nuclear wmd policy memo

8/3/2019 Nuclear WMD Policy Memo

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Policy MemoDATE: October 19, 2011

SUBJECT: Nuclear and WMD Security and Summit DiplomacyLeveraging Top-Level Engagement

As experts and officials gear up for the second Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Seoul, it is a

good moment to step back and assess achievements thus far as well as the remaining work.

While significant progress has been made, it appears the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclearmaterials in four years will not likely be reached. In order to preserve momentum, those involved

in the effort must be as deliberate as ever about the challenge of sustaining the engagement of

top-level leaders and institute frameworks and patterns of action that take on a life of their own.Political sensitivities surrounding the NPT also linger in the background, even as efforts to

maintain a separation between the NSS and NPT processes continue.

According to the agreed plan, 2014 is the final year for the NSS. There are important questions,

though, about whether there should be additional summit meetings or if there are ways to

reconfigure international nuclear security efforts. Participants at the Stanley Foundation

conference discussed a number of alternatives to the current arrangement:

extending the time between summits, down-shifting to the ministerial level, re-engineering the process in the form of a reinvented Global Partnership Against the

Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, or

handing the portfolio off to the evolving G-20.This document offers a summary of the conclusions and recommendations of Stanley

Foundations roundtable on Nuclear and WMD Security and Summit DiplomacyLeveragingTop-Level Engagement.

Impetus for Nuclear Security SummitParticipants took stock of the impact and value of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in

heightening awareness of the challenges and supplying badly needed political will to generate

increased activity. Before the summit process was launched, there were no reliable diplomaticlevers to impel states to take action and improve security measures, partially due to some

governments lingering skepticism over the urgency of the threat. More fundamentally, many

governments lacked the technical capacity for action and sometimes even a basic understanding


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of the issue. One of the most important contributions of the NSS process has been to jolt

governments out of the bureaucratic inertia that had held up long-sought measures. In thosecases, the NSS served as the multilateral backdrop for domestic steps that were already the focus

of bilateral consultations.

Participants devoted much of their discussion to the possibility, ramifications, and options in theevent that the summit series comes to an end in 2014. They considered this a real possibility

because of the personal association of the NSS with US President Barack Obamawho willleave office in either 2013 or 2017as well as natural summit fatigue and limited attention span.

Weighing this contingency also helped participants clarify which elements of the global nuclear

security effort are most essential.

A number of metrics of progress on the nuclear security goal were highlighted. First, there are

the particular steps taken by governments: upgrading the physical protection at sites where

material is located, moving material from one site to another, or down-blending it to levels farbelow weapons-grade. Many of these steps took the form of so-called house giftsi.e.,

commitments made by government heads in the run-up to the summit. Participants alsoemphasized the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment. Putting the amendment in force and enactment of related

domestic statutes are seen as vital contexts for ongoing work by national governments. Putting it

more broadly, the question is whether those governments have internalized the objectives of theNSS, with a culture of security trickling down through their bureaucracies. Funding streams to

underwrite the related costs of security were also seen as essential.

In terms of the contribution of the summit process itself, participants saw multiple levels.Leaders mere participation in the NSS concentrates the minds of lower-level officials, boosts the

priority of the issue, and prompts house gifts or new commitments made during the summit. It

was noted that any drop-off in attendance by the heads of state or government (say, sendingcabinet ministers in their stead) could serve as an early warning of a loss of interest in the NSS,

though there have been no such indications yet. As noted above, the summits serve as basic

education about the issue for senior officials and also raise public awareness more widely. Andthe NSS is an opportunity to bridge some of the remaining political differences in how different

nations view the threat of nuclear terrorism, its relative priority, and the locus of responsibility.

In that vein, participants discussed the political implications of one of the NSS main premises:walling off the issue of nuclear security and keeping weapon-grade material out of terrorist hands

from the nonproliferation issue of preventing new countries from getting the bomb. Because the

former is less controversial and diplomatically fraught than the latter, the NSS process has kepttightly focused on nuclear security. Nonetheless, argued some participants, issues related to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) lurk in the background, particularly impatience with

perceived insufficient disarmament of the US nuclear arsenal. Another participant responded byciting the dramatic reduction of US nuclear weapons to a mere 20 percent of peak Cold War

levels. Either way, no participant predicted that the NSS would become weighed down with

issues of proliferation or disarmament by states.


