chinese guerilla counter-offensive military campaigns during the anti-japanese war (1937-1940)

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Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military

Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War

(1937-1940)

1

Brooke Hutchins

GOVT 451: Conflict in Asia

December 7, 2012

1 “World War II-‐ Pacific War-‐Events,” Kidport Reference Library. < http://www.kidport.com/RefLib/WorldHistory/WorldWarII/WorldWarIIPacificEvents.htm > [accessed 20, November 2012]. An example of Chinese Anti-‐Japanese propaganda spread during the war.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction………….………………………………………………………….……..3

2. Before 1937: The Context of the Chinese Guerilla Counter-‐

Offensive Military Campaigns …………………………………………………………….4 Japan: The Aggressor or The Aggrieved? ...........................................................4

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-‐Shek’s Policy of Appeasement………………….8

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)……………………………………………10

The Bridge that Changed Everything …………………………………………….12

The KMT-‐CCP United Front……………………………………………………………13

3. Wartime Objectives: The GMD-‐CCP United Front versus the

Japanese Imperial Army………………………………………………………….14 Imperial Japanese Army ……………………………………………………………….14

The United Front …………………………………………………………………………15

4. Chinese Guerilla Counter-‐Offensive Military Campaigns…………...17 Mao Tse-‐tung ……………………………………………………………………………….18

The Application of Mao’s Guerilla Strategy within the Anti-‐Japanese

War……………………………………………………………………………………………...20

Battle at P’inghsingkuan ……………………………………………………………….21

The Hundred Regiments Offensive…………………………………………….......22

Analyzing the Damage ………………………………………………………………….23

5. The End of Guerilla Counter-‐Offensive Military Tactics ……………26 The New Fourth Army Incident …………………………………………………….26

6. A Concluding Evaluation of Chinese Guerilla Counter-‐Offensive

Military Campaigns during the Anti-‐Japanese War …………………27

7. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..29

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“We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.”2 - Mao Tse-‐Tung, 1938

1. Introduction

The eruption of war between China and Japan culminated after years of

brooding hostility. However, it was the Marco-‐Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937,

that marked the beginning of Japan’s all-‐out aggression against China and China’s

Anti-‐Japanese War. Forced into an uneasy united front, the Kuomintang (KMT) and

Communist (CCP) forces joined together to resist the Japanese invasion. It was

during the Anti-‐Japanese War that Communist military leader and strategist, Mao

Tse-‐Tung, applied his theory of guerilla warfare, which enabled the Chinese to

unexpectedly weaken the dominant Japanese military aggression scheme and

ultimately defend Chinese territory. Mao’s tactics, executed by the Eighth Route

Army and the New Fourth Army National Revolutionary Forces, demonstrated how

guerilla warfare could be used to build power and weaken a more powerful

aggressor.

Due to the exhausting surprise it gave the Japanese, this paper will examine

Chinese guerilla counter-‐offensive military strategy and campaigns during the Anti-‐

Japanese War. First, it will provide historical background of the years leading up to

1937. Second, it will explore both the Chinese and Japanese objectives during the

war. The third section of the paper will then explicate Mao’s theory of guerilla

warfare and its application during the war, highlighting battles that emphasize the

effect of guerilla counter offensive-‐methodology on the Japanese. The essay will end

with an evaluation of the application of guerilla warfare, exploring the significance

of Chinese guerilla warfare tactics relative to the overall Chinese agenda. Proceeding

chronologically throughout the decade, this paper will provide a detailed analysis of 2 Mao Tse-‐tung, On Protracted War, (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific,

2001); 2-‐3. This quotation was taken from a series of lectures delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-‐tung from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

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Mao’s guerilla counter-‐offensive military campaign tactics and overall attest their

effectiveness against the Japanese military from 1937 until 1945 during the War of

Resistance.

2. Before 1937: The Context of the Chinese Guerilla Counter-

Offensive Military Campaigns

In order to comprehensively understand the use of guerilla counter-‐offensive

military campaigns during the Anti-‐Japanese War, it is important to explore the

historical context from which they were developed and implemented.

Japan: The Aggressor or The Aggrieved?

Prior to 1937, Japan imperialism persistently besieged China. Although from

the Chinese point of view, Japan was the aggressor. It is necessary to explore both

sides of the conflict and understand Japan’s motive for making the decision to

invade China.

As a country that was characteristically resource deficient, Japan held a

strong interest in China’s valuable raw resources. Therefore, an invasion was

viewed as the sufficient means for satisfying Japanese needs. That being said,

Manchuria, in northeast China, rich with minerals, fertile soil, and nearly 200,000

square kilometers of land, was a suitable province, for Japan to seize control over3

and on September 18, 1931, Japan invaded accordingly.

