ELECTORAL FOLLOW-UP MISSION TO EU EOM 2013

RECOMMENDATIONS

EFM Kenya – Final Report February 2016

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Disclaimer: "The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. Reproduction is authorized provided the source is acknowledged and the original meaning of the report is not distorted."

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EU Electoral Follow-up Mission, Kenya February 2016

Contents

Executive summary......................................................................................................................... 3

I. Introduction to the Electoral Follow-up Mission (EFM)............................................................. 4

II. Electoral context and update ...................................................................................................... 5

Constitutional reform and implementation ................................................................................. 5

Credibility of electoral institutions ............................................................................................. 6

Credibility of the judiciary.......................................................................................................... 6

Political party relations ............................................................................................................... 7

Devolution and ethnic-regional political competition ................................................................ 7

III. Current reform initiatives.......................................................................................................... 8

Legal framework for elections .................................................................................................... 8

The Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commission......................................................... 10

Status of EU EOM recommendations....................................................................................... 11

IV. Current challenges .................................................................................................................. 11

Voter registration ...................................................................................................................... 12

Regulation of political parties................................................................................................... 13

Role of technology and election results management............................................................... 14

Participation of civil society and election observers................................................................. 15

Participation of women ............................................................................................................. 16

V. Electoral support ...................................................................................................................... 16

Annex 1: List of EU EOM Kenya 2013 recommendations and status of implementation........... 18

Annex 2: List of meetings held..................................................................................................... 26

Annex 3: List of EU-IEBC roundtable participants...................................................................... 27

Annex 4: List of acronyms............................................................................................................ 29

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Executive summary

• The EU Electoral Follow-up Mission (EFM) was deployed to assess electoral reform processes in Kenya and the extent to which previous EU election-related concerns and recommendations have been addressed. The EFM was led by Alojz Peterle, Member of the European Parliament and Chief Observer for the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Kenya’s last general election on 4 March 2013. Mr. Peterle was in Kenya from 8-12 February 2016 during which time he and EU officials met with a range of stakeholders and co-organised a round-table discussion with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

• The EFM took place as the EU and Kenya expressed a renewed commitment to political dialogue, of which the 2017 general elections, scheduled for 8 August 2017 are one important element. The EFM received strong signals from Kenyan authorities and stakeholders that the EFM was timely and welcome as a sign of the continuing EU engagement and support to the deepening of Kenyan democratic institutions. While the EFM recommended that national dialogue among Kenya’s political parties could advance this goal and foster common ground and shared understanding on the meaning and implementation of transparency as it relates to the law, governance and institutions.

• Assessment of implementation of EU EOM 2013 recommendations shows limited progress to date. Out of the 21 recommendations made none have been totally implemented, 8 have been partially implemented and 13 have not been yet addressed. Of 14 recommendations for which the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) has responsibility for implementation, 8 were partially implemented and 6 were not addressed. The assessment involves judgement answers, and is therefore indicative.

• The EFM recalls that enhancing the authority of the IEBC is one of the pivotal elements to successful elections in 2017. The EU EFM therefore presents an important opportunity to assess the status of transparency and accountability in election management and other electoral reforms. The IEBC leadership has been positive in accepting identified shortcomings and taking initiatives to improve its practices. The commission has developed a Strategic Plan and an Operational Plan which, if fully implemented, address many of the EU EOM’s recommendations for operational and institutional capacity building improvements. IEBC reform is challenging given the entrenched organizational culture and the overall capacity of its staff. While the lack of legal reform to date does not preclude the IEBC from taking its own administrative reforms, the uncertain legal environment and highly charged political climate in Kenya may generate controversy over IEBC actions.

• The IEBC has committed itself to regular and structured engagement with electoral stakeholders and initial IEBC actions in this regard reflect partial implementation of this EU EOM recommendation. This is another key element to a peaceful and successful electoral process. A joint EU-IEBC roundtable was convened during the EFM to contribute to the positive momentum towards building improved IEBC-stakeholder relations.

