joint icao mid/acac workshop on gnss
TRANSCRIPT
Joint ICAO Mid/ACAC Workshop on GNSS
Benoit ROTURIER, DSNA
Moustapha BOUKARY MALAM, EGNOS in Africa JPO
Theme 4: GNSS vulnerabilities and mitigation measures
Rabat (Morocco) : 7 - 8 November 2017
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
GNSS VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF GNSS AGRESSION ON AVIATION OPERATION
FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
STATES AND ANSP RESPONSIBILITIES (GNSS Vulnerability Aviation)
MITIGATION MEASURES
CHALLENGES
CONCLUSION and WAY FORWARD
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INTRODUCTIONThe Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) provides position and timinginformation supporting flights and Air Traffic Management (ATM) operations.
GNSS, has become an important component of navigation infrastructuresupporting ICAO Performance Based Navigation (PBN). Its receiver is :
safety-critical piece of equipment and the main source of position informationwhich drives aircraft navigation systems.
primary equipment supporting Required Navigation Performance (RNP)operations and providing position input to aircraft Navigation Display (ND),Ground-Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and Automatic DependentSurveillance (ADS).
GNSS pulses are extremely weak. GPS signals have been compared with the lightemitted by a “40 Watt light bulb as seen from 11,000 miles away (17,700 km).”
As such GNSS signals are vulnerable3
GNSS VULNERABILITY
GNSS signals are vulnerable to:
Interference. The broadcast of a stronger signal that intentionally orunintentionally blocks or impacts a GNSS satellite signal.
Jamming and Spoofing. The broadcast of a false GNSS signal, but at aslightly greater power. This deceives the GNSS receiver into locking onto thespoofed signal. Once the receiver has locked onto the stronger spoofed signal,the false signal gradually phases out of sync with the actual GNSS signal, causingthe receiver to report false PNT data (information generated by the spoofer).
Cyber attack, attempts to deceive a GNSS receiver by broadcasting incorrectGNSS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal GNSS signals
Space Weather. Solar activity such as solar flares, coronal mass ejections, high-speed solar wind, and the impact of energetic particles on the earth’sionosphere.
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CASE STUDY: Induced Vulnerability from The Ionosphere (Space Weather Phenomena)
JPO Team of GNSS Experts developed case study to demonstrate Vulnerabilityassociated with extreme Ionospheric activities
GNSS data from SAGAIE and IGS GNSS stations within West Africa used fordemonstration. Due to the amount of data to process, the result is not available at time.
Team Identified a set of days under which severe solar-activities were observed. GNSSdata associated with such days was then collected from data sources
GMV MAGIC-SBAS platform used to demonstrate impact on GNSS performance undersevere Ionospheric conditions
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GNSS VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF GNSS AGRESSION ON AVIATION OPERATIONS
loss of on-board GNSS functionality
[GPS-L INVALID] and/or [GPS-R INVALID] messages appear;
decrease in navigation performance leading to RNP alert;
through increasing aircraft horizontal error, Actual Navigation Performance (ANP)
decreases beyond RNP requirement. - [NAV UNABLE RNP] message appears;
in some aircraft, aircraft navigation reverted to IRU or DME/DME after GNSS loss;
impact on Navigation Display;
a large “map shift” was observed;
impact on GPWS;
[TERR POS] and [EICAS TERRAIN POSITION] messages appear;
in certain cases, “Terrain -Terrain, Pull-Up - Pull-Up” aural alerts occur;
loss of auto-land and ADS reporting capabilities.
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
The Mitigation aims to ensure the implementation of a list of measures which give
confidence that the interference risk is reduced as far as practicable – permitting the
full operational benefits provided by GNSS.
The mitigation framework consists in implementing a continuous three-step process of
Monitoring Threats,
Assessing Risks and
Deploying Mitigation Measures.
The ICAO Mitigation Plan then suggests preventive and reactive measures which
States can choose to apply, both strategically during GNSS implementation
planning, and tactically during day-to-day operations. The Mitigation Plan also
explains the need to inform users in the event of GNSS outages and the necessity to
train airspace users and air traffic controllers to be able to recognize such events and
to react appropriately.
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
States Responsibilities
ICAO ANC/12 Recommendation 6/8 “Planning for mitigation of global navigation satellitesystem vulnerabilities” states that States:
a) assess the likelihood and effects of global navigation satellite system vulnerabilitiesin their airspace and apply, as necessary, recognized and available mitigationmethods;
b) provide effective spectrum management and protection of global navigation satellitesystem (GNSS) frequencies to reduce the likelihood of unintentional interference ordegradation of GNSS performance;
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
States Responsibilities (cont’d)
c) report to ICAO cases of harmful interference to global navigation satellite system thatmay have an impact on international civil aviation operations;
d) develop and enforce a strong regulatory framework governing the use of globalnavigation satellite system repeaters, pseudolites, spoofers and jammers;
a) allow for realization of the full advantages of on-board mitigation techniques,particularly inertial navigation systems; and
b) where it is determined that terrestrial aids are needed as part of a mitigationstrategy, give priority to retention of distance measuring equipment (DME) in supportof inertial navigation system (INS)/DME or DME/DME area navigation, and ofinstrument landing system at selected runways.
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
Framework of regulationIn most States, laws allow aviation authorities to take action when GNSS interference is identified.However, the responsibility for regulating and managing Radio and Frequency Broadcasting sites isusually with a National Telecommunications Authority. Often these telecommunications regulators donot have a good understanding of the impact of the various interference sources on aviationapplications of GNSS.
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
ANSP Responsibilities
ICAO GNSS Manual (Doc 9849)
5.1.5 State regulators and ANS providers can take the measures described in thischapter to reduce the likelihood that GNSS service will be lost.
