strategic inteligence

7/26/2019 Strategic Inteligence

1/12

Trustees of Princeton University

Review: The Function of IntelligenceAuthor(s): Willmoore KendallSource: World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jul., 1949), pp. 542-552Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008837.

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2/12

THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

By WILLMOORE

KENDALL

ShermanKent, Strategic ntelligence, rinceton, rincetonUniversity

Press, 1949,pp. xiii, 40. $3.00.

STRATEGIC

NTELLIGENCE

can

be readvariously

s:

1) a general

ntroduction

o intelligence

ork

which, ay,

the director

f

almost

ny

section f Central

ntelligencemight

givea newrecruit o

read

on

his

first ay at the office; ) a

memorandum

rom

n

Old Hand

at

intelligence orkwho has

thoughtt all over-like the bird nPeterand theWolf, rom

safe

distance-and

has a

thing

r

two

to tell

those

of

his

col-

leagueswho have stayed n

in

Washington; nd 3) an attempt

by that

same

Old Hand to make sense-inter alia

for

himself

-out of

a

greatly xpanded

United

States

governmentctivity

in

which,

s

all

who

know

t

can

testify,

ense does not

leap

to

the

eye.

Because the

book is in

part

each of these

three

hings,

it is not

perfectlyatisfactory

s

any

one of

them.

But it

is

evi-

dently

not

offered

s

a

learned

treatise n

any

or

all

of them:

indeed, he gap in the existing iterature

n

the field

s

so great

that

one

can

hardly

be

surprised

t

Mr.

Kent's failure to

define

his

task

with

precision.

he

great

meritof

his

book

is

that

t provides body

of

descriptive

materialwhichwill

enable

serious

public

discussion o

begin

on the relation f

ntelligence

to

policy

n

a democratic

ystem.

ince it is American

olicy

on

which he future fthe freeworldseemsto depend, t is high

time

forthe

public

debate

to

commence.

Moreover,

Mr. Kent's book

is

one

from

which

nyone nter-

ested

n

the

relation, ast, present,

nd

future,

etween

United

States

foreign olicy

nd social

research,

an

learn

much-now

from

ts manifest

ontent;now,perhapsmoreoften romwhat

it

takes

for

granted,

what

t says between he ines, nd what t

might avesaidbut did not.Therefore,et us take a look at the

book n each of ts

three

apacities.


3/12

THE

FUNCTION

OF INTELLIGENCE

543

I

The beginner

t an intelligence

gency an

getfrom

trategic

Intelligencen initiationnto theterminologyf theprofession

he is entering-a

picture f the

ntelligence

map in

Washington

(what

organizations

re

performing

ntelligence

unctions,

ow,

theoretically,

hey

mesh ogether,

tc.)

-and a provisional

rasp

of

some

of

the controversial

ssues

because of

which

the lines

on that

map

lie where hey ie

rather han

somewhere

lse.

He

can

learn

hat he

task

of

foreign

ntelligence

s thatof describ-

ing,

observing,

nd reporting

pon,

and speculating

s to the

futuref... phenomenanforeignands (p. 104), which eems

as

good

a

working

efinition

s he is

likely o

find f the task

actually

beingperformed

y certain

gencies.

He can, perhaps

best of all,

derive

from he

book

the

elements f

an

emergent

ethics

of

the

ntelligence

rofession-

sense of why

t is im-

portant

hat

the

ntelligence

unction houldbe well

performed,

a

realization hat

there re

some

compromises

with, ay,

ad-

ministrative onvenience, r entrenched gnorance) that he

and

his colleaguesmust,

n

the ongrun,

refuse o make,

nd an

insight

nto

certain differences

etweengovernment

esearch

and

academic

research

hat make

the

ethics

of the

latternot

strictlypplicable

o

theformer.

