u n d e r t h e agreement is one of agency coupled with an interest and not a partnership.

Neither can paragraph 16 of the agreement be taken as an indication that the relationship of the parties was one of agency and not a partnership. Although the said provision states that “this Agency shall be irrevocable while any obligation of the PRINCIPAL in favor of the MANAGERS is outstanding, inclusive of the MANAGERS’ account,” it does not necessarily follow that the parties entered into an agency contract coupled with an interest that cannot be withdrawn by Baguio Gold.

 The main object of the “Power of Attorney” was not to confer a power in favor of petit ioner to contract with third persons on behalf of Baguio Gold but to create a business relationship between petitioner and Baguio Gold, in which the former was to manage and operate the latter’s mine through the parties’ mutual contribution of material resources and industry. The essence of an agency, even one that is coupled with interest, is the agent’s ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third persons.

 The strongest indication that petitioner was a partner in the Sto. Nino Mine is the fact that it would receive 50% of the net profits as “compensation” under paragraph 12 of the agreement. The e n t i r e t y o f t h e p a r t i e s ’ c o n t r a c t u a l s t i p u l a t i o n s s i m p l y l e a d s t o n o o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n t h a n t h a t petitioner’s “compensation” is actually its share in the income of the joint venture. Article 1769 (4) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the “receipt by a person of a share in the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business.”

Necesito, Melitte H.

SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC VS. DOZAGR No. 175558 February 8, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner deployed De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star. On December 3 1998, Skippers alleges that De Garcia smelling strongly of alcohol went to the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, MV Wisdom Stars‘Master. Skippers claims that he was rude and shouted noisily to the master. De Gracia left the master’s cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere down the corridors. The incident was evidenced by the Captain’s Report sent on said date.Furthermore, Skippers also claim that on January 22, 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Daza arrived in the master’s cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments due to them. The incident is evidenced by a telex of Cosmo ship MV Wisdom to skippers but had conflicting dates. De Gracia claims that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments, compelling them to vent their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Union. On January 28, 1999, the Filipino seafarers were unceremoniously discharged and immediately repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA. The LA dismissed the seafarers’ complaint as the seafarers’ demand for immediate repatriation due to the dissatisfaction with the ship is considered a voluntary pre-termination of employment. Such act was deemed akin to resignation recognized under Article 285 of the LC. The LA gave credence to the telex of the master’s report that the seafarers indeed demanded immediate repatriation. ISSUE:Whether or not the seafarer’s demand for immediate repatriation can be considered an act of voluntary resignation. RULING: For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process. Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted. Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized cause under Articles282 to 284 of the Labor Code. In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmo ship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., was repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written resignations. Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.

Oliva, Elonie

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots

283 SCRA 31 Dec. 12, 1997

Due process of law has been put into question with regard to the issuance of the Administrative Order by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA), limiting the appointments to harbor pilots to 1 year, subject for cancellation and renewal after conduct of rigid evaluation of performance.

ISSUE:

WON, the respondent’s right to due process has been violated in the issuance of the admin. Order.

Held: Yes, Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of property right. Admin. Order issued by the PPA unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. They have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. It is deprivation of property without due process. After passing the exam knowing that they will enjoy measures of security and a license that will be used until the age of retirement has been put into yearly renewal and subject for cancellation?!

Ortiz, Thomas John

Lumiqued v. Exevea

282 SCRA 125 Nov. 18, 1997

Facts:

-Arsenio Lumiqued was the former Regional Director of DAR-CAR and was dismissed

- He was charged of violation of COA regulations and oppression and harassment, put through administrative proceedings and found guilty

- During the proceedings, the prosecution panel wanted to wait for Arsenio to have a lawyer but Arsenio insisted on pushing through with the trial

-Arsenio was later found guilty and dismissed from service

- His descendants, upon his death, challenged his dismissal

-His descendants claimed he was not given due process because during the administrative proceedings, he did not have an attorney with him

- The DOJ alleged that they informed him several times of his right to have a lawyer with him, but he insisted that he was capable of defending himself during the administrative trial, therefore was afforded due process

Issue:

Whether or not Arsenio Lumiqued was given due process when he was informed of his right to have an attorney but chose not to

Ruling:

- An administrative suit is different from a criminal suit, the case being that the presence or absence of a lawyer for the defense is not as necessary. In an administrative case, it is enough that the defense be given the opportunity to find a lawyer, which in this case, Arsenio insisted on continuing the trial without one. In administrative cases, unlike criminal cases, the defendant is presumed to be of sound mind and capable of defending himself well enough even without aid of a lawyer. The same cannot be said for criminal cases due to the penal nature of the proceedings.

