THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRESUPREME COURT

No. 20 16-0544

State of New Hampshire

V.

Theo Bosa

Appeal Pursuant to Rule 7 from Judgmentof the Merrimack County Superior Court

BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT

Thomas BarnardSenior Assistant Appellate DefenderAppellate Defender Program10 Ferry Street, Suite 202Concord, NH 03301NHBar# 16414603-224-1236(15 minutes oral argument)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ii

Question Presented 1

Statement of the Case and Facts 2

Summary of the Argument 4

Argument

I. THE COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT IT COULD NOTGRANT BOSA CREDIT FOR 243 DAYS OFPRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT 5

A. The court was required to grant Bosa credit for 243days presentence confinement 7

B. Even if the court was not required to grant Bosacredit for 243 days presentence confinement, it haddiscretion to do so 21

Conclusion 23

Appendix A1-A9

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Cady v. Town of Deerfield,N.H. (Jan. 18, 2017) 6, 7, 8

Crosby v. Warden,152 N.H. 44(2005) 18, 19

Duguette v. Warden,154 N.H. 737 (2007) 13

People v. Latona,703 N.E.2d 901 (111. 1998) 18

Ransone v. State,48 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2010) 17

Rex v. Wilkes,98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.3. 1770) 13

Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,

448 U.S. 555 (1980) 17

State v. Arden,424 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1988J 14, 15

State v. Blondin,665 A.2d 587 (Vt. 1995) 13, 14, 16, 17

State v. Decker,127 N.H. 468 (1985) passim

State v. Duiski,363 N.W,2d 307 (Minn. 1985) 14, 15

State v. Duran,158 N.H. 146 (2008) 11,15

State v. Edson,153 N.H. 45 (2005) 10

State v. Folley,438 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1989) 11, 14, 15

11

State v. Forest,163 N.H. 616 (2012) 7, 10, 12, 13

State v. Goar,453 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1990) 11, 14, 15

State v. Harnum,142 N.H. 195 (1997) 11,15

State v. Hott,426 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1988) 11, 14, 15

State v. Leclair,88 A.3d 1186 (Vt. 2013) 15

State v. Mwangi,161 N.H. 699 (2011) 12,13

State v. Patricelli,357 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1984) 18

State v. Philbrick,127 N.H. 353 (1985) 7, 9, 10, 12

State v. Rau,129 N.H. 126 (1987) 13, 14

State v. Sideris,157 N.H. 258 (2008) 20

State v. Tauiliili,29 P.3d 914 (Haw. 2001) 18

State v. Thomas,168 N.H. 589 (2016) 20

State v. Weber,470 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1991) 11, 14, 15

Tapia v. United States,564 U.S. 319 (2011) 17

111

Statutes

RSA 597:1-c 11

RSA 597:2 11

RSA 597:7-a 11

RSA6O1:1 16

RSA651:2 6

RSA 65 1:3 passim

RSA651:6 6

RSA 651-A:23 passim

Court Rules

New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 16-A 20

Other Authorities

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d. ed. supp. 1986) 7, 12

iv

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court erred by ruling that it could not grant Bosa credit for

243 days of presentence confinement.

Issue preserved by Bosa’s request for 243 days of presentence

confinement credit, S 9-17W, the State’s objection, S 3-15, the court’s ruling, S

9, 28-30, and the court’s sentencing order, A6. To the extent this issue is not

preserved, it is raised as plain error.

Citations to the record are as follows:

“A” refers to the appendix attached to this brief;“5” refers to the transcript of the sentencing hearing on September 7, 2016;

“T” refers to the consecutively-paginated transcript of the four-day trial on July 19 to 22, 2016.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence

demonstrated the following facts. Theo Bosa and Patience Carr, both refugees

from Africa living in Concord, began dating in 2013. T 30-33, 40-42, 68-69,

335-37, 340, 348-49. When they broke up in December 2015, Carr told Bosa

that she did not want him to come to her apartment anymore. T 49-50, 359.

On January 8, 2016. at about 5:00 in the evening, Bosa knocked on the

windows and back door of Carr’s apartment. T 50-52. Although the door was

locked, the lock malfunctioned and Bosa pushed the door open and entered. T

55-56, 169-70, 250-5 1. Carr told Bosa to leave, but Bosa grabbed Carr’s neck

tightly with both hands, rendering her unable to speak or breathe. T 53, 57-

59, 62, 132. Carr pushed Bosa away, ran outside and called the police, who

arrested Bosa a few minutes later at his uncle’s home, about 75 to 100 yards

away. T 59, 62-63, 99-100, 103, 154-55, 157-58, 222, 254, 258, 344-45.

In March 2016, the State obtained from a Merrimack County grand jury

one indictment charging Bosa with second degree assault. Al. The State also

filed an information charging him with criminal trespass. A2; see also A3

(amending information).

At the conclusion of a four-day trial on July 19 to 22, 2016, the juzy

found Bosa guilty of both charges. Al, A2; T 431-32. On September 7, 2016,

the court (McNamara, J.) sentenced Bosa on the second degree assault

conviction to three to seven years at the New Hampshire State Prison, stand

committed, and on the criminal trespass conviction to twelve months at the

2

house of corrections, all suspended for five years, consecutive to the state

prison sentence. A6, A8; T 3 1-33. The court did not state an intention to run

the state prison sentence consecutively to any other sentence. A6.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23, the decision of whether to grant or

deny presentence confinement credit is mandatory, not discretionary. Denying

presentence confinement credit merely because the charge at issue was not the

exclusive or “but for” cause of the defendant’s detention is inconsistent with

the plain language of the statute and produces absurd results. The court here

erred by denying the requested credit on that basis.

Consideration of the principles underlying the presentence confinement

credit statutes yields a simple rule: when a defendant is detained on, and later

sentenced on, multiple charges, any period of presentence confinement must

be credited to each sentence if the sentences are concurrent, but can only be

credited to one sentence if the sentences are consecutive. Here, the sentences

were concurrent. Thus, the court was required to grant the requested credit.