7.11.3.1 ANS providers must be prepared to act when anomaly reports from aircraft orground-based units suggest signal interference. If an analysis concludes thatinterference is present, ANS providers must identify the area affected and issue anappropriate NOTAM.
7.12.5 National and international coordination of actions to prevent and mitigate GNSSinterference is essential.
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FROM VULNERABILITY TO MITIGATION
ANSP Responsibilities (cont’d)
7.13.1.1 As described in Chapter 5, States can take measures to reduce the likelihoodof service outages due to unintentional and intentional signal interference. ANSproviders must still, however, complete a risk assessment by determining the residuallikelihood of service outages and the impact of an outage on aircraft operations inspecific airspace.
Appendix B, Roles of ANS Providers and Regulators: ANSP to establish appropriatestrategies to mitigate GNSS outages, Regulator to validate the safety aspects of themitigation strategies.
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MITIGATIONS MEASURES
SBAS adoption-implementation-operation
Interference Cooperation framework to encourage coordination and exchange of best practices, supported by
regional and global mechanisms due to system nature; Policy framework, Regulation and enforcement part of national and regional oversight; Terrestrial NAVAIDS as back up; Protection from other services outside the aeronautical radio navigation frequency band…).
Jamming & Spoofing cooperation with industry; Standardization; Next gen GNSS.
Cibber attacks Policies; Cooperation; Best practices.
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MITIGATIONS MEASURESSBAS adoption-implementation-operation
Space weather, a challenge for Africa
The term Space Weather refers to “the conditions of the sun and in the solar windmagnetosphere, ionosphere and thermosphere that can influence the performance andreliability of space-borne and ground-based technological systems and can endanger humanlife or health”. Short term variations in space weather originate on the Sun.
Risk analysis: Probability of occurrence Impact on aviation operations
Mitigation measures Studies cooperation with industry, Standardization, Adoption of Next Gen GNSS
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CASE STUDY RESULTS: Reduction of impact of Ionosphere using SBAS Solution
JPO team demonstrated the improvement in GNSS performance through provision of a SBAS Solution.
SBAS Solution applied to GNSS data collected under high solar activity periods (as previously mentioned)
Comparison of GNSS-only solution and SBAS-Solution was made.
Improvement in performance was noticed as shown on the next slide.
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MITIGATIONS MEASURES
Spectrum regulation enforcement
Design a national regulation forbidding the advertisement, selling, detention and use of interfering devices (except for State use)
Coordination at State level, with aviation, of State interference events
Intervention against unauthorised interference
Interference detection tools available on France flight inspection aircraft.
ANFr (France Spectrum management agency) has an operational intervention team
3 PPD interferers where detected by DSNA and caught by ANFr, and put in court.
Reflexion in progress on how to mobilise as efficiently as possible State resources to stop a High power Wide scale interference
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EXAMPLE OF MITIGATIONS ADOPTED IN FRANCE AND EUROPE: INTERFERENCE
Assessment of potential impact on aircraft in France
Activity to be launched with support of Defense experts
Specification of system resistance
France asks GSA that EGNOS V3 RIMS to be provided with an automatic detection and isolation capability in case of spoofing close to a RIMS
EC is currently studying an anti-spoofing capability of the EGNOS GEO Link. ICAO also involved.
GBAS data link also supports an anti-spoofing capability
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EXAMPLE OF MITIGATIONS ADOPTED IN FRANCE AND EUROPE: SPOOFING
Actions may be conducted at several levels over a SBAS system
System robustness: design improved algorithms and resilience to scintillation
We have seen significant progress made in Europe over EGNOS vs. Space weather these last years, implemented within EGNOS V2
Increasing the number of ranging sources and signals (DFMC) increases the robustness
Implementation planned for EGNOS V3
Increased awareness and predictions of Space Weather events
ICAO is now designing a world wide Space weather system aiming at providing alerts and NOTAMS to airspace users
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EXAMPLE OF MITIGATIONS ADOPTED IN FRANCE AND EUROPE: SPACE WEATHER
Adressing Cyber Security threat is now part of all new generations of EGNOS design
Threat mitigation specifications designed by a team of European experts
Classified information
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EXAMPLE OF MITIGATIONS ADOPTED IN FRANCE AND EUROPE: CYBER SECURITY
CONCLUSION and WAY FORWARD GNSS pulses are extremely weak, as such, vulnerable, and the potential aggression
impact aviation operations.
For aviation ICAO has defined mitigation plan and responsibilities as sated in theICAO GNSS Manual (Doc 9849) for States and ANSP.
France adopted some mitigation measures.
Africa is preparing for the implementation of EGNOS/SBAS and the challenges exist,part of the challenges is space weather, and all of them need to be considered sincethe beginning. “adoption-implementation-operation”
Adopt best practices in the frame of SBAS implementation in Africa;
In implementing SBAS in Africa, we should ensure that the risk has been assessed andmitigations are in place. The issue is not, will a solar super storm occur, but when will itoccur?
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Summary of the Presentation
This joint presentation on the GNSS vulnerabilities gave an overview of the
threats on the GNSS/SBAS, their impact on aviation operations and the ICAO
mitigation plan and ANC/12 recommendations recalling the States and Air
Navigation Service Providers responsibility, as sated in the ICAO GNSS Manual
(Doc 9849). It also elaborated on the challenges for Africa and the examples of
mitigations measures adopted in France, which are best practices to be
considered by JPO in the frame of SBAS implementation in Africa.
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EGNOS in Africa- Joint Programme Office (JPO)
+221 33 820 9366
www.aviation-africa.eu
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Thank you for you Attention