• Reform of the legal framework for elections is ongoing but not fully implemented. An Election Amendment Bill was drafted in August 2015 and has since been under review in the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament. Several provisions in the draft legislation are consistent with EU EOM recommendations but the final form of the legislation remains

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to be seen. Some electoral stakeholders have expressed concern whether the legal reform will be passed before June 2016, with any further delay jeopardizing the time for sound implementation of reforms before the 2017 elections.

• The Campaign Financing Act (2013) improves provisions for accounting and disclosure of political campaign expenses but leaves these disclosures as “confidential” in the hands of the IEBC and lacks a scaled set of sanctions. The act requires additional regulations before it can be fully implemented.

• The Office of the Registrar of Political Parties has recently been separated from the IEBC but has yet to develop its fully envisioned capacity to register and regulate political parties, which are key players in the electoral process.

• The constitutional provision that no elected body should be comprised of more than two-thirds of the same gender is generally understood to be a “progressively realized” goal but there has been no legislative progress on the issue despite a previous Supreme Court ruling to demonstrate progress by August 2015.

• The integrity of the voter register and the biometric voter registration technology employed in the process remains contentious amongst political parties. The IEBC launched a Mass Voter Registration campaign to run 15 February to 15 March 2016, an early and positive step, which addresses one of the key EU EOM recommendations and presents an opportunity for the commission to demonstrate its commitment to serve Kenyans impartially and effectively.

• Procurement, management and sustainable use of election technology remain a challenge for the IEBC. While the MVR drive will hopefully apply lessons learned in 2013, other elements of technology procurement, training and implementation remain to be seen. A thorough examination and possible re-design of the election results management system is an important EU EOM recommendation to be addressed by the IEBC.

• The devolution of power to newly created elected county assemblies and governors has proven to be an important influence on political party behavior and may re-shape future electoral competition.

I. Introduction to the Electoral Follow-up Mission (EFM)

The EU Electoral Follow-up Mission (EFM) was deployed to assess electoral reform processes in Kenya and the extent to which previous EU election-related concerns and recommendations have been addressed. The findings of the EFM may also be considered when deciding potential deployment of an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the next general elections, scheduled to be held on 8 August 2017.

The EFM was led by Alojz Peterle, Member of the European Parliament, and Chief Observer for the EU EOM 2013. Mr. Peterle was in Kenya from 8-12 February 2016 and accompanied by Delphine Skowron, Policy Officer, Democracy and Electoral Observation, Olli Pirkanniemi, Kenya Desk, Horn of Africa, East Africa and Indian Ocean, and Eldridge Adolofo, Mediation Adviser, (European External Action Service). In addition, two independent experts were

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deployed in Kenya from 30 January -18 February 2016 (David Pottie, Electoral/Political Expert, and Paolo Raffone, Legal Expert) to assist the EFM.

The EFM met with the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Speaker of the Senate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary, the National Cabinet Treasury Secretary, the Chair, Commissioners, the CEO and Directors of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), political party leaders and officials, women political and community leaders, representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), technical assistance providers, and members of the diplomatic community. A round-table discussion was held with more than 45 participants (see annex 3 for list of participants). The EFM gave a de-briefing to the EU Heads of Mission. Mr. Peterle shared public remarks with the media on several occasions during the mission. The EU DEL in Nairobi led by Stefano Dejak provided a crucial support to the overall organization of the mission.

II. Electoral context and update

Constitutional reform and implementation All of the laws necessary to implement the Constitution should have been concluded by the end of 2015, five years after its promulgation. However, many legislative gaps remain (notably, the absence of legislation to give effect to the constitutional requirement that no gender occupy more than two-thirds of the elected seats in any chamber) and the Constitution Implementation Commission ended its five year term in 2015, leaving the overall process without a coordinating agency.