Mr. Kent

may,

to be

sure,

awaken

n

the

beginner

ome ex-

pectations

hat

are

doomedto

disappointment,

s,

for

xample,

when

he

assures

him

that an

intelligence

rganization

s

a

strange ndwonderfulollection fdevoted pecialistsmolded

into

a

vigorous

production

nit

(p.

74) ;

but

it

was two

Old

Hands at

newspaper

work

whowrote

The Front

Page,

and

there

is no

doubt something

o be

said

for

nculcating

n

beginners

an

enthusiasm

hat

only

the

more romantic

f their

seniors

are

able to

maintain.

Speaking

as a man who has often

old

beginners

adly

what

Mr. Kent tells them

well,

the

present

writerwelcomes trategicntelligencen this one of its three

capacities,

nd

hopes

that

the

ntelligence

raternity

ill

make

good

use

of

t.

It

will

save

theP-8's

precious

ime,

nd will

con-

tribute

generously

o

the

professional

evelopment

f

their

junior

olleagues.


4/12

544

WORLD POLITICS

II

Mr.

Kent

has lookedat the ntelligence

et-up

n Washington

and found

t, on balance,

good. Thus,

Strategic ntelligence

s

not thebook of a reformer ho takespen in hand to expose

and remedy

bad situation.

On the

contrary: t insists

hatthe

decision-maker

ho regularly ubstitutes

is

own udgment or

that of the

intelligence rm is,

tout

court, turning

is back

on thetwo nstruments

y whichwestern

man has,

sinceAris-

totle,

teadily nlarged

his horizonof knowledge-the

nstru-

ments

of reasonand

scientific

method p. 206).

It would be

quiteunfair, n theotherhand,to suggest hat Mr. Kentputs

himself orward

s a

defender

f the status

quo

in

intelligence

planning nd organization.

He shows

himself,

t

a

number

f

points

n his

argument, enuinely

ware that

the

existing

r-

rangements

eflect,

hall we

say,

something

ess than

the

best

thinking

f which he

nation

s

capable.

But he

has not

worked

out

in his

own mind

what

an

ideal set of intelligence rrange-

ments-the

ones he would set up

if

all

the

resistanceswere re-

moved-would be like, nd thushas no standard gainstwhich

to

measure

the

magnitude

f the

shortcomings

e

exposes.

n

any

case,

his book

is

not

characterized

y

a

persistent

illing-

ness

to

followthrough

n

adverse

criticism,

o

proceed

from

recognition

f

a basic defect o

such

questions

s:

How grave

s

this?

May

not our

defects

e so

grave

that in

so

faras it is

possible

o

court

national

disaster

bymismanaging

he intelli-

gencefunction,

e are

doing ust

that n

the United States?

Let us examinesome of theemphases hatmighthave led

him

o

ask such

questions:

1.

Mr. Kent

believes

hat

ntelligence

annot

do

its

ob unless

it

knows he

mindof

the

recipients

f

ts

reports,

nd

getsfrom

them

the

kind

of

guidance

that

any professional

man

needs

from is client

pp. 180-182).'

He

can

hardly void the conclu-

sion

that where

uch

guidance

s

not

forthcoming

he intelli-

gence ob is, in effect,otbeingdone. Is it forthcoming,hen,

in

those

areas of

national

policy

hat are of deepest oncern o

us?

The

uninitiated,

Mr.

Kent

replies,

will be

surprised

o

1

Curiously, owever,

e

reproduces

ithevident

pproval

a

passage

of Walter

Lippmann's

which

urges

the reverseof this

(p. 200).

Mr.

Kent's views on KiampfendeWissenschaft

(ibid.)

vary sharply

rom

hapter

o

chapter.


5/12

THE FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

545

hear hat heelement

fguidance .

.

becomes

arer nd rarer

s

the ob of

intelligence

mounts

n

augustness

p.

182).

Does

it not then follow

that,

as

regards he great decisions

about

foreignolicy,t is highly robable hat (we use his language)

our

undertakings

ill

fail

and our

statesmen

lan

in

ignorance?