Japanese military leaders of the Kwantung Army, an army group of the

Imperial Japanese Army, initiated a plot to seize control of China’s three

northeastern provinces, illustrated on the map on page six.4 In his text Facing Japan:

Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, Parks M. Cole describes the

invasion, which came be known as the Manchuria or Mukden Incident. Coble writes:

3 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-‐CLIO, 2012); 183. 4 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); 11

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“Within hours, the major cities of southern Manchuria—Mukden Mukden (Shengyang), Yink’ou, Antung, and Ch’angch’un fell under Japanese control. Within days, most of Liaoning and Kirin provinces were brought inside the Kwantung Army’s orbit; and within weeks, the Japanese military established a puppet government over the entire northeast.”5

As described in the passage above, Japanese armed forces successfully

occupied the entire Manchuria including the Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang

(Heilungkiang) Provinces.

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This attack arguably marked the beginning of Japan’s all out aggression

against China. However, it is important to note that this apparent Japanese hostility

was neither impulsive nor random. It instead occurred following a sequence of

events during which Japan, “made sincere and strenuous efforts to befriend China.”7

In fact, in his K.K. Kawakami wrote in 1938, in the course of the war, that Japan

believed, “herself the aggrieved part in the present conflict.”8

5 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 11. 6 Li Tien-‐yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1959); 10. Map shows provinces that Japanese invaded during the Manchuria Incident. 7 Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims, (London: John Murray,

1938); 54. 8 Ibid., 54.

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Even before the Manchuria incident of 1931, anti-‐Japanese agitation was

rampant in China, while Japan’s policy was distinctly conciliatory. China developed a

technique of anti-‐Japanese agitation and used it with deadly effect. In June 1928, the

National Convention of Anti-‐Japanese Societies, subsidized by the Nanking

Government, issued the following declaration:

“The objective of our anti-‐Japanese movement is to ruin the Japanese by causing our economic rupture with them. The pressure will next be brought to bear upon all the rest of the Imperialist nations, with the ultimate object of nullifying all unequal treaties.”9

Additionally, until August 1929 the Nanking Government subsidized

“Societies for the Revocation of Unequal Treaties” and openly enforced an anti-‐

Japanese boycott directly punishing Chinese merchants handling Japanese goods,

thereby triggering diplomatic complications with Japan. Meanwhile, all educational

institutions were utilized to instill hostility toward Japan. For example, in May 1928,

the National Education Conference at Nanking adopted the following resolutions:

1. “Ample material regarding national humiliations should be included in the text-‐books of middle and primary schools.”10

2. “On every available opportunity, the schools should be used to propagate the facts regarding our national humiliations and to impress upon the people what nation is China’s foremost enemy.”11

3. “Maps and drawings illustrative of national humiliations

should be provided, and attention of the students should be directed to these at every opportunity.”12

4. “The teachers and students should study together the methods whereby China’s foremost enemy may be overthrown.”13

9 Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims,71. 10 Ibid.,72. 11 Ibid.,72. 12 Ibid., 72. 13 Ibid,, 72.

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China’s “foremost enemy” mentioned above was referring to Japan and the

unforgivable historical “humiliation” it caused China was accentuated. Even before

this plan was adopted, children’s textbook contained passages stating: “Japan is an

enemy nation!”14 The effect of this type of propaganda was significant, as the whole

country became, “aflame with hatred of Japan—not a spontaneous combustion, but

a conflagration ignited by the Nationalist Government itself.”15 As a result, anti-‐

Japanese incidents occurred in rapid succession over the years leading up to the

wars as displayed by the following timeline:

The timeline above shows the violent result of years of anti-‐Japanese

propaganda, financed and encouraged by the Nanking Government. However, as 14 Kawakami, Japan in China, Her Motives and Aims, 72. 15 Ibid., 74.

September 18, 1931: Mukden Incident

May 1935: Two Chinese newspaper editors with pro-Japanese leanings were murdered in Tientsin.

December 21, 1935: About a thousand Chinese students paraded through the center of the Shanghai International Settlement shouting “Down with Japanese Imperialism!” “Drive out every Japanese from Shanghai!” They distributed anti-‐Japanese pamphlets.

June 19, 1936: A Japanese was shot dead by Chinese at Fangtou, Shangtung province.

August 24, 1936: A correspondent of the Osaka Minichi and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi and another Japanese press correspondent were pounced upon by a mob of 10,000 Chinese, mostly young boys and girls, and were most brutally murdered at Chengtu, Szechuan province. Two other Japanese were seriously wounded.

January 6, 1936: Two thousand Chinese students of middle schools held demonstrations in Swatow demanding war against Japan.

March 1937: The Kuangsi provincial authorities, for no other reason but to fan anti-Japanese feeling, expelled all Japanese from the province.

July 7, 1937: Marco Polo Bridge Incident

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revealed by his Appeasement Policy, Chiang Kai-‐shek had no intention of going to

war with Japan, but instead meant to exploit the Japanese for an ulterior purpose of

uniting the country under his power and strengthening his own position.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s Policy of Appeasement

Japan’s 1931 attack augmented Chinese fury, not only because of Japanese

audacity, but also due to the initial policy of the Chinese Government to not resist.