The Constitution continues to attract political attention with several initiatives pushing for amendments, including the opposition Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD)’s “Okoa Kenya”, the Council of Governors' “Pesa Mashinani” and Gatundu South MP Moses Kuria’s “Punguza Mzigo”. One group of Jubilee MPs (the “Boresha Katiba” team) has proposed a constitutional referendum during the 2017 general election. Their proposals include reducing the number of counties from 47 to 10 and the number of constituencies from 290 to 210 and abolishing the two thirds gender rule from the 2022 General Election. They also propose a seven-year term limit for Supreme Court judges, fixing the retirement age of all judges at 74 and establishing continuous vetting of judicial officers to weed out corruption.

The CORD “Okoa Kenya” initiative proposes many detailed provisions of election administration to be introduced into the Constitution, including the nomination of five IEBC commissioners on a political party basis, the appointment of a returning officer for each of the 290 constituencies to declare results and the electronic transmission of results1. The alliance has collected the required one million signatures and these are being verified by the IEBC. However, the referendum, if approved, may only be held at the same time as the next general election, implying that such reforms would not apply for the 2017 elections.

1 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Amendment) Bill, 2015. Published by the Committee of Experts, Okoa Kenya Movement.

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Credibility of electoral institutions The linked complex issues of peace, justice, political competition and election management continue to frame the opportunities and challenges of democratic consolidation and ensuring the political participation of the full range of electoral stakeholders, with special emphasis on the role of women, youth and historically marginalized peoples. Each of the national institutions that play a role in these themes faces ongoing credibility and capacity challenges.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) faces multiple challenges, foremost of which is the perception of its overall credibility as an independent, impartial and effective institution. The IEBC’s strategic plan establishes a goal of at least 75% of Kenyans perceiving the 2017 general elections as "free, fair and credible" and the IEBC as an independent, impartial and efficient electoral management body. However, the IEBC faces a severe crisis of confidence among the general population with a recent public opinion poll finding only 18% of Kenyans having “a lot of confidence” in the IEBC and 28% having “no confidence at all.”.2 Some critics (particularly CORD supporters) have called for the replacement of the IEBC chair, Isaack Hassan and some or all of the IEBC commissioners but the EFM was informed that CORD leaders have toned down their criticisms over concerns that any newly appointed commissioners would be beholden to President Uhuru Kenyatta.

Credibility of the judiciary The integrity of the Supreme Court which is mandated to deal with petitions regarding presidential elections has also faced challenges. First, while the court’s denial of former Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s 2013 presidential election result petition was officially accepted by Odinga, he and his supporters have since called the court’s integrity into question, raising concerns that any future complaints may not be pursued through peaceful, legal means. Second, the Justice and the Legal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly introduced changes to the Judicial Service Act at the end of 2015 and critics fear that they will undermine the independence of the Supreme Court. The Law Society of Kenya is challenging the constitutionality of changes in the law that requires the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to give the President three nominees for the post of Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice instead of just one name as currently provided in the Constitution. The JSC is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice when Dr. Willy Mutunga will retire in June 2016. Third, on 23 February 2016, President Kenyatta appointed a judicial tribunal to examine allegations that Supreme Court judge Philip Tunoi accepted a 2 million euro bribe in an election petition case involving the current governor of Nairobi. Fourth, Deputy Chief Justice Kalpana Rawal has launched a legal challenge of the mandatory retirement age, having turned 70 on January 15, 2016. CJ Mutunga has repeatedly castigated widespread corruption in the judiciary which may bear on challenges to election results at MP, Senator and county governors/assembly levels.

2 IPSOS Public Affairs, Kenya, “Game Changers” presentation as of November 2015. A September 2015 IPSOS public opinion survey found that only 43% of Kenyans expressed confidence in the IEBC as and 71% of CORD opposition supporters lacked confidence in the commission. In February 2013, just before the elections, the IEBC enjoyed public support of 62% of Kenyans.