Evidently, ut Mr. Kent

does not

make the

nference.

2.

One of the things hat an

intelligence

gency

must

do

is

to

scrutinize,

nd

try o make

sense

of,

what

goes

on abroad

(p.

152). As

is

wellknown,United States

ntelligencegencies

make

use

for his

purpose

both of overt

techniques-that s,

unromantic

pen-and-above-board

bservation nd

research

(p. 4) -and covert r clandestine echniques ffact-gather-

ing.

Two

choices

which

any intelligence

gency

must make,

therefore,

re those

relating o,

first,

he

allocation

of

resources

between

hesetwo

types

of

collection, nd

secondly, he

de-

greeof autonomy

which he

clandestine peration

hall, out of

tender

egard

or

considerations f

security,

e

permitted

o

enjoy. ndeed,

hewholematter

f

clandestine

perationss

now

so

surrounded y

security

estrictions

s

to

make

even

thestate-

ment hat hey resurroundedy security estrictionsmatter

of

doubtful

egality;

and

the literature

f

the

subject

is

not

extensive.

All

the more nterest hereforettaches

o

Mr.

Kent's

state-

ment-and he is

pretty learly ooking

right

t

Washington

whenhe

makes

t-that

the clandestine

orce,

if

it

allows the

mechanisms

f

security

o cut t

off

rom

ome

of

the

most

sig-

nificantinesofguidance, ndsup destroyingits own reason

for

xistence

y collecting

he

wrong

nformation

nd

not

col-

lecting

he right

p. 167).

And the

interest ecomes ntense

when this statement s

placed

beside

the

further

tatement o

the

effect

hat:

This

kind

of

mis-collection

ould

be

far

ess

likely o

occur if

the

operationwere not

freeto steer

ts own

course

behind he

fogof

ts

own

security

egulations p.

168).2

This

tallies

precisely

with one

of

the

presentwriter's

major

criticismsfourpresentntelligencerrangements: hey nor-

mously xaggerate

he

mportance

f

covert

ollection, nd yet

permit

t

to

yield shockingly

mall

dividends.3

Now:

either

2

The italics re

mine.

3

If

you

were director f an

intelligence

gency

in

France,

and wished

to know

what

goes

on

in

the

United

States,

which would

you

do first:

take out

an

airmail

subscription


6/12

546 WORLD POLITICS

the agencyneeds the extra nformationt can obtain through

clandestine perations fter t has exhausted he potentialities

of its overtcollection, r it does not. If it does not, t can

do

without ts clandestine peration ltogether; f t does, t must

be in

a

position o lay down-and enforce-directives o

the

men responsible or obtaining t. And if the Washington n-

telligence gencies are not

in

this position, hen Mr. Kent

is

tellingus something hat needs to be said to a much wider

audience

than

that which

s

likely o read his book, and some-

thing

whose

implications

need

to be pointed up much

more

sharply

han

he

has

pointed

hem

up.

The whole

question

of

covert ollection s, in the presentwriter's iew, one thatur-

gently requires nvestigation y

a

Congressionalcommittee

prepared o speak the anguageof egislative upremacy,nd

to

insistthat no democracy

an afford

o make

a

simple

and-

in

the short nd

middle

term t least-irrevocable

act

of faith

in the

men

called upon to perform

his

highly xplosive

func-

tion.

3.

Without

professional xperts, ays Mr. Kent, there s

no intelligence .

..