- Lumiqued, if the only flaw was the absence of a lawyer, was thereby afforded due process because of the fact that he was repeatedly offered to be given a lawyer but he refused one.

Pavon, Toby Emerson

Ang Tibay v. CIR

69 PHIL 635 Feb. 27, 1940

Facts:

An MfR was filed by the Solicitor-General on behalf of respondent CIR. National Labor Union on the other hand prays for the remanding of the case to CIR for a new trial. Ang Tibay filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union (NLU).

Toribio Teodoro owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. NLU avers that employer Toribio Teodoro (of the National Workers’ Brotherhood [NWB] of Ang Tibay) made a false claim that there was a shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay, making it necessary for him to lay off workers. NLU alleges that such claim was unsupported by the Bureau of Customs records and the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted to discharge all the members of the NLU from work. Hence, they say that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly favoring NWB.

As regards the exhibits attached to this case, NLU says that these are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the CIR. In addition, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

Ratio:

There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.

The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the president.

There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the separation of powers.

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Some examples that it must follow are:

1. right to a hearing

2. consideration of evidence by the court

3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached

4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules

5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.

6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely accept the views of a subordinate.

7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.

The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law.

Evidence was still inaccessible.

The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Sotelo, Jose

PEREZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164763 544 SCRA 532 February 12, 2008

Facts:

- On December 28, 1988 an audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of Zenon Perez. He (Perez) was the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol.

- The amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of Perez. Based on the audit, Perez must have a total of P94,116.36 on hand. There is a shortage of P72,784.57.

- When Perez was asked by the audit team as to the location of the missing funds, he verbally explained that some part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, some for the the food of his family and the rest for his medicines.

- An Administrative case was filed against him on February 13, 1989. Perez filed his answer reiterating his verbal admission to the audit team the following day.

- Perez was charged by the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds.- Perez, assisted by a counsel de Parte, entered a plea of “not guilty”. He denied the

contents of his first answer to the Administrative case. He claimed that it was prepared without the assistance of a counsel, and that at the time of its preparation and submission he was not in peak of mental and physical condition.

- He revoked his answer and filed another answer.- Perez appealed raising the issue that his right to due process has been violated.

Issue:

W/N the right of Perez for due process has been violated

Ruling:

Petitioner cannot complain that his right to DUE PROCESS has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the before it. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the sentence of the petitioner and he is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine equal to the funds malversed.

Tarca, Aiza A.

People v. Delos Reyes

G.R. 174774, August 31, 2011

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu, a violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The RTC and CA found the accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

On appeal, the accused-appellants averred that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them by the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Also, the arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the arrests are lawful or valid

RULING:

No, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal that they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal was to take place at the Sharingla. Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the box contained shabu and "sensed" that an illegal drug deal took place.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of accused-appellants’ persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-appellants’ possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree.

Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.

The decision is reversed and set aside.

Alonzo, Clariz Anzel Pauline B.

People v. De GraciaG.R. No. 102009 July 06, 1994

 FACTS:

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d''etat staged in December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

Ruling:

YES. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even color-ably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

Bagnate, Honey Lee B.

Sabio vs. Gordon

October 17, 2006 GR No. 174340

FACTS:

Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). She entrusted upon this body the task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Marcos and his close associates. To ensure the PCGG’s unhampered performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that:

“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

Later, Sen. Santiago introduced Senate Resolution #455, directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by Philippine Overseas Telecom Corporation (POTC), Philcomsat, and Philcomsat Holdings Corporation due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective board of directors.

It was submitted to Sen. Gordon where he was the Chairman of the Committee on Government Corporation and Public Enterprises. Sen. Gordon wrote to Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the said committee, which the latter declined and invoking Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 which provides:

“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

However, Sen. Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring Chairman Sabio and several others to appear in the public hearing, but again they did not comply invoking Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.