During the 1931 Manchuria Incident, General Chang Hseuh-‐liang, pictured

below as leader of Manchuria and much of northern China, could have put up a

credible defense against the Japanese. The Japanese Kwantung Army numbered

11,000, while Chang reportedly controlled at least one-‐quarter of a million troops.

In addition, his arsenal at Mukden was considered China’s most modern: “His air

force contained sixty planes; his forces ad tanks, 4,000 machine guns, and modern

field artillery.”16Nevertheless, Chang refused to resist. Following the attack on

September 20, 1931, Chang told reporters17:

18

History later revealed that Chang Hseuh-‐liang, at the time, was being

pressured by Chiang Kai-‐shek and the government to uphold the policy of 16 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 12. 17 Ibid., 12. 18 “Zhang Xueliang,” Wikipedia, < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang > [accessed 20, November 2012]. Photograph of Chang Hseuh-‐liang Warlord of Manchuria.

“As soon as I sensed that Japan was about

to take certain action in Manchuria, I used

an order to all my subordinates that when

and if Japanese troop attacked, all the

forces under their respective commands,

including the police, should not

resist…That is why Chinese troops did not

retaliate in an authorized, organized way.”

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appeasement. Chiang’s policy demanded, “first internal pacification, then external

resistance.”19 Chiang created the policy first because he believed that his army was

inferior to Japan’s military machine and thus war would be disastrous both for

China and himself politically. Second, Chiang was also more concerned with

domestic issues, such as defeating the rebellious Chinese Communists and secure

control of fractionalized China under his central authority. As a result, Chiang

decisively chose to avoid war with Japan and his policy of appeasement ensued.

Chiang’s “appeasement policy carried high political risks.”20In fact it can even

be argued that, “the entire Nanking government lost prestige among the Chinese

public over the appeasement issue.”21Overall appeasement proved to be unpopular

as an emotional charged Chinese populace demanded resistance to Japan.

The city of Shanghai particularly bristled with hostility between Chinese and

Japanese. The metropolis was the center of the anti-‐Japanese boycott and student

movements, as well as Japanese presence in China as nearly 30,000 Japanese

resided in the city. Japanese business and industrial leaders in Shanghai had been

hurt by the boycott and pressured by their military authorities to take action. On

January 28, 1932, a Japanese carrier aircraft bombed Shanghai. Three thousand

Japanese troops then proceeded to invade the city: “The destruction from this

assault was frightful. Bombs and shells landed in densely populated areas, killing

and wounding thousands and destroying untold numbers of house and shops.”22

Ending in a ceasefire, the fighting at Shanghai electrified public opinion in China

even more.

As demonstrations, anti-‐Japanese boycotts, and even attacks on Japanese

citizens augmented dramatically throughout China, as illustrated in the timeline on

page eight, Chiang’s opponents took the political opportunity to attack him. Parks M.

Coble explains that, “Nearly every one of Chiang’s opponents cloaked himself in an

19 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 1. 20 Ibid., 2 21 Ibid., 2 22 Ibid., 43

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anti-‐Japanese mantle and publically assailed Chiang for catering to Japanese

demands;”23 most notably the Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP).

The Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP)

As the Kuomintang Government’s most “deadly enemy,”24 the Chinese

Communist Party was the first to appeal to the masses for armed resistance. When

the Japanese began to take over Manchuria, following the Mukden Incident, in

September 1932, the Chinese Communists responded with the following

resolutions:

“…The Manchurian Incident will have decisive influence on future events in China…All these things will prompt the collapse and bankruptcy of the Kuomintang rule…We shall exploit the popular disappointment in a hatred for the Kuomintang rule so as to organize the broad masses and guide them toward a struggle to eliminate the Kuomintang…We shall lead the masses...”25

Communist sentiments to take action won over the increasingly anti-‐

Japanese population and simultaneously aided the Communists’ tactical goal to gain

supporters. This caused the Nanking government to further lose popularity and

legitimacy. From the KMT’s view, the Communists inadvertently helped facilitate

Japanese aggression in China, “by attacking the Government’s rear.”26Thus it was

these communist activities that further compelled the KMT to uphold the policy of

“giving first priority to internal peace in order to resist external aggression.” Hence,

suppressing the Communists would take precedence over resisting Japan. However,

in January 1933, when the Communists issued a proclamation stating its readiness

to stop fighting and negotiate with the KMT, in order to rally all forces against

“Japanese invaders and save the motherland,”27 Kai-‐shek launched a full-‐scale

encirclement campaign against the Communist Red Army. As a result of Nationalist

23 Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, 2. 24So Wai Chor, “The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932-‐1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Wang Jingwei,” Modern China, vol. 28, (2002): pp. 214 25 John C. Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World Institute, 1976); 3. 26 Ibid., 3 27Tien-‐yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, iii.