Theyare thesocial and natural scientists

and

the

military xperts

who

have

a

finger-tip

eel

for he

ways

of

research

nd

analysis,

who

are

masters

or

dedicatednovi-

tiates)

...

of

their

articular

racket f

earning,

nd

to whom

the

discovery

f new facts or new

relationships

s a

career

(p. 107).4Again

and

again, ndeed,

he

shows

his

awareness hat

the

quality

of

an

intelligence gency'spersonnel

s the

major

determinantf the qualityof its performance;nd if in the

passage just

cited

he

sidesteps

the

question,

whether he

in-

telligence

unction

s

today

in the hands of men like

those he

has described

if they

do

not

in

actual

departmental ractice

measure up

to

the

specifications

f this

paragraph,

. .

they

should ),

it

is not difficult

o collecthis

views

as

to

the

present

trend

n

this

regard:

Two

forcesof

disintegration

re

now

working

n concert n

themost

valuable

people.They

are

being

nudged romwithinbycivil ervice egulations] ndbeckoned

fromwithout.

heir oss

is

a

catastrophe

o federal

ntelligence

to the

New York

Times,

or send four

ex-Deuxieme-Bureau

men to

dispense largesse

in

Washington?

And

now

that

you

have answered

that

question

in the mannerthat

the

present

writer

xpected,

how sure are

you

that

you

would send the

four men at all?

4

The

italics re

mine.


7/12

THE

FUNCTION

OF

INTELLIGENCE

547

work

(p.

147).5

But the

warning

s buried

n

a

technical

dis-

cussion

in

the

middle

of

the

book,

and has no

impact

upon

its

general

rgument.

4. Mr. Kent has otherminorquarrelswithpresentntelli-

gence

policy:

he

would

like

a

civilian

director

or

Central

n-

telligence

p.

100) ;

he

feels hat

CIA's

powers

f

nvestigation

vis-a-vis

departmental

ntelligence

re

inadequate

(p.

101);

he

believes

hat

Washington

would be well-advised

o rethink he

relation etween esearch

eople

n

the home

office

n the

one

hand,

and

field

taff,

ncluding

here overt

as

well

as

covert

collection,

n

theother

p.

165) ;

and

so

on.

The presentwriter elieves hat f all of Mr. Kent's reproofs

were

cted

upon,

nd

all

his

proposals

dopted,

he result

would

be

an improvement

n

UnitedStates

ntelligenceperations. ut

this

mprovement

ould,

ike

the infant

mentioned n

Marx's

famous

ootnote,

e

very

mall.

III

The most nstructiveassages nStrategic ntelligencere, nthepresentwriter's pinion, hose n which

Mr.

Kent reveals

what we

may

call the

general

theory

f

the

intelligence

unc-

tion

to

which

his

thinking

as

brought

im-plus

those

n

which

he

records,

ut on

his

theory

oes

not

identifys

such,recog-

nizably

pathological

aspects

of

existing

ntelligence

rrange-

ments.

They

are instructive

ecause Mr.

Kent's

state

of

mind

on

most of

the

problems

o which

uch a

theory

must

address

itself eflectso a remarkable egree hatofofficialWashington

as

the present

writer ame to

know t in

the

course

of his

own

tour

of

duty

s

an

intelligence

fficial.

nd,

so far

as

he knows,

this

s the first ime that that state

of

mind

has,

so

to

speak,

ventured

eyond

he

steel

curtain n

26th

Street

o

subject tself

to

criticism.When

approached

rom his

point

fview,

trategic

Intelligence

ecomes

a

book

that every

ocial

scientist

hould

lay in his

heart

and ponder.

Let

us notice

some of

the char-

acteristicsf his tate fmind:

5

And

he

says elsewhere hat if

we are looking

for the

encouraging

lement n

depart-

mental

ntelligence,

.e., the

departmentshat

have

realized the importance

f the

task,

shown

a

decent respect

for full

and accurate

knowledge,

nd employed

the right

kind

of

professional

eople, it is to

Labor,

Commerce,

nd Agriculture

thus,

one infers, ot

to

State and

Defense) that

wemustgo (p.

115).


8/12

548

WORLD

POLITICS

1. It

is a state

of mindwhich

s-dangerously,

n this writ-

er's

view-dominated by an

essentially

wartime onception f

the ntelligence

unction.