Even if this Court does not consider the principles underlying the statutes, a

technical reading of the statutes compels the same result. Thus, this Court

should reverse the denial of the requested credit.

Even if this Court concludes that the decision of whether to grant or

deny presentence confinement credit is discretionary, the court here erred by

ruling that it lacked discretion to grant the requested credit. Thus, even if this

Court does not reverse the denial of the requested credit, it should vacate that

denial and remand.

4

I. THE COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT IT COULD NOT GRANT BOSACREDIT FOR 243 DAYS OF PRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT.

Bosa was detained in lieu of bail on the charges in this case between his

arrest on January 8, 2016, and sentencing on September 7, 2016, a total of

243 days. S 14-15, 17. On January 8, 2016, Bosa was also charged in the

Concord Circuit Court with three counts of violating a protective order, based

on events prior to that day, and detained in lieu of bail on those charges as

well. S 5, 10, 12, 14-15. On June 27, 2016, the Circuit Court (Spath, J.)

found Bosa guilty of two of those counts. 5 3, 10. On one of the convictions,

the court sentenced Bosa to twelve months in the house of corrections, with all

but four months suspended for one year. S 3, 11. The court gave Bosa credit

for four months of presentence confinement. S 3, ii. On the other conviction,

the court sentenced Bosa to twelve months in the house of corrections, all

suspended for one year, consecutive to the first sentence. S 11.

At the Superior Court sentencing hearing on September 7, 2016, the

State argued that, in light of the Circuit Court sentence, the Superior Court

had to deduct four months from the 243 days to which Bosa would otherwise

be entitled, for a total of 123 days presentence confinement credit. S 3, 8, 15.

Giving Bosa credit for 243 days presentence confinement, the State argued,

would “allow[ him] to double-dip.” 5 12.

The court stated that presentence confinement credit is “not a matter of

discretion.” S 9. Bosa, however, argued that “the trial court has discretion on

this issue,” S 17, and that the Court should give him credit for 243 days, S 9-

17.

0

After examining RSA 65 1:3, RSA 651-A:23 and cases construing those

statutes, the court ruled, “I am convinced that pre[sentencej confinement in

this case must be for 123 days, not the 243 days requested by the Defense.” S

28. It stated that “the statute means what it says, that a person receives credit

if he is held because of a charge, it is but for causation.” S 29-30. Because

Bosa “didn’t make bail on either charge,” the court reasoned, “there’s no but for

causation.” S 28. By ruling that it could not give Bosa credit for 243 days of

presentence confinement, the court erred.

Presentence confinement credit is governed by RSA 65 1:3. That statute

provides, in relevant part:

All the time actually spent in custody prior to the time[a defendant] is sentenced shall be credited in themanner set forth in RSA 651-A:23 against themaximum term of imprisonment that is imposed andagainst any minimum term authorized by RSA 65 1:2or 6.

RSA 65 1:3, I. RSA 651-A:23, in turn, provides:

Any prisoner who is confined to the state prison, anyhouse of correction, any jail or any other place shall begranted credit against both the maximum andminimum terms of his sentence equal to the number ofdays during which the prisoner was confined in jailawaiting and during trial prior to the imposition ofsentence and not under any sentence of confinement.The clerk of the court sentencing a prisoner shallrecord in the mittimus the number of days of suchconfinement, and the credit provided for herein shallbe calculated on the basis of such information.

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Cadv v. Town

of Deerfield, N.H. — (Jan. 18, 2017). This Court is “the final arbiter of

6

legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a

whole.” Id.

A. The court was required to grant Bosa credit for 243 dayspresentence confinement.

The sentencing court found that the decision to grant or deny credit for

presentence confinement is “not a matter of discretion.” S 9. Bosa’s primary

position on appeal is that, in this limited respect, the court was correct. The

“act of sentencing” and the application of “the crediting rule” set forth in RSA

65 1:3, I, “operate independently of each other.” State v. Philbrick, 127 N.H.

353, 357 (1985). “Courts render sentences; RSA 65 1:3, I, specifies the method

of calculating terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to such sentences.”

Id. at 356. “The codification of the crediting rule ensures that where

applicable the rule will apply uniformly in every criminal case.” at 358.

Thus, although the act of sentencing is discretionary, “the crediting rule is

mandatory, not discretionary.” Id. at 358; see also 3 ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice § 18-4.7(e), at 308 (2d. ed. supp. 1986) (“the award of credit

for pretrial incarceration should be automatic and mechanical”).’ Because the

issue of whether to grant presentence confinement credit is not discretionan’, it

is reviewed de novo.

The court denied Bosa’s request for 243 days pretrial confinement credit

because he was detained on multiple charges. S 28-30. Thus, the court

reasoned, the second degree assault charge was not the “but for” cause of his

In contrast to the question of whether to grant or deny credit for presentence confinement,

the question of how to allocate presentence confinement among consecutive sentences is

generally a matter of discretion. State v. Forest. 163 N.H. 616, 619-20 (2012J.

7

detention. S 28-30. The court’s rationale does not withstand scrutiny, for two

reasons.

First, nothing in RSA 65 1:3 or 652:23 suggests that a defendant can only

receive presentence confinement credit when sentenced on a charge that was

the exclusive or “but for” cause of his detention. See Cady, N.H. at — (this

Court “interpret[sj legislative intent from the statute as written and will not

consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the

legislature did not see fit to include”). To the contrary, RSA 65 1:3, 1, provides,

“All the time actually spent in custody prior to the time he is sentenced shall be

credited in the manner set forth in RSA 651-A:23.” RSA 651-A:23 mandates

that a defendant receive credit “equal to the number of days during which [he]

was confined in jail awaiting and during trial prior to the imposition of

sentence and not under any sentence of confinement.”

Second, denying presentence confinement credit on any charge that was

not the exclusive or “but for” cause of the defendant’s incarceration would

produce absurd results. See State v. Decker, 127 N.H. 468, 470 (1985) (this

Court “will not presume that in enacting RSA 65 1:3 and RSA 651-A:23 the

legislature intended [an] absurd result”). A defendant detained on, and later

sentenced on, a single charge is undoubtedly entitled to presentence

confinement credit. Under the sentencing court’s rationale, however, a

defendant who was detained on multiple charges is never entitled to

presentence confinement credit on any sentence, because no single charge was

8

the exclusive or “but for” cause of his detention. Thus, the sentencing court’s

ruling cannot be justified by its stated rationale.