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aggression against the Communists, the Communist Party gained a positive

reputation and even more support.

On August 1, 1935, the Chinese Communist party called for the establishment

of a national anti-‐Japanese united front and put forward a “Ten-‐Point Program” to

save the nation. Although the Declaration, like other CCP documents, contained

vehement attacks on the KMT and its leadership, it omitted repetition of the slogan

calling for the overthrow of the National Government. The Declaration stated:

“…as soon as any troops want to go to war with the Japanese, the Red Army shall immediately stop its hostilities and be willing to cooperate closely with them [Kuomintang troops] in the common task of national salvation, regardless of their past and present grievances with the Red Army, as well as any differences they may have with the Red Army over domestic issues.”28

Despite mounting opposition however, their cooperation in dealing with the

Japanese threat did not evolve until after 1935. Furthermore, it was not until the

attack at Lukou-‐chiao on July 7, 1938 that Chiang Kai-‐shek finally agreed to go to

war and jointly directed the policy toward Japan with the Communists.

Below is a map showing areas under Nationalist Control from 1928 until

1937. The map demonstrates how divided China was prior to 1937.

28 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 3.

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The Bridge that Changed Everything

What happened on the night of July 7, 1937, near the Lugouqiao Marco Polo

Bridge, ten miles outside Beijing in Hebei, is not entirely clear. Allegedly Japanese

forces fired blank cartridges, while undergoing training exercises; which prompted

Chinese soldiers to retaliate with live fire. The Japanese then discovered that one of

their soldiers was missing. Thinking the Chinese might have captured him, the

Japanese demanded permission to search Wanping for him. Refusing the Japanese

entry, a shot was heard, and the two sides began firing. Both sides sent more troops

to the area and early in the morning of July 8th , Japanese infantry and armored

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vehicles attacked the Marco Polo Bridge. Attempts were made to settle things, but

the Chinese government, under strong anti-‐Japanese pressure, refused to make any

concessions in the negotiation of the dispute. Concurrently, the incident gave

Japanese the excuse to mount a full-‐scale invasion of China.

Chiang Kai-‐shek saw the Incident as the boldest attempt yet by Japan to

completely separate northern provinces from Chinese control and incorporate them

into the Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo. In his account, General Li Tien-‐yu

further explains that, “after the Lukouchia (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) which the

Japanese precipitated on July 7, 1937, Japan arrogantly expected to conquer China in

three months.” “Hordes of Japanese troops capture Peking, Tientsin, Nanknow,

Changchiakou (Kalgan), and later Tehchow and Paoting, like a flood let loose by

broken dykes.”29The position of China was daily deteriorating and the entire

Chinese people were on the brink of national subjugation.”30 As a result it was this

event that broke Chiang’s tolerance of Japanese aggression as Chiang finally agreed

to initiate a full-‐scale war with Japan.

The KMT-CCP United Front

Following the attack at Lukou-‐chiao, Mao Tse-‐tung and high-‐ranking

Communist military leaders sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-‐shek expressing their

wishes to join forces to fight the Japanese under Chaing’s leadership. In response, on

August 22, 1937, the National government formally issued orders to incorporate the

Communist forces. Under agreement, the main force of the CCP’s Red Army was

reorganized into the Eighth Route Army establishing the Eighth Route Army

National Revolutionary Forces,” with Chu The and P’eng The-‐huai as Commander

and Deputy commander. The army, composed of three divisions with a total

strength of 46,00031 men, was assigned to the Second War Area in Northern Shansi

province under the command of Yen His-‐shan. Meanwhile, Lin Tsu-‐hu and Chang-‐

Kuo-‐t’ao were appointed Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Shansi-‐Kanus-‐Ningsia

29 Tien-‐yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, 1. 30 Ibid., ii. 31 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 469.

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Border Area Government. Chu The and P’eng The-‐huai assumed their new command

on August 25, 1937 and pledged their sincere support to Chiang as Generalissimo. In

the south, the Red Army’s guerilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth

Army of the National Amy, totaling 10,30032 men, including four field divisions. Ye

ting would command the New Fourth Army National Revolutionary Forces.

The Chinese people, now unified, embarked on the War of Resistance against

Japan. More significantly, it is within this framework that the Chinese performed

their guerilla counter-‐offensive military campaigns against the Japanese.

3. Wartime Objectives: The GMD-CCP United Front versus the

Japanese Imperial Army

In order to fully value the guerilla counter-‐offensive military campaigns

performed by the Chinese, it is beneficial to review the objectives of each party

involved in the development and execution of the campaign. The following section

will provide a comprehensive outline of the Chinese objective to unite and

effectively weaken the dominant Japanese Army versus the Japanese military

objective to conquest Chinese territory.

Imperial Japanese Army

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Empire of Japan’s main objective was to

establish a newly advanced position in Asia. In order to guarantee its supremacy in

the East, Japan adhered to a policy of self-‐preservation. This policy was adopted in

response to a range of external problems.