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Political party relations Tense relations between the ruling Jubilee Alliance and CORD continue to shape the overall national political dialogue in Kenya. At the time of the EFM, the two party coalitions were competing in two by-elections and many political leaders were in the early stages of positioning themselves in preparation for the 2017 election campaign. The Jubilee Alliance has made significant overtures to CORD politicians and in recent months a handful of prominent CORD elected politicians defected to Jubilee while several CORD Members of Parliament announced their intention to support President Uhuru Kenyatta’s re-election.

Jubilee is in the process of forging a new consolidated party, Jubilee Alliance Party, with a proposed branch structure based on the 47 counties and with nominations for senator, governor, MP and MCA to be done at the county level. Provisions of the Political Parties Act may create legal challenges to this initiative. Section 11 of the Political Parties Act allows an MP or Member of County Assembly (MCA) to join another party or be identified as an independent member, but has no provisions for what happens to the President, Deputy President, governors and their deputies in the case of party dissolution. The Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) is reviewing proposed amendments to the Political Parties Act to address the issue. The Jubilee Alliance Party steering committee initially set a March 2016 deadline for all coalition members to dissolve their parties but some have yet to do so, pointing to unresolved internal issues within the coalition. The JAP project also faces political challenges from within, mainly in the Kalenjin strongholds.

Despite the recent defections to the ruling party, CORD asserts its leadership - Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka and Moses Wetang’ula – remain strong and united but there is public speculation about which of them will be the CORD presidential candidate or if there may be a split as two or more of them pursue individual presidential ambitions.

International politics are also likely to play a direct role in the final determination of a Jubilee presidential ticket. President Uhuru Kenyatta has continued to lobby African nations to cease their participation in the International Criminal Court. While the ICC case against President Kenyatta has been dropped, uncertainty of the pace and outcome of the ongoing prosecution of Deputy President William Ruto for his alleged role in post-2007 election violence continues to fuel speculation about the composition of the Jubilee ticket in 2017, although the recent decision by the Court not to use recanted evidence based on testimonies withdrawn by former witnesses is seen as a major boost to the defendant’s side.

Devolution and ethnic-regional political competition

The new constitution devolved a degree of power to 47 counties and 1,450 ward assemblies and enables county representation at national level through the Senate. While the elected offices were filled in the 2013 elections, the overall legal, administrative and financial transition continues with overlapping legal and administrative jurisdictional disputes between counties and national government still to be resolved (e.g. infrastructure development such as road construction and maintenance). The mandate of the agency guiding the devolution process, the Transition Authority, expires in March 2016, leaving the ongoing process without an implementing authority.

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Devolution has significantly influenced political party competition and has shifted the attention of many national leaders who are now positioning themselves to contest the county governor seats in the 2017 elections. Notably, as many as 16 current Senators are said to be interested in the governor races.

The historical influences on the political party system reflect many dynamics that have also contributed to political violence in Kenya, including politicization of ethnicity, use of intimidation and displacement of populations to suppress political opposition, and accusations of gerrymandering during boundary delimitation process to build ethnic and regional voting blocks to suit the party in power. Since the end of the President Daniel Arap Moi era in 2002, politicians have relied on building coalitions of smaller parties (in contrast to large, national parties), many of them narrowly ethnically-based.

In advance of the 2017 elections, parties are already engaged in political calculations influenced by ongoing internal migrations that have changed the ethnic composition of many constituencies and counties, shrinking some ethnic bases while introducing a greater mix of communities in others. Rivalries between ethnic communities and within them (on a clan basis for example), often over access to local resources and infrastructure investment, drive both competing political interests and sometimes fuel community conflicts. In the event of 2017 electoral violence, devolution is likely to be a shaping influence as parties and their supporters organize political campaigns around local and county issues in the governor and county assembly elections.