Most of the men who

occupy he key

positions earned he ntelligence usinessduring hewar. They

seem to have

acquired a

trained ncapacity o put

aside, more

than

momentarily,

he intellectual

habits

appropriate o the

conduct

of

hostilities or preparation

or the

conduct of hos-

tilities)

gainst

n

actual

or potential

nemy, nd togiveto the

distinctivelyeacetime

unctions f a

governmentalntelligence

agency he

mportance hey

deserve.

This is not to imply hat

research

nto theconstituents

f power

hould apse in time of

peace, or that strategicntelligence s this stateofmindcon-

ceives

t

shouldbe

performed

ith ny less

loving are than n

the

past;

and it is

certainly

ot to

imply

hat the

possessors

f

this

state of

mind

are in

any sense

reluctant o place the in-

telligence

gencies

at

the

serviceof

the

quest

for

(or,

as

Mr.

Kent

likesto put t,the

trategy f)

peace. The point s, rather,

that the

very

use of

the term

strategic

s

opposed

to, say,

foreign olicy, o denote he

entire ask of

ntelligences itself

profoundlyignificant,nd thatthebig ob-the carving ut of

United States

destiny

n

the world as a

whole,

as

contrasted

to

the

conductof

United

States

policy

toward

a

congeries

f

nation-states-tends o

slip through

heir

ingers.

One illustration

f

this

to whichone

might oint

s

the

ease

with which

Mr. Kent

moves

from

definition f

the role

of

intelligence

which

presupposes

hat the

objectives

of

foreign

policyare given (p. 154), as, withrespect o the large ssues,

they

re

in

time

of

war,

and one that runs n

terms f

the

ob-

jective

and

impartial

exploration

f

competing

lternatives,

which

s

evidently

he

appropriate

efinition

n

peacetime

p.

201).

Another

llustration

s

his

willingness

o

acquiesce

in a

definition

fthatrole

which

egards

he

knowledge upon

which

we base our

high-level

ational

policy

toward he

other tates

of

the

world as

separable

nto

two

parts,namely,

hat

about

other tates nd that boutsomethingalled our own domestic

scene. Such

a

definition

uts

the

first

art

n the hands

of

a

distinct

roup

of officials hose

research

must

stop

short

t

the

three-mile

imit even when

the thread

they

are

following

runsright

cross

it,

and

yet

which

tells

itself t

is

using

the


9/12

THE FUNCTION

OF INTELLIGENCE

549

scientific

method. This ends

you

up

with

ntelligence eports

that

never,

ever ake

cognizance

fUnited

States

policies

lter-

native o theone

actually

n

effect,uch

problems

eing

domes-

tic matters.)

It is

this

wartimeconceptionof

the

intelligence unction

which

eads to

a

regionalbreakdown

f the

ntelligence

unc-

tion,and deems

knowledge

f

the

outside world

as

additive-

in the

sense that if six

regional

divisionchiefs

are gathered

togethern thename

ofthe

world

ituation here

lso

is

wisdom

about the atter.

t is a

state

of

mind

characterizedy a

com-

pulsive

preoccupation

with

prediction,

iththe

elimination

f

surprise from oreign ffairs.The shadow of Pearl Harbor

is

projected

nto the mists

of

Bogota, and

intelligence

ooks

shamefaced

ver

ts failure

o

tell

Secretary

Marshall

the

day

and

hourat which

revolution

ill

break

out

n

Colombia.

The

course

of

events

s

conceivednot as

something ou try

to

in-

fluence

ut

as

a

tape

all

printed p

inside

a

machine;

and the

job of intelligence s

to

tell the

planners

how it

reads.

With

this

conception

f

ntelligence

ne does

not,

and,

on

the record

at least,cannotdistinguishetweenwhatwemaycall absolute

prediction

nd

contingent rediction.6

he

latter s

what the

government

eeds,

specially

n

peacetime.

2. It

is a

stateof mind dominated

y

an

essentially

ureau-

cratic

conception

f United States

government,

nd

of the

in-

telligence

roblem.