On the third time, Sen. Gordon sent another notice, still Chairman Sabio did not appear. This prompted Sen. Gordon to issue an Order requiring him to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.

Chairman Sabio and several PCGG officials filed a Compliance and Explanation stating therein that the EO No. 1 Section 4(b) constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry.

Unconvinced, the Committee on Government Corporation and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Service, issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia and Senate Sgt. At Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate.

On September 12, 2006, Chairman Sabio arrested at around 10:45 in the morning and brought to Senate where he was detained.

Hence, this petition for the issuance of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUE : Whether or not Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 may be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on legislative investigations?

RULING:

The petition was dismissed on the ground that Sec. 4(b) of the E.O No. 1 is repugnant to the Constitution and that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding and

compelling state interest. Petitioners committed acts in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of said Corporations, therefore, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.

Note: Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

Dapulaza, Alfredo C.

Abdula vs. Guiani

326 SCRA 1 G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000

NATURE: Filed before the Court is the petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, ordering the arrest of petitioners without bail for murder.

FACTS:

1. A complaint for murder of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao was filed against the petitioner, alleging that they paid six other respondents for the death of Dimalen. The provincial prosecutor dismissed the case against the petitioner and five other respondents on finding that there is no prima facie. He, however, recommended the filing of the information against Kasan Mama.

2. On Sept. 13, 1994, the respondent Judge returned the case to the Prosecutor to file the necessary resolution.

3. On return, the case was assigned to the 2nd Assistant Prosecutor who now was able to obtained the affidavits of two witnesses. The said prosecutor refiles the charge and issued subpoena to the petitioners.

4. Judge issued the warrant of arrest for the petitioners and others .

5. Petitioners files motion before the court for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest.

ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest warrant issued by the Judge is valid relying the information provided by the prosecutor.

RULING: The petition is granted and the case was remanded to the court for appropriate action.

RATIONALE:

The respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

Fernandez, Rolando M.

People vs Estrada296 SCRA 383 (Sept 25, 1998) G.R. No. 124461

The People of the Philippines seeks the reversal of the order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, which granted private respondent Aiden Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant.The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void because:  (1)  it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City;  (2) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized;  (4)  the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued;  and (5)  its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person. In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the application for its issuance suffered from a “grave” defect, "which escaped (her) attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la MontanaThe place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound.  The said warehouse is owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly implemented.  For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.  However, the team did not find any of the drug products which were the object of the search.  Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse owned by one David Po. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which were duly receipted.In searching the warehouse the searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant.

The conclusion is that there has been an unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quash of the search warrant.”

The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant. 

Francisco, MarissaSAMMY MALACAT VS COURT OF APPEALS

283 SCRA 159 Dec. 12, 1997

FACTS:

In response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Police officer Yu and his companions were on foot patrol all of them in uniform along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their moving very fast. Police Officer Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic point and observed both groups. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching the petitioner Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s “front waist line”. Yu’s companion, Police Officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.

The trial court then ruled that the seizure at the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.

RULING:

The arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, because the general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicle; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk”.

In the instance petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a “stop and frisk” with “the seizure of the grenade from the accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest”. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases whether an arrest merely used a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed. Assuming there is a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in

flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the police officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Thus, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

Here are at least three (3) reasons why the “stop-and-frisk” was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier.  This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.  Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner.  

Second, there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” – an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.  Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.  None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was “discovered” “inside the front waistline” of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.  In fact, as noted by the trial court, when the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline.  They did not see any bulging object in his person.

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Thus, petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.

Luquias, Nora S.

PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ323 SCRA 754 January 28, 2000

FACTS- On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gunban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.One of the policemen saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgil io Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escaño, to open the door. PO3Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police, p a r k e d a l o n g S e n . G i l P u y a t A v e . , t h e o t h e r passengers were search for more weapons. Their s e a r c h y i e l d e d a . 4 5 c a l i b e r f i r e a r m w h i c h t h e y seized from Escaño.- The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven byPO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4d e l o s S a n t o s w a s s u s p i c i o u s o f t h e v e h i c l e , h e requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation, was found positive for hashish.- An information for violation of RA 6425 thereafter w a s f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e m . T h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h e three accused guilty of the said crime.- Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend t h a t t h e c h e c k p o i n t m a n n e d b y e l e m e n t s o f t h e Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an a r b i t r a r y a n d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m a n n e r . A l s o , t h e y question the validity of the search.