In the late 1920’s Japan experienced serious economic turmoil. Protectionism

and trade tariffs introduced by the United States to protect its industry placed high

barriers on Japanese trade. In addition, due to an increasing Russian presence and

influence with China, Japan was facing a looming political threat. Furthermore,

Japan was experiencing the detrimental economic, diplomatic, and political effects of

anti-‐Japanese propaganda spreading throughout China perpetuated by the Nanking

32 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 469.

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Government. As a result of these various issues, high unemployment, growing over-‐

population, and acute shortage of raw materials plagued the Japanese economy. In

order to solve these problems, Japan implemented their self-‐preservation policy and

set out to gain new territory hoping to preserve their East Asian supremacy.

Logically, Japan, held a strong interest in China’s abundance in valuable

natural resources. Moreover, because of the chaotic and instable situation in China,

which was at the end of a large-‐scale civil war and vulnerable, Japan was provided

with an excellent opportunity to expand and enhance foreign trade and industry.

That being said, when the Japanese resumed their military operations in North

China in July 1937, they informed the world that they meant to “chastise the Chiang

Kai-‐shek government”, and “eradicate the anti-‐Japanese activities in China.” Overall,

they viewed an invasion as the vehicle to secure Japanese supremacy.

The United Front

The goal of the Chinese United Front in short was to unite and fight the

encroachment of Japanese imperialism on Chinese sovereignty. However, being only

a temporary and exceedingly shaky military and political coalition, the objectives of

the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party should be further

examined separately.

It is important to note that with the establishment of the United Front came

the formation of two fronts: first, the Kuomintang Front and second, the front of the

liberated areas and that of the Communist Party.

Although the goal of the Kuomintang’s National Revolutionary Army was to

resist Japanese aggression, because of looming tensions and continual paranoia

towards the Communists, controlling the growth, expansion, and influence of the

Communist Party remained a priority. That being said, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-‐

shek’s wartime platform included both armed resistance and national

reconstruction.

On the other hand, the Communist Chinese forces fought as a nominal part of

the National Revolutionary under the United Front. However, a distinctive feature of

their wartime policy was their belief in defeating the enemy by extending the

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duration of the war. Mao-‐Tse-‐tung further explicates this policy in his 1938 treatise,

On Protracted War. He explains that although the political aim of the War of

Resistance against Japan is to “drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new

China of freedom and equality,” to reach that goal the object of the Chinese must be

“to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy,” meaning “disarm him” or “deprive him

of the power to resist.”33 This policy resulted in the Communist forces’ guerilla

status and furthermore their efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing

Chinese guerilla forces, an objective, which unsurprisingly irritated Chiang Kai-‐shek,

as explained later, in section four. The basic Communist strategy to achieve their

objective of a protracted war was to engage in guerilla warfare and expand their

strength and territories thereby preserving their ability to resist relentlessly and

eventually exhaust the Japanese.

Below is an overview of Communist bases during the war.

33 Tse-‐tung, On Protracted War, 61-‐62

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34

The subsequent section will explore Mao’s remarkable strategy, as Mao’s

guerilla style tactics during this war are a solid example of an effective counter-‐

offensive guerilla warfare campaign.

4. Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Campaigns

34 Kataoka, Tetsuya, “Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front.” (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974); 53.

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Mao Tse-tung

35

Mao Tse-‐tung, pictured above, adopted a Chinese nationalist and anti-‐

imperialist outlook early in life. He was particularly influenced by the events of the

Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Qing Dynasty and May Fourth

Movement of 1919, a populist movement, which prepared the ideological

foundation for the establishment of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He was

one of the early members of the CPC, quickly mounting to a senior position. In 1922

when the Communists first agreed to an alliance with the KMT, Mao aided in

creating a revolutionary peasant army and organizing rural land reform. In 1927

however, Chiang Kai-‐shek, the KMT’s military leader terminated the alliance and

enforced an anti-‐communist purge. In response, the CPC formed an army of peasant

militia and the two sides fought in the Chinese Civil War. Mao was responsible for

commanding part of the CPC’s Red Army. That being said, during the Anti-‐Japanese

War, Mao agreed to help lead the Red Army forces incorporated into the United

Front.

Numbering only 20,000 men, the Communist Army was numerically inferior

to the Nationalist Government troops, and therefore could not be expected to play a

decisive role no matter how good their performance was on the battlefield. That

35 “The Key Codes: The Asian Leopard,” (Bible Code Research); (White Stone Foundation for Research, Inc., 2010), < http://biblecoderesearch.org/Key_Codes/Leopard_Files/Index.html > [accessed 20 November 2012].

19

being said, from the beginning of the war against Japan Communist military leader

and strategist, Mao argued against having his Communist troops join in regular

warfare battle.