On

examining

Mr. Kent's

discussion

fthe

relation

between he

producers

nd

consumers

f intelli-

gence (pp. 180-206),one recognizes t once that he is con-

cerned not with the

relation

betweenhis

intelligence

xperts

and the

elected

officials

ho,

as

we

hope,

are

still

making

he

actual

decisions

bout our

foreign

olicy, ut with

the

relation

between

his

intelligence

xperts

nd

what

t is

now

fashionable

to call

the

policy planners.

The

issue

here

s

fundamental:

if

you

conceive

he

ntelligence

unctionn this

manner, ou are

excluding

rom ts

purview

what

this

writerwould call

its

most

crucialaspect-i.e., thatwhich oncerns hecommunicationo

6An

example

of

absolute

predictionwould

be: General

DeGaulle will

come to

power

this

day

six

months ;

or

Japan

will

attack Pearl

Harbor on

x-day at y-hour. The

con-

tingentprediction

would

read: The

following

actors,

which can

be

influenced n such

and

such a

fashion

by

action from

the

outside,

will

determine

whether,

nd

if so,

when,

General

DeGaulle

will

come to

power.


10/12

550 WORLD POLITICS

the

politically esponsible aymen

of the

knowledgewhich,

o

use

Mr. Lippmann's happy phrase,

determines

he

pictures

they

have

in

theirheads of the world to

whichtheirdecisions

relate. The role of the intelligence gencies becomes,on this

showing, that of mere research assistants to

the

George

Kennans.

Mr. Kent

might eply o

this

criticism,

s

the presentwriter

has heard

many

of his former

olleaguesreply:

This

is

how it

in

factworks,

nd

it would be unrealistic

o discuss the in-

telligence

unction

n

any

otherterms.

No

doubt; but

if

so,

we do

not ellourselves hatours s a book aboutthe

knowledge

upon whichour nation'sforeign elations,n war and peace,

must rest

(p. vii).

For

the

state

of mind for

which

that

book

calls

is one which

xplicitly ecognizes

ow small

a

part of that

knowledge an or should

be

provided y

a

governmentperation

(i.e., how large

a

part of it

is

and should

be

provided y pro-

fessional

scholarship

under

non-governmentaluspices, and

how

arge part

of

t

is,

whethert should

be

or

not,provided-

howeverbadly-by journalists), and how importantt is to

relate ur

thinking

bout

that small

part

to our

thinking

bout

therest.

3.

It

is

a

state

of

mind characterized y a crassly em-

pirical onception f the research rocess n the social sciences.

This,

in

view

of

the profoundcommitment f our intelli-

gence agencies

to

what we

have

called the

regional break-

down

of their

problem,

s

not

surprising. or,

if

it

is

regional

unitsyou are building, nd it is social scientistspecialized o

specific

ountries nd

areas

you

wish

to

staff hem

with,what

you

end

up

with

s an

extremely ighpercentage

f

historians,

who

with he

best will

in the

worldcommunicate

o the

opera-

tion the

characteristic

ices

(and virtues)

of

their

kind of

re-

search.The

performance

fthe

ntelligence

unction

ccordingly

becomes

matter

f

somehow

keeping

ne's head

above water

in a tidal wave of documents,whose factual contentmust be

processed - i.e., in Mr. Kent's language, analyzed, eval-

uated, and

exploited

s

raw materialfor

hypotheses.

he

emphasis,

s

we have already noticed,

s

on prediction, hich

against

this

background

s

necessarily

nderstood

s

a

matter


11/12

THE FUNCTION

OF

INTELLIGENCE

551

of

projecting

discernible

mpirical

trends into

an indefinite

future.

