thierry epictetusscheseis 1944

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Epictetus on ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ(Diss. 3, 3, 5-10)

Author(s): J. J. ThierrySource: Mnemosyne, Third Series, Vol. 12, Fasc. 1 (1944), pp. 61-70Published by: BRILL

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EPICTETUS ON S??S??S

(Diss. 3, 3, 5?10)

BY

J. J. THIERRY

5 ??a t??t? p?s?? ???e??t?t?? p??????eta? t? a?a???,

??d?? ???? ?a? tf pat??, ???a tf ??a?f.

"??t?? e? s??????;"

??t?? ?a? p?f??a? t??t? ??? t? ????s?a d?d??e? ?

6 ?e??. d?a t??t?, e? t?? ?a??? ?a? d??a??? t? a?a???

?te??? ?st??, ???eta? ?a? pat?? ?a? ade?f?? ?a? pat??? ?a?

7 p??ta ta p????ata, ???' ??? t? ???? a?a??? ?pe??d?,

??a s? s???, ?a? pa?a????s? s??; a?t? t????;

"pat?? s?? e???."

???* ??? a?a???,

"ade?f?? s?? e???."

8 ???' ??? a?a???, e?? d' ?? ???? p??a???se? ???e?, a?t?

<^t?^> t??e?? ta? s??se?? a?a??? ???eta?? ?a? ???p?? ?

t?? ??t?? t???? ???????, ??t?? t?? a?a??? t?????e?.

9 "a??e? ta ????ata ? pat??."

???' ?? ???pte?.

"e?e? t? p???? t?? a???? <(? ?de?f??^>".

ds?? ?a? ???e?, ?? t? ??? t?? a?d??????, ?? t? t?? p?st??,

10 ?? t? t?? f??ad??f??; ?? ta?t?? ?a? t?? ??s?a? t??

d??ata? ???a?e??; ??d' ? ?e??. ??d? ?a? ?????se?, ???'

?p' ???? a?t? ?p???se? ?a? ed??e? ???? e??e? a?t??,

?????[s]t??, ??a????ast??, ?pa?ap?d?st??.

(Division of the dialogue according to the edition of

H. SchenkI, Leipzig, 1916).

In this lecture Epictetus first gives a theoretical explanation of

the duty of the ?a??? ???a???. In doing so he points out the

analogy between the logical and ethical functions of the soul.

Logically the soul knows three kinds of reactions; in respect of







62 EPICTETUS ON S??S??S

thruth: s???at??es?? (?p??e?e??), in respect of the lie: ????e?s??

and in respect of the ?d????; ep???. The ethical functions can

be distinguished in the same way: to good the soul reacts with

d?e???, to evil with e????s?? and to that which is neither good

nor evil, so to that which is independent of the free will1), it

reacts in neither way (??det????). To make this clear Epictetus

gives an example. A money-changer or greengrocer may not

refuse a coin

bearing

the

stamp

of the

emperor.

Thus it is with

the soul: it will never refuse a clear picture of good. So far the

theory, which is then, in the shape of a dialogue, applied to

every-day life. Now one may assume that this is a made-up

dialogue, as often occurs in the diatribe. It is also possible, however,

that Arrian gives, a true report here of a dispute, which really

developed at college between Epictetus and one of his audience,

probably a pupil. In this case the latter supposition seems to be

the more plausible. For quite unexpectedly a new subject is

broached here, which seems to be only indirectly related to the

theory set out before: a more or less hot-headed listener, who,

perhaps, had just had a quarrel? at home, with his father and his

brother, without any further cause tries to apply Epictetus's expla-

nation of good to his own concrete situation and so begins to

talk about relationship. With a made-up dialogue we should have

expected a smoother transition2).

Now, the way in which Schenkl divides the dialogue between

Epictetus and the listener, cannot satisfy us. For Schenkl makes

Epictetus say the first words of the dialogue and also makes him

draw the conclusion, ??d?? ???? ?a? tf pat??, "I have nothing

to do with my father"3). This is apparently so strongly expressed

that the other asks, "Are you so hard?", to which Epictetus

answers, "Yes, so I am by nature". Then the other tries to appeal

to Epictetus's natural feelings, "I am your father, your brother;

if at this moment they actually, in the body, stood before you,

1) 2, 16, 1.

2) For this reason I also want to reckon the sentence, d?a t??t? p?s??