The EFM was informed that many Kenyans are very concerned about the possibility of electoral violence in 2017, with some citing that the elections will be an important moment for Raila Odinga politically as it will represent his last viable chance to win the presidency. It is also unclear how he and his supporters would react to a loss of any magnitude given the denial of their 2013 election result petition to the Supreme Court3. Should the ICC prosecution result in a conviction of DP Ruto, many sources from the Rift Valley fear that it could trigger a violent reaction of his supporters.

III. Current reform initiatives

Legal framework for elections The Constitution enacted in 2010 initiated a period of deep and broad reform of the governance and other legislative sectors. The Constitution is based on a strong bill of rights that aligns with and recalls international instruments, respect for diversity and inclusion based on national values, devolution of power and responsible government.

The Constitution is central to the electoral legal framework. The 2013 elections saw the undertaking of significant concurrent reforms passed by Parliament but significant amendments resulted in a time-constrained election calendar and undermined the full application of the electoral law. Several important legislative actions did not occur in time for the elections, 3 It should be noted, that despite losing the presidency, CORD candidates won more governorships (16 of 47) and more county assembly ward seats than any other party (offsetting the veracity of claims of anti-ODM election rigging, at least at those levels).

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including the Campaign Financing Act (2013), legislation to implement the constitutional provision for enhanced political representation of women and provisions to promote the inclusion of marginalized groups.

Several key legislative reforms related to the electoral process remain outstanding, including4:

• The Campaign Financing Act (2013)5 • The Election Amendment Bill (2015)6 • The Political Parties Amendment Bill (2015)7 • The Two-third Gender Rule Laws Amendment Bill (2015)8

Parliament is also considering amendments to legislation and regulations that would:

• Clarify the tenure of the director of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and the process of appointing a substantive holder of the office;

• Establish disciplinary procedures for MP defections and cross floor practices that circumvent the Elections and Political Parties Acts;

• Amend political party policy and regulation of the candidate nomination process, among others.

The Election Amendment Bill (2015) responds partially or fully to several EU EOM recommendations. First, a number of time frames for key pre-election processes have been adjusted to address the extremely compressed election calendar of 2013.9 Second, multiple procedural steps in candidate nomination are clarified, with the specific role of the IEBC confirmed for each step10. Third, in response to EU EOM recommendation 3, the maximum

4 http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-15-11-10-24/election-laws-regulations 5 http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ElectionCampaignFinancingAct2013.pdf 6 http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2015/ElectionLawsAmendmentBilI2015.pdf 7 The Political Parties Act 2011 http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/PoliticalPartiesAct.pdf provides for the distribution of public funds to political parties with at least five percent of votes in the general election. Provisions require submission of a list with maximum two-thirds of one gender among office bearers and spending a portion (undefined) of funds for promoting the representation in parliament and the county assemblies of women, youth, disabled, ethnic and marginalized communities. These provisions are only partial implementation of EU EOM 2013 recommendation 1 and 13 as it does not explicitly increase gender equality in elected posts. 8 http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2015/Two-ThirdGenderRuleLaws__Amendment_Bill2015.pdf Intended to give effect to article 100 of the Constitution, this bill failed to be passed by Parliament. The bill would have amended the Political Parties Act, 2011 to, amongst others, “(d) develop and implement measures for the progressive realisation of representation and meaningful participation of the special interest groups in decision-making positions and structures; and (e) implement the affirmative , action programmes, policies and strategies contemplated under Article 27(6) of the Constitution” and gave the IEBC the “power to make regulations to progressively give effect to the principle that not more than two-thirds of members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender.” 9 For example, increasing from 60 to 90 days of the election the period within which the IEBC must open the voter register for public inspection, submission of party nomination rules at least six months before an election instead of three and submission of party lists 60 days before the elections. The clarification and extension of key time periods responds to aspects of EU EOM 2013 recommendations 3, 8 and 9. 10 EU EOM recommendation 1 also calls for the creation of funds and policies within political parties to support women candidates and training aimed at preparing women aspirants for an elected post but these issues are not addressed in the draft bill.