This Court has not construed RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23 in a

technical manner. Rather, it has construed those statutes in light of their

underlying principles. On their face, for instance, the statutes do not mention

bail or express a concern for indigent defendants unable to post bail. But in

Philbrick, this Court observed that RSA 65 1:3 “stems principally from the

recognition that presentence detention is often the result of indigency” and

reversed the denial of credit because, in the circumstances of that case,

denying credit discriminated against the indigent. Philbrick, 127 N.H. at 354-

58. In Decker, this Court affirmed the denial of credit because, in the

circumstances of that case, granting credit would result in an indigent

defendant serving less total time than a wealthy one, “a disparity,” this Court

held, that “could have no conceivable penological justification.” Decker, 127

N.H. at 470.

As explained below, there are at least four principles underlying the

presentence confinement credit provisions of RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23.

First, the total amount of time defendants serve should not depend on their

wealth. Second, time served prior to the sentencing hearing should be placed

on the same footing as time served after the sentencing hearing. Third, the

sentencing court’s discretionary decision to run sentences concurrently or

consecutively should be given full effect. Fourth, the total amount of time a

defendant serves should not depend on arbitrary or irrelevant factors such as

g

the temporal proximity of multiple sentencing hearings. Consideration of these

principles yields a simple rule: when a defendant is detained on, and later

sentenced on, multiple charges, any period of presentence confinement must

be credited to each sentence if the sentences are concurrent, but can only be

credited to one sentence if the sentences are consecutive.

As noted above, the first of these principles is well-established in this

Court’s cases. “To ignore the pretrial incarceration of the indigent offender is

to permit discrimination based on economic status, which, regardless of the

extensive debate over its constitutionality, is unwise and unjust.” Philbrick,

127 N.H. at 355 (brackets omitted). Thus, courts must “ensure[} the equal

treatment of those confined prior to trial due to indigency, and those who are

able to post bail.” State v. Edson, 153 N.H. 45, 49 (2005). “[Am indigent

offender unable to furnish bail should serve neither more nor less time in

confinement than an otherwise identically situated offender who succeeds in

furnishing bail.” State v. Forest, 163 N.H. 616, 619 (2012); accord Edson, 153

N.H. at 49; Decker, 127 N.H. at 470. Thus, RSA 65 1:3 and RSA 651-A:23

“mandate that a prisoner . . . receive credit for all jail time — neither more nor

less — served before sentencing which relates to the criminal episode for which

the prisoner is sentenced, but does not receive credit greater than the number

of days of his presentencing confinement.” Forest, 163 N.H. at 619 (quoting

Decker, 127 N.H. at 471); accord Edson, 153 N.H. at 49.

Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized that equal treatment of

indigent and wealthy defendants is an important principle underlying similar

10

statutes. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for instance, has held that “a

defendant who cannot post bail because of indigencv should serve the same

time that a person in identical circumstances who is able to post bail would

serve.” State v. Weber, 470 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Minn. 1991); accord State v.

Goar, 453 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. 1990); State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 374

(Minn. 1989); State v. Hott, 426 N.W.2d 423, 424 (Minn. 1988).

However, as Justice Broderick noted in State v. Harnum, 142 N.H. 195,

201 (1997), equal treatment of indigent and wealthy defendants is not the”

underlying principle” of NSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23. Id. (Broderick, J.,

dissenting). There are, in fact, “other legitimate objectives that underlie the

statute.” Id. Although Justice Broderick expressed this view in a dissent in

Harnum, his dissent later “persuaded” this Court, in a unanimous opinion, to

overrule Harnum. State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 155-56 (2008).

Equal treatment of indigent and wealthy defendants is in fact an

incomplete explanation for RSA 65 1:3 and NSA 651-A:23 because those

statutes frequently require credit for presentence confinement even if an

identically situated wealthy defendant also would have been detained. For

instance, “[a]ny person arrested for an offense punishable by up to life in

prison, where the proof is evident or the presumption great, shall not be

allowed bail.” NSA 597:1-c. Even if a defendant is charged with a less serious

offense, the court may still detain the defendant, without the possibility of bail,

under certain circumstances. NSA 597:2, 1(c), I-a(c), Ill-a, Ill-c, V(c); NSA

597:7-a, III. NSA 65 1:3 and NSA 651-A:23, however, require that even

11

defendants who have been detained without the possibility of bail receive

presentence confinement credit. Thus, equal treatment of indigent and wealthy

defendants cannot be sole principle underlying RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23.

A second principle underlying the credit statutes is that time served prior

to the sentencing hearing should be placed on the same footing as time served

after the sentencing hearing. See 3 ABA Standards, § 18-4.7W, at 308

(advocating “the abolition of any distinction between pretrial and posttrial

confinement”); Philbrick, 127 N.H. at 355 (citing ABA Standards in support of

the principle of equal treatment of indigent and wealthy defendants). Unlike

the principle of equal treatment of indigent and wealthy defendants, the

principle of equal treatment of time served before and after sentencing explains

why defendants who are detained without the possibility of bail are entitled to

presentence confinement credit.

The practice of crediting a period of presentence confinement to more

than one sentence is sometimes referred to as “double dipping” or “double

credit.” Forest, 163 N.H. at 618. For defendants who receive consecutive

sentences, the State’s objections to “double dipping” are well-founded. Id. at

619-20; State v. Mwangi, 161 N.H. 699, 702-07 (2011), Decker, 127 N.H. at

469-71. Because those defendants would not receive “double credit” for time

served after sentencing, they should not receive “double credit” for time served

before sentencing. However, the very definition of concurrent sentences is that

the time a defendant spends in confinement is credited to more than one

sentence. It is beyond dispute that each day the defendant serves after

12

sentencing is credited to each concurrent sentence. Thus, when the State

objects to crediting each day a defendant serves before sentencing to each

concurrent sentence as “double dipping,” it is really arguing that the time

defendants serve before sentencing should be treated differently than the time

they serve after sentencing, in contravention of this principle.