???e??t?t?? p??????eta? t? a?a??? to the words that are spoken by the

listener, although Epictetus too, could have fully endorsed this thesis; cf.p. 4 note 4.

3) cf. for this turn in Epictetus also 2, 19, 16: t? ???? ?a? s??;







EPICTETUS ON S??S??S 63

would you still maintain they do not concern you?" Epictetus

sticks to his opinion "They are not good" and then comes to

the thesis, that the keeping up of the s??se??, of the mutual

relations between men, is a good thing. This he maintains, even

though the other indicates the disadvantages which having a father

or a brother involves.

This division of the dialogue meets with several objections.

I. ? From his thesis thatgood

ispreferable

toevery relationship

Epictetus draws a conclusion which practically comes down to

a denial of the value of all relations between men (5). On the

other hand, he says later (8), t??e?? ta? s??se?? a?a??? ???eta?,

which conflicts with what went first. That he now adds a condition

to it, "if only we seek good in the right choice of our will" does

not change this fact at all. For this so much constitutes the basis

of his ethics, that it is impossible to assume that he would have

neglected this thought in the beginning of this talk.

IL ? The transition in Epictetus's words, ???* ??? a?a???, ?a?

d' ??. a?a??? ???eta? (8), is not a very smooth context.

First he avers that the tie between brothers is no good thing,

by which he means that he need not mind his brother, and, as

if in one breath, he then adds that maintaining family-relations

becomes a good thing, if we put good in the right choice of

the will.

HI. ?Epictetus's conclusion, ?a? d' ?? ???? p??a???se? ???e?

?. t. ?., creates an impression, as if that other person, who hitherto

did nothing but defend natural relations, looked for good in

something else than the choice of the free will, which impression

cannot be justified from the few words the man has spoken so

far. His share in the dialogue was most scanty and modest, "??t??

el s??????;" (5). "pat?? s?? e???." "ade?f?? s?? e???" (7).

IV. ? The opponent, as we got to know him in this first part

of the conversation, so the man who tried to induce Epictetus

to accept natural relations, cannot be identical with the one, Schenkl

makes say later, "a??e? ta ????ata d pat??", "e?e? t? p???? t??

????? ? ade?f??" (9), for the latter tries to shake Epictetus's

belief in the good character of s??se??. Of course, it is not im-

possible that a third speaker butted in. If one wants t? stick to








the opinion that the whole dialogue is based on a fiction of

Epictetus, one might consider it in agreement with the style of

the diatribe, that a new case is put here and a second opponent

introduced. But why not consider the whole pericope 5?10 as

a unit, if this is possible without using far-fetched constructions?

When we are now going to consider more closely, what view

Epictetus held regarding s??se??, a difficulty crops up at once.

In agreement with the nature of the diatribes we find no systematical

explanation. Yet what Epictetus said here and there about s??se??

is sufficient to form a comparatively clear picture of his view

concerning it. In doing so it be premised that from what Arrian

says Epictetus appears not as a gloomy moralist, a kind of mis-

anthrope, but as a real friend of man. "For what is more pleasant

for a man who loves his fellow-men than seeing many people?",

he exclaims1). This teacher, who, naturally, mixed much with

young people, was besides a child-lover par excellence. From

numerous little touches it appears that he thoroughly knows child-

life. He has observed youth in all possible situations2). Indeed,

one could not but expect this from a man according to whom all

people, as offspring of Zeus, are relatives, brothers by nature.

Man is Zeus's own son, he bears God in him3). From this it

follows that the words of the man in our dialogue, who says that

his father and his brother do not concern him, and that he has

nothing to do with them, are little in Epictetus's line. On the

other hand, the first thesis, that good is preferable to any relationship,

expresses exactly the opinion of Epictetus, even though we think

it to be the words of the opponent4). This is connected with the

fundamental thesis of Epictetus's philosophy: the distinction between

the things which are within our control and dependent on the

choice of our free will, and the things which are not. There are

many places which prove that according to Epictetus parents,

1) 4, 4, 24-28.

2) 1, 23, 9; 1, 24, 20; 1, 29, 31; 1, 29, 66; 2, 1, 15; 2, 8, 22; 2, 16, 25;

2, 16, 37; 2, 24, 18; 3, 9, 22; 3, 13, 18; 3, 15,5; 3, 15, 12; 3, 19,4; 3,22, 106;

3, 24, 8; 4, 7, 2; 4, 7, 5; 4, 7, 22; 4, 8, 33.