Mao presented” three tenets that gave guerrilla warfare a new

potential.”36First, he admitted that guerillas troops could not win unaided. He

therefore envisaged an effort to create regular forces while guerrillas waged their

“hit and run” tactics.37He argued that at a later phase, the guerillas and regular units

would collectively coordinate their campaigns against the opponent. He overall

stressed that both styles of fighting were needed to win.

Second, Mao demanded a mass effort in organizing popular, political,

logistical, and moral support for guerrillas and regulars. He argued that the entire

population should be actively enlisted in either organization and fighting for the

cause. According to Mao, youths, farmers, teachers, workers, artists, and both men

and women were eligible to participate in the common cause of waging war. He

asserted that mass support was extremely vital.

Finally, Mao’s doctrine established that it was essential the war be a

protracted one. He made no promises of quick victory, but argued for prolonged

sacrifice. He explained that effective guerrilla warfare took time.

Overall, Mao viewed guerilla warfare as a “powerful special weapon with

which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them. It is a way

for the Chinese to expel an intruder that has more arms, equipment, and troops.” His

overarching goal was thus to adopt a policy of protracted war characterized by

guerilla operations. He believed that this technique could at least partially destroy

the Japanese.

In order to effectively execute guerilla operations Mao argued that it would

be important for Communist troops to undergo an all-‐out effort to increase

Communist military strength. He therefore concluded that during the initial stage of

the war, it would be therefore be important for the Communist troops to act in

36 Rod Paschall, “Guerrilla Warfare,” The History Channel, < http://www.history.com/topics/guerrilla-‐warfare > [accessed 19 November 2012]. 37 Ibid., < http://www.history.com/topics/guerrilla-‐warfare >.

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accordance with the assignments orders of the Nationalist Government in order to

create a good image and thereby reap propaganda advantages. This caused already

suspicious Chiang to believe the Communists were “trying to infiltrate the

Kuomintang on a large scale.”38 Consequently, making the initial execution of his

strategy was initially difficult to accept by the KMT.

The Application of Mao’s Guerilla Strategy within the Anti-Japanese War

Mao argued that there were six requirements to ensure to conservation and

development of Chinese strength and the destruction of the Japanese:

1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical

attacks in a war of strategically defense; tactical speed in a war

strategically protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a

war conducts strategically on interior lines. 39

2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.40

3. The establishment of bases.41

4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the

attack and the defense. 42

5. The development of mobile operations.43

6. Correct command.44

38 China’s Bitter Victory: The War With Japan 1937-1945, edited by James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992); pp. 98 39 Mao Tse-‐tung, “On Guerilla Warfare,” Maoist Documentation Project, < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm > [accessed 19 November 2012] 40 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm >. 41 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm >. 42 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm >. 43 Tse-‐tung, “On Guerilla Warfare,” < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm > [ 44 Ibid., < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm >.

21

Of these requirements, the most evident during the Anti-‐Japanese War was

Mao’s contention that guerilla activities could be carried out directly

complementary to traditional operations of the Nationalist army. He further

explained his strategy in following terms:

“The division of labor between the KMT and the CCP in the anti-‐Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerilla warfare behind enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual coordination and mutual assistance.”45

Guerilla operations during the Anti-‐Japanese War are best exemplified in the

following two cases.

Battle at P’inghsingkuan

The Battle at P’inghsingkuan46 on September 1937 is an example of the

execution of Mao’s division of labor strategy. During the battle, the Communists

managed to ambush an entire Japanese division, inflicting about 5,000 casualties in

the process. In this battle, “the casualties of the Government troops, which carried

on regular frontal warfare were double those of the Communist troops which

carried out ambushes on the flank.”47

Below is a map of the 8th Route Army’s movements from September

Movements from September until November 1937.

45 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 24. 46 Ibid., 24. 47K’ang-jih chan-cheng shih-chi ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang-chun (The Chinese People’s Liberation Army during the Anti-‐Japanese War), (Peking: Jen mi ch’u-‐pan-‐she, 1945), p. 18 Cf. Hu Hua, Lectures, p. 365 reprinted in John C. Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Asia and World Institute, 1976); 3.

22

48

The Hundred Regiments Offensive

A second execution of Mao’s division of labor strategy was during the

Hundred Regiments Offensive. Beginning on December 5, 1940, the Communist

division commanded by Peng Dehuai launched a surprise massive guerrilla

offensive against the Japanese counterinsurgency campaign led by General Tada

Hayao. The eighth route army began the battle with 400,000 troops, about half

guerrillas and half regular troops. The attacks focused on the Shihchiachuang-‐

Taiyuan, Peiping-‐Hankow, and Tatung-‐Fenglingtu rail lines. Catching the Japanese

off-‐guard the offensive, which lasted three months, managed to greatly annoy the

Japanese. There were 25,000 Japanese casualties and another 20,000 prisoners. 48 Kataoka, Tetsuya, “Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front.” (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974); 62.

23

Material damage was fairly significant, with 600 miles of railroad destroyed and the

Chingching coal mine near Taiyuan shut down for six months. Due to this damage,

Japanese occupation of North China was disrupted.