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On the other hand, participants noted another issuenuclear safety, i.e., the safe operation of

energy reactorsthat due to the recent disaster at Fukushima and Koreas proximity to Japan,will certainly be on the agenda for the Seoul summit, yet hopefully as it intersects with nuclear

security. Likewise, leaders are sure to address their Korean hosts neighbor to the north and its

nuclear arsenal in the margins of the summit and possibly in national statements, even if it isnt

on the main agenda.

Falling short of the original four-year goal should not cast a pall over the 20102014 push or thesummit meetings of those years. For one thing, prospects look good for being able to declare

victory within just a few more years after 2014. And the summits stand to leave a strong legacy

if they lead to implementation of the CPPNM, new domestic legislation, increased governmentcapacity, and top-level focusall of which would help make security more self-sustaining

without the summits bright, hot spotlights.

Therefore, experts at the conference recommended that governments continue to pursue thefollowing irrespective of the summits lifespan:

Strengthening the IAEA to ensure it has an integral role in nuclear security efforts. Ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material.

Adherence to the CPPNM even before the treatys amendment enters into force. National legislation to establish liability and penalties for the illicit trafficking of material. Funding and technical assistance to boost nuclear security capacity. Setting up centers of excellence to serve as the locus of professional standards and

innovation.

Detection systems. Developing alternatives to HEU, i.e., medical isotopes. Downblending of HEU to LEU for civilian use.

Maintaining Political Momentum

Under the assumption that the NSS process could sunset in 2014, participants also identified a

range of options to reconfigure the nuclear security effort as alternatives to the biennial pattern of

NSS summits. Should the 2012 summit in Korea, and a possible summit in 2014, generate oridentify additional challenges that will require sustained high-level engagement, multiple options

were discussed for moving the political momentum beyond the current NSS process:

Lengthen the interval between summits to three or four years (closer to the tempo of theNPT review conferences). This option would represent the least change from the status quo.

Shift summits to an irregular schedule. Leaders could convene themselves when theyjudge it necessary.

Develop the CPPNM into a more robust treaty regime, though this would only addressthose dimensions of nuclear security covered by the agreement.

Strengthen the capacity and statute of the IAEA. Build the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass

Destruction up into an NSS successor forum. The Global Partnership (GP) arouses some


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suspicions in the Global South, given that it is a creature of the G-8 and therefore the

Western powers. However, the GP is currently on course to be substantially expandedand reorientedwhich may offer a chance for developing nations to join with a greater

sense of ownership.

Move the NSS under the aegis of the G-20. This idea drew the oft-heard response that theproper focus of the G-20 is economic affairs. But even participants who support G-20moves into political matters saw problems with the mismatch of the two forums

participating states and the adoption by the G-20 of such an extensive program

(advocates of a broadened G-20 agenda have focused more on issues to be boosted, ratherthan down-shifted, like the NSS would be).

Fold the NSS into the United Nations. This would certainly be an ironic move, since theNSS was born as a way to circumvent some of the politics of the United Nations.

Conclusion

Experts shared an understanding that the four-year goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear

materials will most likely not be met. High-level engagement may be required in the future tocontinue to address nuclear security discretely from other nonproliferation issues. In this regard,

2014 will be a pivotal year for both the NSS process and the work itself.

While its not clear at this time at what level or in what venue nuclear security should beaddressed beyond 2014, it is clear that consideration should be given to these questions before

the time arrives. Fragmentation, coordination, continuity, norm development, and connections

back to other multilateral venues will continue to be critical issues for the global effort to combatnuclear terrorism. The Seoul summit, and any others that follow it, could help, with thoughtful

planning, prepare for the future of nuclear security after summits.

The analysis and recommendations included in this Policy Memo do not necessarilyreflect the view of the Stanley Foundation or any of the roundtable participants, butrather draw upon the major strands of discussion put forward at the event. Participants

neither reviewed nor approved this document. Therefore, it should not be assumed that

every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

For further information, please contact David Shorr, Jennifer Smyser, or Keith Porter

at the Stanley Foundation, 563-264-1500.

About The Stanley FoundationThe Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world

citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, andlasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a

nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on

peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. The foundation

frequently collaborates with other organizations. It does not make grants. Online at

www.stanleyfoundation.org.

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