A third principle underlying the credit statutes is that the sentencing

court’s discretionary decision to run sentences concurrently or consecutively

should be given full effect. Where a defendant has already been sentenced on

one offense, a sentencing court has broad discretion to order a subsequent

sentence to run either concurrently with, or consecutively to, the earlier

sentence. Duguette v. Warden, 154 N.H. 737, 742 (2007); State v. Rau, 129

N.H. 126, 129-30 (1987). This discretion is “[firmly rooted in common law”

and dates to pre-Revolution English cases. Duguette, 154 N.H. at 742 (citing

Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770)).

In Forest, Mwangi and Decker, this Court held that, where a court has

exercised its discretion to sentence a defendant to consecutive sentences, the

defendant is only entitled to presentence confinement credit on one of the

sentences. This rule is necessary to fully effectuate the court’s discretion to

impose consecutive sentences; granting credit on each sentence would, in

effect, at least partially convert the consecutive sentences into de facto

concurrent sentences. See State v. Blondin, 665 A.2d 587, 589 (Vt. 1995)

(granting credit on each consecutive sentence “would undermine the trial

court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences”).

13

Where a defendant has been sentenced to concurrent sentences, the

same analysis applies, but in reverse. Denying credit on all but one of the

sentences would, in effect, at least partially convert the concurrent sentences

into de facto consecutive sentences, thus restricting the court’s discretion to

impose concurrent sentences. Giving full effect to a court’s decision to impose

concurrent sentences, however, is particularly important because the

legislature has indicated that, except for defendants who are part of “that

group of criminals who need the deterrent of consecutive sentences . . . judges

should almost always impose sentences concurrently.” Rau, 129 N.H. at 130

(brackets and quotation omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has mandated that presentence

confinement be credited to each concurrent sentence precisely because failing

to do so would “in effect convert a presumptively concurrent sentence into a

facto consecutive sentence.” Weber, 470 N.W.2d at 114; accord Goar, 453

N.W.2d at 29; Folley, 438 N.W.2d at 374; Hott, 426 N.W.2d at 424-25; State v.

Arden, 424 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Minn. 1988); State v. Dulski, 363 N.W.2d 307,

309-10 (Minn. 1985). As the Vermont Supreme Court has recognized, denying

so-called “double credit” when sentences are imposed concurrently “is

unacceptable for the same reasons that [granting] double credit is

inappropriate when sentences are imposed consecutively — it is illogical and

unfair, and it would undermine the trial court’s control over sentencing.”

Blondin, 665 A.2d at 591.

14

The fourth principle underlying the presentence confinement credit

statutes is that the total time defendants serve should not depend on factors

unrelated to their culpability. This Court, for instance, has rejected the

“arbitrary application of labels” in determining presentence confinement credit.

Duran, 158 N.H. at 156 (citing Justice Broderick’s dissent in Harnum). Thus,

the total time defendants serve should not turn on arbitrary factors such as

“where they are resentenced,” “the length of the local trial court’s docket and

the prosecutor’s and public defender’s caseloads.” Harnum, 142 N.H. at 202

(Broderick, J., dissenting).

Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized this principle. The

Minnesota Supreme Court, for instance, has held that “the total amount of

time a defendant is incarcerated should not turn on irrelevant concerns such

as whether the defendant pleads guilty or insists on his right to trial,” or “on

matters that are subject to manipulation by the prosecutor.” Weber, 470

N.W.2d at 114; accord Goar, 453 N.W.2d at 30; Follev, 438 N.W.2d at 374;

Hott, 426 N.W.2d at 424-25; Arden, 424 N.W.2d at 294; Dulski, 363 N.W.2d at

310. More specifically, it has held that the total time a defendant serves

should not “turn on when the sentence is executed.” Dulski, 363 N.W.2d at

310. Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court has held that the total time a

defendant serves should not “depend[] on factors beyond the court’s control”

such as “when [probation] revocation proceedings or resentencing was initiated

or finalized” or “how quickly or slowly the State acted in prosecuting the

defendant.” State v. LeClair, 88 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Vt. 2013). It has specifically

15

held that the total time a defendant serves should not “turn on when the

underlying and new sentences were imposed, which would be subject to the

parties’ manipulation and to irrelevant factors such as whether the defendant

pled guilty or demanded ajuiy trial.” Blondin, 665 A.2d at 592.

The facts of this case demonstrate how failing to credit a period of

presentence confinement on each concurrent sentence gives effect to arbitrary

factors. Bosa received a four month sentence on June 27, 2016 and a

presumptively concurrent three to seven year sentence on September 7, 2016.

Because the Superior Court subtracted four months from his presentence

confinement credit on the latter sentence, he will serve a total of three years

and four months before his minimum parole eligibility date and a total of seven

years and four months before the expiration of his maximum term. But if Bosa

had not been detained and the sentencing hearings in both cases took place on

the same day, then he would only serve a total of three years before his

minimum parole eligibility date and a total of seven years before the expiration

of the maximum term.

Bosa’s indigency caused his detention. A number of factors might have

caused the sentencing hearings to take place over ten weeks apart. The Circuit

Court may have experienced more judge availability or less docket congestion

than the Superior Court. Unlike in the Circuit Court, the State had to obtain

an indictment to proceed on the felony in the Superior Court, RSA 601:1; ten

weeks passed between Bosa’s arrest and the indictment, Al. Unlike in the

Circuit Court, trial was by jury in the Superior Court, T 1-442. Six weeks

16

passed between trial and sentencing in the Superior Court, T 1-442, S 1-51; in

the Circuit Court sentencing took place immediately, S 10-11. None of those

factors have any relevance to Bosa’s culpability for the crimes at issue.