The following is a photograph of a Communist guerilla soldier waving the

Nationalist Flag of China after a victorious battle against the Japanese during the

Hundred Regiments Offensive.

49

Analyzing the Damage

In both of these Chinese soldiers fought relentlessly utilizing Mao’s non-‐

traditional guerilla tactics. An historical account from the time exemplifies this

persistence: “The Japanese people are disillusioned and the army is baffled by the

stubbornness and courage of the Chinese soldiers in the act of defending their

national honour and existence.”50 Another account states:

49 “Hundred Regiments Offensive,” Wikipedia, < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Regiments_Offensive > [accessed 20 November 2012]. 50 National Southwest Associated University Library. Japan’s Aggression and Public Opinion (Kunming, China: 1938); pp. iii.

24

“In China there is an increasing conviction that right will finally overcome might, as the war of attrition is protracted, there has been manifested in the whole nation an indomitable will and power of resistance to the bitter end, in spite of China’s immense sacrifice which is the greatest she has ever experienced in the course of her long history.”

As illustrated by this remarkable passages Communist guerilla campaigns

can be recognized for exhausting the Japanese forces. This claim can be further

accredited by the Japanese responsive “three all policy,” which included killing,

burning, and destroying all Chinese. (A map of the Japanese 1941 plan can be seen

on the subsequent page) Although the vicious counterinsurgency program by the

end of 1942 severely eroded Communist power as it reduced the Red Army from

400,000 to 300,000 and the population of Communist base areas from 44,000,000

to 25,000,000, the Japanese lacked the military resources needed to prosecute this

campaign to its conclusion, allowing the communist army to survive and recover.

Mao himself acknowledged that the enemy was in a weak strategic position. The

Japanese Empire had grievously and with Communist satisfaction, overextended

itself.

25

51

51 Patrick Clancey, “China Defensive: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II,”HyperWar Foundation, < http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-‐C-‐ChinaD/index.html > [accessed 19 November 2012].

26

5. The End of Guerilla Counter-Offensive Military Tactics

Although the guerilla campaigns were arguably successful, the Kuomintang

Government remained adamantly against the Communist Party. Chiefly due to the

expansion policy that supplemented the guerilla campaigns, friction with the

Government troops was inevitable. In addition, the friction grew partly out of the

nature of guerilla warfare itself, which requires independent operations. In his

treatise, On Guerilla Warfare, Mao explains that guerilla warfare should be

decentralized to allow quickness and detachment, a concept inconsistent with

Nationalist Government policy and which perpetuated their mistrust. As a result,

from 1939 onwards, the Kuomintang made many criminal attacks against the

Communist areas, secretly ordered large numbers of Kuomintang troops to

surrender to the Japanese invaders, and eventually collaborated with the Japanese

in attacking the Eighth and New Fourth armies.52

The New Fourth Army Incident

It can be asserted that the New Fourth Army Incident also known as the

Wannan Incident of 1941 marked the significant end of real cooperation between

Nationalists and Communists.

Fearing the Communists were attempting to politicize the peasants in order

to gain support and popularity in the Yangzi River delta and areas south of the river,

GMD officials issued a directive on December 9, 1940, demanding that the

Communists withdraw their forces north of the Yangzi River by December 31, 1940.

The Communists delayed executing this movement as they indeed were attempting

to win mass support and remain south of the river. As a result, on January 4, 1941,

seven Nationalist divisions surrounded and attacked the headquarters of

approximately 9,000 New Fourth Army troops near Maolin in Jiangsu Province.

From January 7 to 13th, Nationalist troops killed about 3,000 New Fourth Army

troops and captured the remainder. Then, on January 17, 1941, the government of

52 Tien-‐yu, Saga of Resistance to Japanese Invasion, vii.

27

Jiang Jieshi dissolved the New Fourth Army and closed CCP military liaison offices in

many GMD held cities.

Although this incident was a detrimental to the Communist effort, it was also

an advantageous for their popularity as it drew party support. The Incident

provided the Communists with a powerful propaganda tool by which they could

present themselves as “martyred patriots.”53 The Nationalist Party of China was

criticized for creating internal strife when the Chinese were supposed to be united

against the Japanese, while the Communist Party of China seen as heroes at the

vanguard of the fight against the Japanese and Nationalist treachery.54 Overall, “no

single event during the Anti-‐Japanese war did more to elicit sympathy for the CCP

and establish its patriotic credentials both at home and abroad.”55

In 1939, Mao Tse-‐tung issued a declaration stating: “we [CCP forces] will not

attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-‐attack.”56

Mao’s remark signaled the start of Communist military attacks, which aggravated

the already strained KMT-‐CCP relations. Overtime, KMT influence in North China

was greatly lessened as Government troops were either absorbed by the

Communists or expelled by the Japanese.