3) 1, 13, 3-4; 1, 19, 9; 2, 8, 9?14; 3, 24, ?.

4) cf. p. 2 note 2.







EPICTETUSON S??S??S 65

brothers, children, fatherland are not within our power and that

in all these we should not seek the essence of good. Who does

so, must lapse into wars, risings and such-like outrages1). It is

not in our power to get the task we desire. A special body, special

parents, special brothers are given to us2). Parents, brothers,children

and all other relations are not our own and therefore we should

not consider them as such3); they form part of that by which

we are encumbered and drawn downward4).

Therefore we need not grieve when we lose something of that

which is not in our power. For good is only what lies within

the choice of our free will5). Paris sustained no loss, when the

Greeks destroyed Troy and his brothers perished. But a loss he

did suffer, when he failed in those things which were in his

power, when he no longer acted faithfully and properly6). "So

we must become of one will with God and thus dividing things,

in every way possible acquire what is in our power, leaving what

is not in our control to the cosmos and gladly submit to him,

when he wants our children, our fatherland, our body, or whatever

other thing"7). Epictetus makes this clear by examples taken from

life. From the way of life of the Cynic it appears, that also he

who has neither wife nor children can be happy and free8).

Diogenes, whom Epictetus refers to with predilection, is also here

called as a witness, as well as Socrates9). They knew, from whom

and on what conditions they had received wife, children, friends

and country.

When now in our dialogue the remark is made, that good is

preferable to any relationship, then this is entirely in line with

Epictetus's view. The opponent, however, draws from this a con-

clusion which Epictetus cannot have taken upon himself. We can

find no places, which would induce us to assume, that to Epictetus

his relatives are so much thin air. Although they belong to those

1) ?, 22, 10-16. 2) 1, 29, 39.

3) 2, 16, 27; 4, 1, 87; 4, 1, 107; further also see 1, 11, 31; 1, 12, 27 ff.;

2, 17, 24; 3, 24, 85?88; 4, 7, 35.

4) 1, 1, 14-15. 5) 1, 11, 31; 3, 24, 27. 6) 1, 28, 22 ff.

7) Fragm. 4 : '???f?? ?? t?? ?p??t?t?? pe?? f???a?.

8) 3, 22, 46?49. 9) 4, 1, 152-169.

Mnemosyne XII 5








things which are not in our power, he not only is not indifferent

to them, but he even takes a very positive point of view. The

inclination to have intercourse with each other is so naturall),

that beside desiring and avoiding Epictetus reckons among the

first duties: participation in political life, marriage, procreation

of children, honouring God and taking care of parents2). Among

the three parts of philosophy, which one should practise to be

a ?a??? ???a???, the second takes avery important place:

de?te???

?st?? ? pe?? t? ?a?????? ?? de? ??? ?e e??a? apa?? ?? a?d????ta,

???a t?? s??se?? t?????ta ta? f?s??a? ?a? ?p???t??? ?? e?se??,

?? ????, ?? ?de?f??, ?? pat??a, ?? p???t??3). Who wants to

pass as a wise man, must bring his way of life into line with

this, also in respect of his own family4).

Clearly and straight-out he teaches, that as a son, father, brother,

citizen, husband, wife, neighbour, fellow-traveller, regent and

subject, one must maintain the s??se??, where he describes the

ideal attitude of the wise man : ?? ?? pe??est? t??? s?st?sa??????

a?t? ?? ????e? ?? ap?t???a?e??, ?? ?????se? d? ?? pe??p?pte??,

???p??, ?f????, ?ta????? d?e???e?? ?a?* a?t?? ?et? t?? ????????

t?????ta ta? s??se?? t?? te f?s??a? ?a? ?p???t???5). Even if our

relatives have failed towards us, it remains our duty to treat them

as we should6).

Epictetus has come to this opinion about s??se??, because,

according to him, maintaining them is indeed something that is

within our power. The f???sse?? ta? s??se?? lies in the sphere

of what can be either good or bad and is wholesome for him

who has placed the T' and "mine" in the choice of the free

will7). In fact, Epictetus does not fail to mention the obligations

springing from the name of son and brother, very clearly8). Who

lives up to his social obligation, is a peaceful and social being;

who does not do so, is a harmful, sly and caustic being9), causing

harm to himself10). Medea e.g. became a viper in stead of a

1) 3, 13, 5.