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number of voters per polling station will be reduced from 1000 to 500. Fourth, petitions over election results would have to be submitted within 28 days of the declaration (rather than publication) of results11. However, many other EU EOM recommendations are not addressed in this legislation, including provisions for more detailed vote tallying procedures, publication of election results disaggregated by polling station, and clear demarcation of respective jurisdictions of the commission, the courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms.

The IEBC’s operational plan calls for amended electoral laws and attendant regulations to be completed by February 2016. The Election Amendment Bill 2015 was tabled in Parliament the week of 15 February with one week for public comment. Several civil society organizations have urged parliament to adopt this legislation no later than June 2016 in order to allow due time for the regulations to be drafted and the amendments to be implemented by the IEBC. The introduction of legal reforms at a later date threatens to generate many of the same problems as in 2013 when late changes to the election regulations and procurement of technology eroded the credibility of the IEBC12.

The Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commission Article 88 of the Constitution establishes the IEBC as the body mandated to conduct and supervise elections and referenda in Kenya. The commission is responsible for the registration of voters and updating the voters roll, delimitation of constituency and ward boundaries, the regulation of candidate nomination by political parties, voter education, dispute resolution arising out of nominations and regulation of campaign finance among others.

In July 2015 the IEBC published a five year “Strategic Plan 2015-2020” with three pillars; managing elections, institutional transformation and trust and participation13. The strategic plan was followed in January 2016 with an “Election Operation Plan 2015-2017” to serve as a road map for the 2017 elections14. These documents present a promising structured plan, indicating actions, activities and outputs for all phases of the electoral cycle and a more pro-active attitude on the part of the IEBC.

The IEBC has responded to some of it capacity challenges with several new appointments – including a new CEO who appears to have introduced a more managerial approach – and sought to hold past officials more accountable - with several, including the former CEO, facing criminal prosecution for their role in bribery and kickbacks associated with the procurement process in 2013.

Based on the proposed plans, the IEBC is publicly committed to redress some of the institutional weaknesses identified by the EU EOM recommendations for electoral reform (notably tender and procurement processes, the effective use of technology and management of the election results 11 EU EOM recommendations 18 and 19 call for clarification of processes, bodies and time frames for election disputes resolution. 12 The internationally widely respected Venice Commission, which has 60 Member States from 4 continents, notes that the fundamental elements of the electoral law should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election. Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. 13 http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-15-11-10-24/research-publications/item/iebc-strategic-plan-2015-2020 14 http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-15-11-10-24/research-publications/item/election-operations-plan-eop-2015-2017

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process). Communications remains another priority area for IEBC reform as it lacks a fully implemented communications strategy led by an IEBC spokesperson.

The hurried character of the setting up of the first phase of Mass Voter Registration in late January and the sudden request to donors to plug the financial gap for the conduct of this exercise, months after the state budget allocation to the IEBC was known, casts doubts on the planning capacity of the IEBC. First feedback from the registration centers also shows disappointing figures in terms of registration of voters, and confusion on the location of these centers among communities because of the necessary “mobility” of the Biometric Voter Registration kits due to their limited number (each should cover on average 5 registration centers – see figures in voter registration section below). This again shows that the ability of the IEBC to plan and rollout critical phases of the electoral cycle to ensure maximum participation and credibility is not yet up to the task. This was already a concern in 2013, as evidenced by recommendation 7 made by the EU EOM at the time.

Status of EU EOM recommendations A mid-term assessment of implementation of EU EOM 2013 recommendations shows very limited progress to date. The assessment is based on documented changes since the 2013 elections as well as the EFM’s stakeholder interviews. The assessment involves judgement, and is therefore indicative rather than categorical. With the potential adoption of the Election Amendment Bill, 2015 some additional EU EOM’s recommendations could be addressed but the current overall status of non-implementation of recommendations raises questions about the probability of improved general elections in 2017.