One of the primary purposes of the criminal justice system is to instill

respect for the law, particularly in those who have shown a willingness to

disobey it. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011). As the United

States Supreme Court has observed, however, “arbitrariness . . . spawns

disrespect for law.” Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595

(1980). The total time a defendant serves under multiple sentences should

depend on the sentences themselves, not arbitrary factors such as the

temporal proximity of the sentencing hearings. To hold otherwise would

undermine respect for the law in precisely those individuals whose respect for

the law must be developed.

When the principles articulated above are considered, one simple rule

emerges: when a defendant is detained on, and later sentenced on, multiple

charges, any period of presentence confinement must be credited to each

sentence if the sentences are concurrent, but can only be credited to one

sentence if the sentences are consecutive. Courts in several other jurisdictions

have adopted this “fair and straightfonvard benchmark.” Blondin, 665 A.2d at

592 (“the time spent in jail before the second sentence is imposed should be

credited toward only the first sentence if the second sentence is imposed

consecutively, but toward both sentences if the second sentence is imposed

concurrently”); see also Ransone v. State, 48 So. 3d 692, 694 (Fla. 2010)

17

(“when a defendant receives concurrent sentences, his jail time is credited

toward all concurrent sentences, but when a defendant does not receive

concurrent sentences, jail time may be credited toward only one sentence”);

State v. Tauiliili, 29 P.3d 914, 918 (Raw. 2001) (“a defendant who receives

consecutive sentences is entitled to a presentence credit only once against the

aggregate of the consecutive terms, while a defendant sentenced to concurrent

terms in effect receives credit against each sentence”); People v. Latona, 703

N.E.2d 901, 907 (111. 1998) (“defendants . . . sentenced [to consecutive

sentences] should receive but one credit for each day actually spent in custody

as a result of the offense or offenses for which they are ultimately sentenced[,

w]hile a defendant sentenced to concurrent sentences receives credit for time

served against each sentence”); State v. Patricelli, 357 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn.

1984) (“because defendant’s sentences are concurrent, he should be able to

apply the jail time against both of them. It would be different if defendant’s

sentences were consecutive because in that case crediting the defendant for jail

time against both sentences would give him an unfair double credit”).

If a sentencing order is silent as to whether the sentence is concurrent or

consecutive to a prior sentence, then, at least where the sentencing judge was

aware of the prior sentence, the subsequent sentence is presumed to run

concurrently. Crosby v. Warden, 152 N.R. 44, 46-47 (2005) (sentences

presumed to run concurrently, even though they were imposed on different

dates for different crimes committed on different dates, where the record

established that the sentencing judge was aware of the prior sentence). “fI]f, in

18

its discretion, a sentencing court intends to impose consecutive sentences, it

must specifically state that intention in its order.” 14.

Here, the record establishes that the Superior Court judge was aware of

the Circuit Court sentence before he announced the Superior Court sentence.

S 3-5, 10-11, 17. The Superior Court failed to specifically state an intention to

run its sentence consecutively to the Circuit Court sentence. A6. Thus, the

sentences are presumed to run concurrently. Because the sentences are

concurrent, Bosa was entitled to presentence credit from the date of his arrest

on each sentence.

The analysis above considers RSA 65 1:3 and RSA 651-A:23 in light of

four principles underlying those statutes. But even if this court construes

those statutes technically, without regard to their underlying principles, Bosa

was still entitled to 243 days of presentence confinement credit on the Superior

Court sentence.

RSA 65 1:3 mandates that “[ajil the time actually spent in custody prior

to the time [a defendant] is sentenced shall be credited in the manner set forth

in RSA 651-A:23.” RSA 651-A:23, in relevant part, mandates that “[ajny

prisoner who is confined to . . . any house of correction [orj any jail . . . shall be

granted credit. . . equal to the number of days during which the prisoner was

confined in jail awaiting and during trial prior to the imposition of sentence

and not under any sentence of confinement.” Thus, a defendant is entitled to

presentence confinement credit for time that meets four requirements: (a) the

time must actually be spent in custody, (b) the defendant must have been

19

awaiting a proceeding in the case at issue, (c) the time must have been served

prior to sentencing in the case at issue, and (d) the defendant must not have

been under a sentence of confinement.

Here, the 243 days between Bosa’s arrest and the Superior Court

sentencing satisfy all four requirements. Bosa was actually in custody; all of

that time was spent awaiting proceedings in the Superior Court case; and all of

the time was served prior to sentencing in that case. Before the Circuit Court

sentencing hearing, Bosa had not yet been sentenced by any court, and after

that hearing, Bosa had fully satisfied the sentence imposed by the Circuit

Court. Thus, at no time during the relevant time period was Bosa under a

sentence of confinement. For these reasons, even under a technical reading of

the statutes at issue, Bosa was entitled to 243 days of presentence confinement

credit on the Superior Court sentence.

To the extent this claim is not fully preserved, the court’s denial of Bosa’s

requested credit constitutes plain error. This Court may reverse for plain and

prejudicial errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public

reputation of judicial proceedings. Sup. Ct. R. 16-A; State v. Thomas, 168 N.H.

589, 604 (2016). For the reasons stated above, the court erred, and plainly so.

The error prejudiced Bosa because it increased the total amount of time he will

have to serve. Requiring Bosa to serve more time based on arbitrary factors,

such as his indigency and the lack of temporal proximity between the

sentencing hearings, seriously affects the fairness, integrity and public

reputation of judicial proceedings. See State v. Sideris, 157 N.H. 258, 264

20

(2008) (“Imposition of an illegal sentence is a serious error routinely corrected

on plain error review”).

The court erred by denying Bosa’s request for 243 days presentence

confinement credit. For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse.

B. Even if the court was not required to grant Bosa credit for243 days presentence confinement, it had discretion to doso.

The court here did not decline, in its discretion, to grant Bosa credit for

the 243 days he served between his arrest and the Superior Court sentencing.

Rather, the court ruled that it was legally forbidden from granting Bosa credit

for more than 123 days. S 9, 28-30. Even if this Court concludes that the

Superior Court was not required to grant the credit Bosa requested, it should

nevertheless.conclude that the Superior Court had discretion to do so.