ISSUES1. WON the check point was illegal2. WON the search was valid3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425

HELD

1. NO- Not all checkpoints are il legal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.RatioThis Court has ruled that not all checkpoints a r e i l l e g a l . T h o s e w h i c h a r e w a r r a n t e d b y t h e exigencies of public order and are conducted in away least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, a d m i t t e d l y , r o u t i n e c h e c k p o i n t s d o i n t r u d e , t o a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the v e h i c l e i s n e i t h e r s e a r c h e d n o r i t s o c c u p a n t s subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is l imited to a visual search, said routine c h e c k s c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s v i o l a t i v e o f a n individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.- The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance o f t h e g u n b a n e n f o r c e d b y t h e C O M E L E C . T h e COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who

intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.- The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused a g a i n s t i l l e g a l s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e . P O 3 S u b a admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows a r e h e a v i l y t i n t e d j u s t t o s e e i f t h e p a s s e n g e r s t h e r e o f w e r e c a r r y i n g g u n s . A t b e s t t h e y w o u l d merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they w o u l d s t o p , w i t h o u t o p e n i n g t h e c a r ’ s d o o r s o r subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as t h e a c c u s e d h a v e i n v o k e d . N o t o n l y w o u l d i t b e impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may stil l be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated.

2. YES- Escano consented to the search and consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions from the warrant requirement.

Ratio

J u r i s p r u d e n c e r e c o g n i z e s s i x g e n e r a l l y accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving v e h i c l e s ; ( 3 ) e v i d e n c e i n p l a i n v i e w ; ( 4 ) c u s t o m s searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6)stop-and-frisk situations.- Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escaño was consented to by him.3. NO- No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car and there was n o s h o w i n g t h a t U s a n a a n d L o p e z k n e w o f t h e presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not o p e n e d s o o n a f t e r i t w a s s t o p p e d a n d a f t e r t h e accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car’s trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño, without t h e p r e s e n c e o f U s a n a a n d L o p e z ; a n d ( 5 ) a f t e r arrival at the police station and until the opening of the car’s trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the l a t t e r ’ s c a r b e f o r e t h e " f i n d i n g " o f t h e h a s h i s h sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing ,or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was n o s h o w i n g t h a t U s a n a a n d L o p e z k n e w o f t h e presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

Necesito, Melitte H.JAO V CA

249 SCRA 35 October 6, 1995

FACTS:The Office of the Director, Enforcement and Security Services (ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information regarding the presence of untaxed vehicles and parts in the premises owned by Pat Hao located along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and Honduras St., Makati. After conducting a surveillance of the two places, respondent Major Jaime Maglipon, Chief of Operations and Intelligence of the ESS, recommended the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention. District Collector of Customs Titus Villanueva issued the warrants of seizure and detention. Maglipon coordinated with the local police to assist in the execution of the respective warrants of seizure and detention. The team searched the two premises. They were barred from entering the place, but some members of the team were able to force themselves inside and were able to inspect the premises and noted that some articles were present which were not included in the list contained in the warrant. Amended warrants of seizure and detention were subsequently issued by Villanueva. Consequently customs personnel started hauling the articles pursuant to the amended warrants. Narciso Jao and Bernardo Empeynado filed a case for Injunction and Damages with prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before RTC Makati Branch 56on August 27, 1990 against respondents. On the same date, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, claiming that it was the Bureau of Customs that had exclusive jurisdiction over it. RTC denied motion to dismiss. Respondents filed MFR. MFR was denied.CA set aside the questioned orders of the trial court and enjoined it from further proceeding with the Case. The appellate court also dismissed the said civil case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over cases questioning the validity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs

HELD:The RTC is devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings .The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and RA1125 "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper for and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues rose concerning these proceedings.Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform. The illegality of a seizure by the Collector of Customs does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of the seizure should properly be ventilated before the Collector of Customs. We have had occasion to declare:The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance.

(AuyongHian v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 10)

Oliva, ElonieBureau of Customs v. Ogario

The validity on the part of customs in issuing an order to seize and determine the probable cause of the alleged smuggled 25,000 bags of Rice even without the power of search warrant has put into question by the respondents. However, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional trial Court over the case.