6. A Concluding Evaluation of Chinese Guerilla Counter-Offensive

Military Campaigns during the Anti-Japanese War

When evaluating Chinese guerilla counter-‐offensive military campaigns

against the Japanese throughout the Anti-‐Japanese War, it is both important and

necessary to note that at no point did the Chinese threaten to completely dislodge

the Japanese occupation. Even Samuel Griffith, Mao’s sympathetic American

translator admits:, “No authentic records support the proposition that Communist

military operations succeeded in forcing the Japanese invaders from an extensive

53 China at War: An Encyclopedia, edited by Xiaobing Li, 319. 54 Ibid., 319. 55 Ibid., 320. 56 Kuan, The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945, 24.

28

territory they physically occupied and wanted to hold…”57 However, Mao’s military

writings and possibly this paper thus far may create a mistaken impression that

Chinese Communist were engaged in constant fighting against the Japanese, that

most of Japanese war effort was directed against the Communists and that in the

end the Japanese were defeated chiefly because of the relentless attacks of the

Communist divisions. In reality, “even after 1940 only about one-‐quarter of the

Japanese forces in China were operating against the Communists.” However,

although the Communists never succeeded in destroying the forces of the Japanese

occupation, a successful application of guerilla counter-‐offensive military campaigns

did occur during the Anti-‐Japanese War.

During the eight-‐year war of resistance, the Communists indeed achieved

their basic strategy to engage in guerilla warfare to expand their strength and

exhaust the Japanese. In fact, Japanese Army Archives recall that Chinese

Communist forces carried out successful guerilla operations against the Japanese

Army, and that Communist forces created numerous, popularly supported anti-‐

Japanese enclaves in each of the provinces in North China. Overall, as

comprehensively demonstrated throughout this essay, Mao’s guerilla style-‐tactics

were supplementary to Chinese efforts to destroy the Japanese aggressor as they

effectively exhausted and thereby weakened Japanese army during the Anti-‐

Japanese War. Moreover, the legacy of Mao’s guerrilla operations led to a successful

defeat of Chiang Kai-‐shek’s Nationalists after World War II, and inspired emulation

by many insurgent leaders thereafter.

57 Benjamin Borgeson, “The Principles of Destruction in Irregular Warfare: Theory and Practice,” Small Wars Journal, (4 January 2012), < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-‐principles-‐of-‐destruction-‐in-‐irregular-‐warfare-‐theory-‐and-‐practice#_ftnref127 > [accessed 19, November 2012].

29

7. Bibliography

Bisson, Thomas Arthur. Japan in China (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1937); Borgeson, Benjamin.” The Principles of Destruction in Irregular Warfare: Theory

and Practice.” Small Wars Journal, (4 January 2012). < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-‐principles-‐of-‐destruction-‐in-‐irregular-‐warfare-‐theory-‐and-‐practice#_ftnref127 > [accessed 19, November 2012].

Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945 (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1962);

Chiang Kai-‐shek, Resistance and Reconstruction: Messages During China’s Six Years of

War 1937-1945, (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945); China at War: An Encyclopedia. Edited by Xiaobing Li. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-‐CLIO,

2012); China’s Bitter Victory: The War With Japan 1937-1945. Edited by James C. Hsiung and

Steven I. Levine (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992); Chor, So Wai. “The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932-‐1937: The Roles

of Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Wang Jingwei.” Modern China. vol. 28, (2002); Clancey, Patrick, “China Defensive: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II,

”HyperWar Foundation. < http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-‐C-‐ChinaD/index.html > [accessed 19 November 2012].

Coble, Parks M. Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937.

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); “Guerilla Warfare” Wikipedia. <

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Guerrilla_Warfare > [accessed 20, November 2012].

Hu Pu-‐yu, A Brief History of Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), (Taipei, Taiwan: Zhong Wu Pub. Co., 1974);

Hundred Regiments Offensive.” Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Regiments_Offensive > [accessed 20 November 2012].

Kuan, John C. The KMT-CCP Wartime Negotiations 1937-1945 (Taipei, Taiwan: The

Asia and World Institute, 1976);

30

“Marco Polo Bridge Incident.” Encyclopedia Britannica. <

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364275/Marco-‐Polo-‐Bridge-‐Incident#tocBiblio > [accessed November 20, 2012].

National Southwest Associated University Library. Japan’s Aggression and Public Opinion (Kunming, China: 1938).

Paschall, Rod. “Guerrilla Warfare.” The History Channel. <

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Second United Front.” (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974).

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Tse-‐tung, Mao. “On Guerilla Warfare,” Maoist Documentation Project. < http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-‐warfare/ch07.htm > [accessed 19 November 2012].

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2001);

“World War II-‐ Pacific War-‐Events,” Kidport Reference Library. < http://www.kidport.com/RefLib/WorldHistory/WorldWarII/WorldWarIIPacificEvents.htm > [accessed 20, November 2012].

“Zhang Xueliang.” Wikipedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang > [accessed 20, November 2012].

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