As explained above, when a court sentences a defendant to a

subsequent, concurrent sentence, it has several legitimate reasons to grant full

presentence confinement to that sentence, even for time that has already been

credited to the prior sentence. The court may prefer to avoid discriminating

against an indigent defendant. It may prefer to place time served before

sentencing on the same footing as time served after sentencing. It may prefer

that the subsequent sentence run fully concurrently with the prior sentence.

Finally, it may prefer that the total time the defendant serve not turn on

arbitrary factors, such as the temporal proximity of the two sentencing

hearings.

21

Even if a sentencing court is not required to grant presentence

confinement credit in a manner consistent with these principles, it has the

discretion to do so. The court’s ruling here — that it was legally forbidden from

granting Bosa credit for the 243 days between his arrest and the Superior

Court sentencing — amounted to a ruling that it was legally required to impose

what was, in effect, a consecutive sentence. Because nothing required the

court to impose a consecutive sentence, this ruling was error.

To the extent this claim is not fully presenTed, the court’s ruling

constitutes plain error. The court’s refusal to exercise its discretion to

determine whether its sentence should, in effect, run concurrently with the

prior sentence was plainly erroneous, prejudiced Bosa, and seriously affected

the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

For these reasons, even if this Court does not reverse the denial of Bosa’s

request for credit for 243 days, it should vacate that denial and remand for a

new determination of the appropriate amount of presentence confinement.

22

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Thea Bosa respectfully requests that this Court (a) reverse

the denial of his request for 243 days presentence confinement credit, or,

alternatively, (b) vacate that denial and remand far a new determination of the

appropriate amount of presentence confinement.

Undersigned counsel requests 15 minutes oral argument.

The appealed decision was not in writing and therefore is not appended

to the brief.

Respectfully submitted,

ByThomas Barnard, #16414Senior Assistant Appellate DefenderAppellate Defender Program10 Ferry Street, Suite 202Concord, NH 03301

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief have been mailed,postage prepaid, to:

Criminal BureauNew Hampshire Attorney General’s Office33 Capitol StreetConcord, NH 03301

Thomas Barnard

DATED: March 14, 2017

23

APPENDIX

APPENDIX — TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Indictment — second degree assault Al

Information — criminal trespass A2

State’s Motion to Amend Information, with margin order A3

Sentence — second degree assault A6

Sentence — criminal trespass A8

A

WESTA TE OFNEWH4MPSHIREMERRIMAcK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT MARCH TERM, 2016

INDICTMENT

At the Superior Court, held at Concord; in the County ofMerrimack on the 17th day ofA’L4R€’11 2016the Grand Jurorsfor the State ofNew Hampshire, upon their oath, present that

THEO BOSAof CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

did commit the crime of SECOND DEGREE ASSAULTcontrary to RSA 631:2,1(1), a CLASS B FELONY

on or about the 8th day of JANUARY, 2016at CONCORD, New Hampshire

In that:

1. Theo Bosa strangled Patience Carr;

2. Theo Bosa committed the above act knowingly.

contrary to the form of the statute, in such cases made and provided; and against the peace and dignity qfthe State. This is a true bilL

Theo Bosa614 Daniel Webster Highway Grand Jwy ForemanBoscawen, NH 03303

DSR/

• So3It W MurrayDATE: Ivkrrimack County Attorney

Statev. TheoBosa 1Date ofBirth: 10/25/91

&Hh1Th.rc . .. - ‘.4/Lc

C

(-aC0

INDICTMENT:

Al

TUESTA TE OFNEWHAMPSHIRE

MERIUMA CK, SS. SUIERIOR CO UR 7 APRllT4j2ff

INFORMATION

To the Superior Court, holden at ConcorcL within andfor the County qfMerrimack on the J3hhl day ofAPRIL, 2016 comes now the Merrimack County Attorney in the name and on the b ifqfrfi .t/2Fb7New Hampshire upon information and complaints that

THEO BOSA i6 APR 13of CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

In that:

did commit the crime of CRIMINAL TRESPASS, contrary to RSA635:2,111, a CLASS A MISDEMEANOR

&on or about the 8TH day of JANUARY, 2OI

at CONCORD, New Hampshire

.J S

1. Theo Bosa remained at 10 Jermings Drive, the residence of Patience Carr, indefiance of au order to leave which was personally communicated to him byPatience Can, an authorized person.

2. Theo Bosa was not licensed or privileged to remain in the property;

3. Theo Bosa committed the above acts knowingly egnily Qf

Whereupon the said County Attorney prays the consideration of the Court here in trial Se and that

due process of lmi’ may be awarded against the said defendant in this behalf to make hun ZTh’er to thesaid State concerning the premises aforesaid.

Theo Bosa614 Daniel Webster HighwayBoscawen, NH 03303

DSR

State v. Theo BosaDate ofBirth: 1 0/25/91

DAt? 7ftzj i1 _Lrs€

Wi

INFORMATION:

nfl 7 ES

•1

Scott W MurrayMerrimack County Attorney

A2

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIREMERRIMACK, 55. SUPERIOR COURT JULY TERM, 2016

16-CR-130 1212524ca,

cn

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Cr m

V. :1THEOBOSA

MOTION TO AMEND INFORMATION i— —JC) 0

NOW COMES the State of New Hampshire by and through David Rotman, Assistant

Merrimack County Attorney, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to amend an information

flied in connection with the above-captioned matter, and states in support thereof as follows:

The defendant is currently charged with one count of Second Degree Assault and

one count of Criminal Trespass.

2. Trial is scheduled to begin on July 19, 2016, twelve days from today.

3. In reviewing the Criminal Trespass information, undersigned counsel realized that

the date of the offense should read “on or about the gih day of January, 2016,” rather

than “on or about the 8th day of January, 2015.”

4. The State seeks to amend the scrivener’s error as set forth above in paragraph 3.

5. Further, the State seeks to amend the information to add a paragraph and to state:

i. Theo Bosa remained at 10 Jennings Drive, the residence of Patience Carr, indefiance of an order to leave which was personally communicated to him byPatience Can, an authorized person.