Out of the 21 recommendations made by the EU EOM 2013, none have been totally implemented, 8 were partially implemented and 13 were not implemented at all. See annex 1 for information on the status of implementation of each EU EOM 2013 recommendation.

Of the 12 recommendations requiring legislative amendments, one has been partially adopted and five may be adopted pending the final text of the Election Amendment Bill (2015) which will amend provisions of the Elections Act (2011) and the IEBC Act (2011)15. This clearly demonstrates the importance of the proposed legislative amendments and their timely adoption by the Parliament.

Out of 14 recommendations for which IEBC has responsibility for implementation, 8 were partially or fully implemented and 6 were not implemented.

IV. Current challenges

While some areas of the conduct of elections have received attention by Kenyan authorities and other political actors, many EU EOM recommendations for electoral reform remain pertinent and are yet to be addressed. Some EU EOM recommendations point to large scale, systemic concerns

15 The Campaign Financing Act (2013) partially responds to EU EOM 2013 recommendation 2 “to promote equality of opportunity and transparency of campaigning and reduce the advantage held by wealthier parties and candidates” but requires the adoption of regulations for full implementation.

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that are likely to be at best only partially addressed before the 2017 elections. These include stemming electoral violence and reform of the police and political party behavior, continued strengthening of an independent, unbiased and effective judiciary, especially regarding election petitions, as well as the overall framework for peace and reconciliation among Kenya’s diverse communities.

The EFM recommends that special emphasis be placed on the following six targeted areas for achievable electoral reforms before the 2017 elections.

Voter registration For the 2013 elections, the IEBC registered some 14 million voters. With a current estimated eligible voting population of 22 million, the IEBC has committed to register 8 million new voters through continuous voter registration and two phases of Mass Voter Registration (MVR) to be conducted in early 2016 and 2017. The IEBC met this initial commitment with the first MVR campaign on schedule and underway 15 February to 15 March 2016. The IEBC produced a budget of 2 billion Ksh (17.5 million euros) for the current MVR but received only 500 million Ksh (4.4 million euros) from the government thus far, causing the commission to scale back the scope of the campaign.

The IEBC deployed 5,756 kits to mobile voter registration teams to cover the 1,450 county wards (a doubling of their original projection following support from development partners). Overall, the IEBC aims to establish a total of 24,559 registration centres during the MVR. The reliance on mobile registration centres poses potential problems depending on public awareness of the schedule. Further, for various reasons, some areas or communities may be underserved while others may be perceived to be favoured. Indicative of the conflictual political environment within which the IEBC operates, opposition parties claimed in advance that any such patterns reflect the political bias of the IEBC.

Although the IEBC is required to open the register of voters for public inspection to enable registered voters to verify the correctness of their voter information, the final certification of the Principal Register of voters regarding accuracy, comprehensiveness and currency is not subject to a formal (external) audit procedure16.

EFM recommendation

• Attention is paid to the IEBC’s implementation of full management of the voter register well ahead of the next general elections. Support is given to an audit of voter register by an external organization (in collaboration with the IEBC)17. These measures are recommended to avoid partisan controversies around the register arising prior to the general elections, which would risk undermining confidence in the process.

16 EU EOM 2013 recommendation 8, “Finalisation of Voter Register at least two months before polling” will be implemented if the Election Amendment Bill retains the provision for public inspection of the register to be conducted ninety days before the election. 17 EU EOM 2013 recommendation 8 “Enable qualified and neutral CSOs to carry out an audit of the VR, in sufficient time for rectification of serious problems.”

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Regulation of political parties Several EU EOM 2013 recommendations pertain to political party practices and regulations yet many of the legal and institutional provisions for the regulation of political parties remain incomplete. Legislation is either incompletely implemented or pending in Parliament and the respective roles of the IEBC and the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) have yet to be clarified. While the ORPP has been physically separated from its prior home in the IEBC, the specific modalities of its partnership with the IEBC and confirmation of its leadership are undecided. Moreover, the ORPP faces institutional capacity challenges and staff shortages.