Here

also

the

ssue s

fundamental: n

intelligence peration

built upon a conception f the researchprocess n the social

sciences hat

assigns

due

weight

o

theory

s

it

is

understood

in economics

and sociology and,

increasingly ne hopes, in

politics,would

of

course

be

a

whollydifferentffair. t would

recruit

considerable ercentage

f its

personnel recisely or

its theoretical rainingand

accomplishments; t would free

them

from

he

tidal

wave of

documents;

t

would enable them

to work underconditions alculated to

encourage hought; t

would, above all, give them continuous and instantaneous

access

(e.g.,

by

international

elephone)

o

the

data that really

matter,

amely

he raw data

of

the

developing ituation

n

the

outsideworld.

The documents, aving

ome

from

broad,

are

as a

matter

f course

ut of

date.) This,

clearly,

s

not the place

to discuss

he

comparative

merits f

the two

conflictingoncep-

tions of

social

research,

nd

it is

not

intended o

suggest

hat

the intelligence unction hould be delivered ver entirely o

that

implied

n

the

foregoing

entences.The

point s, rather,

that current

lanning

nd

organization

n the

ntelligence

ield

ignores

ne

of the

wo

altogether.It is,

from

his

point

of

view,

highly ignificant

hatMr.

Kent,

for

ll

his

numerous

eferences

to the

social sciencesand social

scientists,

ever

employs

n

that

connection

hewords

heory

nd

theorist.)

4.

It

is

a

state

of

mind

characterized

y

an

uncritical p-

timism egardinghesupply ftheskillsuponwhich heeffec-

tive

performance

fthe

ntelligence

unction

epends.

Mr.

Kent,

quite rightly

n this reviewer's

pinion,

ooks

primarily

o

the

social

sciencesforthese

skills. Like

most

scholars

who

served

with

OSS

during

he

war,however,

e

tends o

envisage

he

olu-

tionof

the

ntelligence ersonnel roblem

n

terms

f

attracting

back

to Washington

he social science

scholars

who,

in

the

course

fthe

shake-up

fter

he

war,

ost

heart

nd turned heir

faceshomeward-i.e., in termsof a return o a GoldenAge

situated,

ike

Spain's,

in

the

past. Or,

to

put

the

same

thing

another

way,

he tendsto

assume

that

out there -in the uni-

versities,

n theresearch

nstitutes,r,

one

supposes, emporarily

unemployed-the

men

you

need exist

nd

await their all.

One


12/12

552

WORLD POLITICS

finds n

him,and in the

ntelligence

raternityn Washington,

noneof

theanxieties hatwould

cause

mostresponsiblecholars

in the

fields ther han History

for

whichwe leave Mr. Kent,

as a professional istorian, ntirely ree to speak) to say to

him:

There could

be no more dangerous

rror.The

supplyof

skills you have in

mind is

hopelessly nadequate

and, failing

drastic

national ction-for

example, newManhattan

Project,

but thistime

n

the

social

sciences-to increase t, will

remain

hopelessly

nadequate

throughout hepredictable

uture. t is

inadequate in two senses: We

are, and

are likelyto remain,

unable

to

release

ny significant

umber

f men

to government

intelligence ithoutwreckinghe eaching rograms ponwhich

the

future upply of such men

must

depend;

and

we

have

grave

misgivings-the conomists erhaps

ess than

the restof

us,

but the economists

lso-about

the

ability

of our

sciences

to

supply

the

sort

of

knowledgewhich,

n

Mr.

Kent's

phrase,

our

highly laced

civilians

nd

militarymen must have.

It

is,

in

fine,

not a

state

of mind which

s

likely

o

produce

thebook all

of us have been

waiting

or

omeone o

write ince,twenty-sevenearsago,Mr. Lippmann'sPublic Opinionfirst

directedour

attention

o those

pictures

n

decision-makers'

heads-and to

the

possibility

f our

deliberately

nfluencing

their

ccuracy.

Nor is it a

stateof

mind

ikely

o

produce

ven

a

small

part

of

the

book thatwould deal

with he

government's

own high-level

oreign ositiventelligence. ut

the

publica-

tion of

Strategicntelligence

may

well

make

more

possible

he

writingf thesetwo other ritically eededworks.

strategic inteligence

Documents