3) 3, 2, 4.

5) 2, 14, 8.

7) 2, 22, 19?20.

9) 2, 10, 14.

2) 3, 7, 26; 3, 21, 5.

4) 2, 21, 11.

6) 3, 10, 19?20; 3, 18, 5-6; Ench. 30.

8) 2, 10, 7-8.

10) 2, 10, 25?26.








human being1); an adulterer has become a wolf or a monkey2).

In 4, 5, 29 ff. Epictetus gives a clear summary of everything,

starting from the behaviour of Eteocles and Polynices: if the other

things are good or evil, so if good and evil must be looked for

in the sphere of those things which are not in our power, then

no son loves his father, no brother his brother. The well-applied

choice of the free will should be the only good, the ill-applied

one theonly

evil ; then thepossibility

formaintaining s??se??

is

open. No man can harm or benefit another; that is only done by

the opinion one has about everything. Here again Diogenes is

cited as an example: he kept the golden mean and knew that

on the one hand relationship cannot be reckoned among good,

but that on the other hand maintaining relations indeed lies in

the sphere of good. "He was so mild and full of love, that, for

the common good, he gladly accepted so much pains and so many

obstacles for the body". Compare with this praise the words,

"??t?? e? s??????;" in which Epictetus should have been charged

with lack of love of his neighbours. In all this, Diogenes, however,

as befits a servant of God, remained submissive to God. He realized

throughout, that relatives, acquaintances and friends belonged to

that which was not his. That Antisthenes had taught him; he

had really made him free3). But what about the Cynics, who remain

unmarried; do they live up to their obligations? Yes, Epictetus

says, it is like that, Cynical preachers are necessary, now that,

alas , there is no state to be found which consists of only wise

people. These moralists are in an exceptional position. They must

be able to devote themselves entirely to the service of the Deity

and their fellow-men, without being tied by individual obligations

and free from any relation : ?? p??sdede????? ?a?????s?? ?d??t?????

??d' ??pep?e?????? s??ses??4). If the Cynic observes these, he

cannot properly discharge his duty as a messenger of God, if he

breaks them, he fails in his part of ?a??? ???a???, therefore he

must be free of all s??se??. So Epictetus does not maintain, that

he may neglect it ; keeping up s??se??, among other things, includes

the following occupations, to which therefore not the Cynical

1) 1, 28, 9. 2) 2, 4, 3?11; 2, 10, 18. 3) 3, 24, 64 ff.

4) 3, 22, 69; cf. S. Paul's account for celibacy: Corinthians 1,7,32?33.








preacher, but certainly every other human being is called : attending

to one's wife and children when they are ill; making hot water

for baby's bath; providing clothes for one's children; sending them

to the teacher, equipped with slates and pencils ).

Similar thoughts about the attitude we have to assume towards

our relatives, are to be found with Musonius Rufus, the teacher

of Epictetus, and with Seneca2). It is quite evident now, therefore,

that the words, "I have nothing to do with my father", etc. can

hardly be attributed to Epictetus, even if, looking at them super-

ficially, they seem to be nothing but the extreme consequence of

the opinion that s??se?? are not in our power and consequently

form no part of good. The remark of Bonh?ffer, that the words,

???eta? ?a? pat?? ?a? ade?f?? ?a? pat??? ?a? p??ta ta p????ata,

exactly express the Stoical point of view3), certainly does not

hold good for Epictetus. Even if one would regard these words

as the logical consequence (which they are not) of the thesis:

p?s?? ???e??t?t?? p??????eta? t? a?a???, one should bear in mind,

that none better than Epictetus has realised, that any consequence

1) 3, 22, 67 ff.

2) More elaborately ?. Bonh?ffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, page 90-92

and the notes page 117.

3) Ibid, page 117. Epictetus himself might perhaps have said, that this

is the very Epicurean point of view, towards which he was very critical.

According to Epictetus, Epicurus wants to do away with natural inter-

course between men. Thus Epicurus says, "?? ??apat?s?e, ?????p??, ??d?

pa???es?e ??d? ??ap?p?e?e ? ??? est? f?s??? ???????a t??? ???????? p???

a???????? p?ste?sat? ???. oi d? ta ?te?a ?????te? ??apat?s?? ???? ?a?

pa?a???????ta?". The very fact, however, that he says so and cares somuch for the opinion of people, shows, thus Epictetus, that nature has an

ascendency over logic with him (2,20, 6 ff.). So Epictetus is quite averse to

the doctrine that justice is nothing, that fatherhood or sonship are nothing,

p?? pat?? ??d?? ?st??, p?? ? ???? ??d?? ?st??. An Epicurean state in which

people may not marry and may not beget children, one cannot imagine.