Issue: WON, the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.

Held:NO, the RTC doesn’t have any jurisdiction. The tariff and customs code vested the Bureau of customs the “exclusive jurisdiction” even tainted with illegality yet it’s the duty mandated that exempts it from the general rule.

Ortiz, Thomas JohnAtty. Capuchino v Apolonio

A.M. No P-04-1771 Sept. 09, 2011

Facts:

- This is an administrative case filed against Apolonio by Atty. Capuchino

- Atty. Capuchino served as counsel for the defense in a criminal trial. The defendant was found guilty and ordered to pay P120,000

- Atty. Capuchino filed an appeal. While on appeal, he attempted to settle the case with the plaintiffs, offering them P120,000 to drop the charges.

- The plaintiffs refused to drop the charges. Atty. Capuchino and the defendant, not wanting to carry home so much money, left the money with a court employee Tessie Duque for safe keeping

- When the appeal of Atty. Capuchino was denied, he produced the receipt from Duque for the said amount to show willingness to pay

- The prosecuting panel cried foul and said that Duque was unauthorized to receive any money from litigands

- A trial began on the matter of Duque’s actions

- on the day of the trial, the judge was absent. Atty. Capuchino went to inquire on the next schedule of the trial. The other panel led him to the sala and began asking him about the money and the case

- Later, Atty. Capuchino found out that their conversation was tape recorded without his knowledge and used as the basis of a complaint filed against Duque

- Atty. Capuchino claimed the respondents in this case were in violation of the Anti-Wiretapping law

Issue:

Whether or not respondents Apolonio were in violation of right to privacy of communication even if the recording was consented by their party

Ruling:

Apolonio was in violation of the right to privacy when he failed to ask the permission of Atty. Capuchino to record their conversation. As long as any of the involved parties is not informed or did not consent to the recording, it is in violation of his right to privacy and communication.

Pavon, Toby EmersonSALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

235 SCRA 111 Aug. 04, 1994

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

Sotelo, JoseNAVARRO vs. CA

G.R. No. 121087 313 SCRA 153 August 26, 1999

Facts:

- On February 4, 1990 Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique “Ike” Lingan, reporters of radio station DWTI together with one Mario Ilagan went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.

- When the dancer started to strip, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. The floor manager, Dante Liquin accompanied by a security guard, Alex Sioco approached Jalbuena and questioned the gesture. Jalbuena replied that it is his job. Sioco warned him and told him that he will kill him, when Sioco was about to pull out his gun, they managed to ran away.

- Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station, there they found three policemen in duty including Navarro drinking.

- Liquin and Sioco went to the police station as well, Navarro talked to them and after a moment turned to Jalbuena, he pulled out his firearm and pressed it against the face if Jalbuena. Lingan intervened, then had a heated argument with Navarro. When Lingan was about to turn away, Navarro hit him using the handle of his pistol. Lingan fell down, when he was about to get up Navarro punched him. Lingan was brought to the hospital but died due to the injuries.

- Without the knowledge of everyone, Jalbuena managed to tape recorded the argument between the deceased and Navarro. Using it as an evidence the trial court gave credence to it. Navarro appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

- Navarro appealed for giving credence to the presented evidence. According to him the Court of Appeals erred in rendering its decision.

Issue: W/N the tape is admissible in view of RA No. 4200 “The Anti-Wire Tapping Law”

Ruling: The tape is admissible. The law provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretely overhear, intercept, or record such communication xxx

xxx That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial offenses mentioned in secttion 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. xxx

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on Navarro’s sentence.

Tarca, Aiza A.Mercado v. Security Bank

G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006

FACTS:

Incidental to the present petition is the contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter to the Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., insinuating that:

(1) the ponente succumbed to the "tremendous pressure" of Chief Justice Davide in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank Corporation, respondent, financed the ponente’s travel to the United States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a "go signal" to sell his property.

CA Justice Renato C. Dacudao, the Commissioner in the contempt incident, submitted that the petitioner is "guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief Justice”. However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can invoke his right to freedom of speech and privacy of communication

RULING: No, a person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute

contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of such liberty.

When the petitioner attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.

Accordingly, the Court held Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Alonzo, Clariz Anzel Pauline B.