2. Theo Rosa was not licensed or privileged to remain in the property;

3. Theo Rosa committed the above acts knowingly

5. An information or complaint may be amended at any time before or during trial;

State v. Green, 105 NH 260 (1964); State v. Crocket, 116 N.H. 324 (1976). 1-

A3

hDC fr

7. Amendment is sought to comport with the wording of the criminal trespass statute

RSA 635:2, III.

8. The rights of the defendant would not be prejudiced by the amendment of this

information.

9. While it is unclear if defense counsel agrees to amendment of the date as requested

in paragraphs 3 and 4, defense counsel indicated he OBJECTS to the second

proposed amendment in paragraph 5

WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that this 1-lonorable Court:

A. Grant the foregoing motion and thereby amend the information as requested; or

B. Hold a hearing on the issue;

C. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

July 7,2016

Attorney

Respectfully submitted,

(603) 228-0529

A4

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has this date been forwarded lo Jeremy

Clernans, Esq. —Th

David Rotman44Assista5pthh Attorney

A5

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

JUDICIAL BRANCHhttp:!Iwww.courts.state.nh.us

Court Name: N _ix-3 fri iL I Cxi .S’i Pt’vLiO Vt (ti Lt’I.

Case Name: -VThNE \J Th-itTh

Case Number (., C YL 3O Charge ID Number 9 t.i2) C(if known)

.rrvn-.w fl,r -STAWE:PRlSON SENTENCE

I.Pls4erdici) j4.4..,

Clerk: Lc P7

Crime: .s i) 4ssç Date of Crime: y

Judge: RI3Monitor k’

djp6fGUlLTYIrRUE is entered.

The defendant is sentenced to the New Hampshire State Prison for not more than 7 year(s) /_____

months, nor less than S year(s)!

________

months. There is added to the minimum sentence a

disciplinary period equal to 150 days for each year of the minimum term of the defendant’s sentence, to

Aiè prorated for any part of the year.

‘2. This sentence is to be served as follows: committed C Commencing

Q 3.

____________________________________

of the minimum sentence is suspended

_________________________________________

of the maximum sentence is suspended

Suspensions are conditioned upon good behavior and compliance with all of the terms of this order.

Any suspended sentence may be imposed after a hearing at the request of the State. The suspended

sentence begins today and ends — years from today or release on charge ID no.

__________

jJ 4.

____________________________________

of the sentence is deferred for a period of

______

year(s).

The Court retains jurisdiction up to and after the deferred period to impose or terminate the sentence or

to suspend or further defer the sentence for an additional period of

_____

year(s). Thirty (30) days prior

to the expiration of the deferred period, the defendant may petition the Court to show cause why the

deferred commitment should not be imposed, suspended and/or further deferred. Failure to petition

within the prescribed time will result in the immediate issuance of a warrant for your arrest.

C 5.

______________________________________

of the minimum sentence shall be suspended by the Court

on application of the defendant provided the defendant demonstrates meaningful participation in a

sexual offender program while incarcerated.

C 6. The sentence is C consecutive to

________________________________________________________

U concurrent with

____________________________________________________

j%7. Pretrial confinement credit: (33’i

C 8. The Court recommends to the Department of Cbrrectibns:

U A. Drug and alcohol treatment and counseling

C B. Sexual offender program

C. Sentence to be served at the House of Corrections

flD.

If required by statute or Department of Corrections policies and procedures, the defendant shall provide a

sample for DNA analysis.

Pursuant to RSA 499:1O:a, the clerk shall notify the appropriate health care regulatory board if this conviction is

for a felony and the person convicted is licensed or registered as a health care provider.

NHJB-21 15-S (10116(2015) A6

Case Name:

_____________

Case Number:

___________

STATE PRISON SENTENCE

PROBATION

C 9. The defendant is placed on probation for a period of

___________

year(s), upon the usual terms of

probation and any special terms of probation determined by the Probation/Parole Officer.

Effective: C Forthwith C Upon Release

______________

C The defendant Is ordered to report immediately to the nearest Probation/Parole Field Office.

Q 10. Subject to the provisions of RSA 504-A:4, Ill, the probation/parole officer is granted the authority to

impose a jail sentence of 1 to 7 days In response to a violation of a condition of probation, not to

exceed a total of 30 days during the probationary period.

C 11. Violation of probation or any of the terms of this sentence may result In revocation of probation

and imposition of any sentence within the legal limits for the underlying offense.

/ OTHER CONDITIONS

El 12. Other conditions of this sentence are:

CA. The defendant is fined $

________________

plus statutory penalty assessment of $

_____________

The fine, penalty assessment and any fees shall be paid: Q Now Q By

________________

OR

Through the Department of Corrections as directed by the Probation/Parole Officer. A 10 %service charge is assessed for the collection of fines and fees, other than supervision fees.

C $

__________

of the fine and $

_________

of the penalty assessment is suspended for

____

year(s).

A $25.00 fee is assessed in each case file when a fine is paid on a date later than sentencing.

C B. The defendant is ordered to make restitution of$

_________________

plus statutory 17%administrative fee

C Through the Department of Corrections as thrected by the Probation/Parole Officer

C At the request of the defendant or the Department of Corrections, a hearing may be— scheduled on the amount or method of payment of restitution.

,7 C Restitution is not ordered because:

________________________________________________

C. The defendant is to participate meaningfully and complete any counseling, treatment and

educational programs as directed by the correctional authority or ProbationlParole Officer,

C D. Subject to the provisions of RSA 651-A:22-a, the Department of Corrections shall have the authority

to award the defendant earned time reductions against the minimum and maximum sentences for

successful completion of programming while incarcerated.

C E. Under the direction of the Probation/Parole Officer, the defendant shall tour the

C New Hampshire State Prison U House of Corrections

C F. Ee defendant shall perform

__________

hours of community service and provide proof to

the State or C probation within

_________

days/within

________

months of today’s date.

CGThe defendant is ordered to have no contact with

__________________________________________

eliher directly or indirectly, including but not limited to contact in-pion, by mail, phone, emaii, text

message, social networking sites or through third parties.

C H. Law enforcement agencies may C destroy the evidence in this case C return evidence in this

case to its rightful owner.