"They are bad principles", Epictetus exclaims, "which throw over the state,

disintegrate the family, even do not become women". (3, 7, 19?21). When

Epicurus maintains, that a wise man must not rear children, neither go in

for politics, Epictetus contends that somebody who leaves his child in the

juren, does an unnatural thing, to which animais even do not come. Quite

sharp becomes his polemic when he says to Epicurus, "I think that even

if your father and mother had foreseen that you would say such things

hey would not have abandoned you". (1, 23).








is odious. Two examples may make this clear. Strictly speaking

he denies the existence of evil in the sense of a calamity that

may strike us; yet he does not deny that in life there are dis-

agreeable and difficult things1)? And in a situation analogous to

ours, after explaining that not siege and devastation are the calamities

that befall man, but the destruction and deterioration of correct

opinions, he does not agree with an over-impetuous pupil, who

blurtsout,

"so when women aredragged away,

children are made

prisoners of war and men killed, is not that a calamity (?a??) ?"2).

There need be no question here, however, of a whether-or-not

happy inconsistency of Epictetus; it is the listenef who?too

one-sidedly?only sees the one truth that father, brother and

further relatives are not in our power, but forgets that other truth,

that good lies in the sphere of the things which are in our power

and that consequently in general the pietas is part of good. Thus

errs this man, who only sees a father who takes his money from

him and a brother who will get a greater piece of the field. He

is even so wide of the track, that it appears he assumes good

to be in outward things (evidently he has not altogether under-

stood that fine thesis he began with). He even makes the absolute

something relative and speaks of "what is good for me" ? "t?

???? a?a???"? "must I relinquish my money, my field, that you,

my father, my brother have it and must I abandon it for your

sake?"

With the words, e?? d' ?? ????? p??a???se? ???e?, a?t? t?

t??e?? ta? s??se?? a?a??? ???eta?, Epictetus shows his pupil the

better way. To him too, Epictetus could think it applicable, what

was said of the Lacedaemonians, ????? ????te?, ?? ?f?sf d*

a??pe???3). At college he had got a head full of learning, but

did not use it in practice or, worse still, made it a pretext to give

his wrong attitude towards life an appearance of right. In doing

so he affected great piety, "God has given me that coin, i. e. that

clear picture of good"4)?

"Relinquish outward things" Epictetus

1) 1, 6, 26.

2) 1, 28,26?27. AlsoD. C. Hesseling, De KoUeges van Epictetus, page 18?19,

is of opinion, that there are many inconsistencies with Epictetus.

3) 4, 5, 36?37.

4) 3, 3, 4: ??a??? fa?tas?a? e?a???.








advises him, "then you will obtain good, which lies in the right

choice of the will".

So in this way we come to the following division of the dialogue :

Disc. 5 "??a t??t? p?s?? ???e??t?t?? p??????eta? t? a?a???, ??d??

???? ?a? tf pat??, ???a tf ??a?f".

?. ??t?? e? s??????;

Disc. "??t?? ?a? p?f??a? t??t? ??? t? ????s?a d?d??e? ? ?e??.

6 d?a t??t?, e? t?? ?a??? ?a? d??a??? t? a?a??? ete???

?st??, ???eta? ?a? pat?? ?a? ade?f?? ?a? pat??? ?a? p??ta

7 ta p????ata, ???* e?? t? ???? a?a??? ?pe??d?, ??a s?

ffX?tej ?a? pa?a????s? s??; a?t? t????;"

?. pat?? s?? e???.

Disc. "a??* ??? a?a???".

?. ade?f?? s?? e???.

Disc. "???* ??? a?a???".

?. 8 e?? d* ?? ???? p??a???se? ???e?, a?t? <^t?^> t??e?? ta?

s??se?? a?a??? ???eta? ? ?a? ???p?? ? t?? e?t?? t???? ??-

?????, ??t?? t?? ??a??? t?????e?.

With this cast all objections set out above are done away with.

From 9 on we must then further follow Schenkl's division.

Den Haag, Tomatenstraat 48.

thierry epictetusscheseis 1944

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