C l>.zhe defendant and the State have waived sentence review in writing or on the record.

121. The defendant Is ordered to be of good behavior and comply with all the terms of this sentence.

C K. Other:

q/77 7cea) £Date Presiding Jusice

NHJB-21 15-S (1011512015)A7

—

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIREJUDICIAL BRANCH

hftp:ilwww.courts.state.nh.us

C concurrent withC 4. Pretrial confinement credit:

_________

days.

C 5. The court recommends to the county correctional authority:A. Work release consistent with administrative regulations.B. Drug and alcohol treatment and counseling.C. C Sexual offender program.D.C

If required by statute or Department of Corrections polides and procedures, the defendant shall provide asample for DNA analysis.Pursuant to PSA 499:1 O:a, the clerk shall notify the appropriate heafth care regulatory board if this conviction isfor a felony and the personconvicted is licensed or registered as a health care provider.

NHJS-2312-S (1011612015)

A8

Court Name:

Case Name:

Case Numer(if known)

Merrimack Superior Court

317r\Th U. fl-1E0 Bcoij., 1Li3O

HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS SENTENCE

Charge ID Number: 121 2s2q c

-

J R1&erdi),

.

Clerk: Irgt ICrime: i-n fDateofChme: I ‘cit I

Judge: V%’LCMCrv’-&rcMonitor: j<. Zfhk

A finding of GUILTY/TRUE is entered.This conviction is for a J Felony G’Misdemeanor C Violation of ProbationC The defendant has been convicted of the crime of domestic violence as defined in RSA 631:2-b1 I, and

the defendanrs relationship to the victim is the following: C 1. Current or former spouse; 2. Parent ofthe victim; C 3. Guardian of the victim; C 4. The parties share a child in common OR C The partiescohabitate!cohabitated as a C 5. Spouse; Q 6. Parent; C 7. Guardian OR the relation,ip of thedefendant and victim is that of C ii. Intimate partner; C 12. Adult related by blood or marriage.Federal lawprohibits a defendant convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing,

,.%‘eceiving or purchasing any firearm including a rifle, pistol or revolver, or ammunition for any firearm.yTlSe defendant is sentenced to the House of Corrections for a period of

______

day(s)! \ — month(s)9’2. This sentence is to be served as follows:

C Stand committed C Commencing

_______________

C_-consecutive weekends from

______

PM Friday to

______

PM Sunday beginning

_____________

1.3’ Am..c of the sentence is suspended durir good behavior andcompliance wHh all terms and conditions of this order. Any suspended sentence may be irijposed afterhea.0fl6 at the request of the State. The suspended sentence begins today and ends S years fromGloday or Q release on charge ID no.

_______________

C of the sentence is deferred for a period of_years!

_____

months. TheCourt retains jurisdiction up to and after the deferred period to impose or terminate the sentence orto suspend or further defer the sentence for an additional period of_years!

_____

months,Thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the deferred period, the defendant may petition the Courtto show cause why the deferred commitment should not be imposed. Failure to petition within theprescribed time wifl result in the immediate issuance of a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.Other:

_________________

The sentence is

___________________________________

2nsecuUveto ‘L ci&13b l1W12LC

Case Name: —

Case Number:

_____________________

HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS SENTENCEPROBATION

6. The defendant is placed on probation for a period of

____________

year(s), upon the usual terms of

probation and any special terms of probation determined by the probation/parole officer.

Effective: Q Forthwith Q Upon Release

___________

The defendant Is ordered to report immediately to the nearest Probation/Parole Field Office.

9 7. Subject to the provisions of RSA 504A4, Ill, the probation/parole officer is granted the authority to

impose a jail sentence of I to 7 days in response to a violation of a condition of probation, not to

exceed a total of 30 days during the probationary period.

9 8 Violation of probation or any of the terms of this sentence may result in revocation of probation

and imposition of any sentence within the legal limits for the underlying offense.

OTHER CONDITIONS

i. Other conditions of this sentence are:

C A. The defendant is fined $

________________

plus statutory penalty assessment of $

____________

OThe fine, penalty assessment and any fees shall be paid: 9 Now 9 By

______________

OR

C] Through the Department of Corrections as directed by the Probation/Parole Officer. A 10%

service charge is assessed for the collection of fines and fees, other Ui an supervision fees.

C] $

_________

of the fine and S

__________

of the penalty assessment is suspended for — year(s).

A $25.00 fee is assessed in each case file when a flne is paid on a date later than sentencing.

C] a. The defendant is ordered to make restitution of $

_________

plus statutory 17% administrative fee.

C Through the Department of Corrections as directed by the Probation/Parole Officer

C Through the Department of Corrections on the following terms:

C At the request of the defendant or the Department of Corrections, a hearing may be scheduled on

the amount or method of payment of restitution.

C Restitution is not ordered because:_________________________________________________________

C C.The defendant is to participate meaningftilly and complete any counseling, treatment and

educational programs as directed by the correctional authority or Probation/Parole Officer.

C D.The defendant’s 9 license 9 privilege to operate in New Hampshire is revoked for a period

of

____________________

effective

_____________________

C] E.Under the direction of the Probation/Parole Officer, the defendant shall tour the

C New Hampshire State Prison C House of Corrections

C F. The defendant shall perform

____________

hours of community service and provide prod to

State or 9 probation within

________

days/within

______

months of today’s date.

t?The defendant is ordered to have no contact with -

-‘ either directly or indirectly, iocluding but not limited to co tin-person, by mail, phone, e-mail,

text message, social networking sites and/or third parties.

C H.Law enforcement ageiiie&may U destroy the evidence in this case Q retum evidence in this

to its rightful owner.

defendant is ordered to be of good behavior and comply with all the terms of this sentence.

EJ.Other:

Pr) (oviOlflpv.i CF flI€Sui.flOthD x—ie&Dn,-t tL’ruL

IhJE )-o (o’JflflLV b)lfl\ WnTh&,jcE LAvv hvS 1b’iL flry.-RLI

Ua4qhfrreDate Snature cf Judge

NHJB-2312-S (1011612015)A9