Broadly speaking, there appears to be a lack of clarity from both agencies as to what is the appropriate level of supervision or intervention into political party structures, rules and regulation. IEBC capacity and willingness to become so engaged is also unclear. Some commentators argue that the political party regulatory framework should seek to ensure that political parties are in compliance with requirements to have internal statutes, for example to give effect to gender representation, and to create a clear entry point for dispute resolution on the part of either the IEBC or ORPP rather than involve either body in the detailed workings of political parties (and possibly open them to charges of political interference). In this view, disputes could first be sent to the existing Political Party Dispute Tribunals, with the IEBC or ORPP serving as an appeal body.

In pursuance of article 88 (4)(d),(f) of the Constitution, the IEBC is responsible for the regulation of candidate nomination but an audit of the 2013 elections revealed difficulties with the uploading of candidate’s photographs, verifications of their details against party membership, and signature requirements. Various forms of non-compliance with regulations generated a high volume of disputes, further challenging the IEBC’s ability dispute resolution capacity. Regulations to address these and other problems remain incomplete, especially provisions to ensure access of women and marginalized groups to elected posts18.

The Campaign Finance Act remains incompletely implemented and lacks the necessary regulatory framework to be effective. The act was signed into law in December 2014 but the regulations to give it force are still in draft form with the JLAC. Enforcement of these regulations remains undecided and it is unclear what, if any, capacity will be invested to investigate or audit the required financial disclosures. At present political parties are to submit disclosures to the IEBC (confidentially) however the respective responsibilities of the IEBC and the ORPP for enforcement and issue of sanctions require clarification.

EFM recommendation

• Regulations adopted to confirm specific provisions of Campaign Financing Act, Elections Act and Political Parties Act regarding, among others, disclosure of campaign expenses, candidate nomination, preparation of party lists and appeal procedures.

18 EU EOM 2013 recommendations 1, 2 and 9.

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• Clarify the roles of various bodies, including the IEBC, ORPP, Political Party Liaison Committees, Political Party Dispute Tribunals, the police and the courts19.

• Political party dialogue is established to consider transparency issues and how parties may be accommodated in all stages of the preparation and conduct of elections.

Role of technology and election results management The EU EOM 2013 recommendation 6 calls for the effective use of technology and the EFM found that complaints about technology failures in 2013 continue to reverberate20. Reports from the 7 March by-elections indicate that in some cases technology failures occurred. The IEBC is aware of these criticisms, committing itself in its internal planning documents to early acquisition of all technology to be used, testing and adequate training of staff before deployment. The commission defends the integrity of the biometric voter registration (BVR) kits used in 2013 and redeployed for the MVR in 2016. Observation of MVR showed that the BVR kits worked well. By contrast, there were extensive problems with the electronic voter identification kits (EVID) and the results management system that included programmed handsets provided to polling station officials for transmission of provisional results to a national tally center.

The commission has created a new director of procurement post and is currently filling several IT positions in its effort to build institutional capacity. The IEBC reported to the EFM that their outstanding request for the government to provide them with necessary budget threatens their intention to apply lessons learned from 2013 to initiate procurement earlier and to allow for full testing and training of any systems they may acquire.

The IEBC is committed to develop a new results management framework that will provide guidelines on the results management from the polling station to the national tallying centre including security and storage. The ICT infrastructure is to be revamped and staff adequately trained on the revised framework. These steps remain incomplete. Another obstacle is the reserved affirmative action seats are frequently used as an excuse to deny women nominations for 'normal' seats.

EFM recommendation

• Support be given to IEBC procurement and management practices related to the introduction of any new technology to ensure that they are extensively tested and piloted, widely understood and agreed to be electoral stakeholders, and election officials receive thorough training prior to its implementation (with back-up provisions established in case of malfunction)21.

19 EU EOM 2013 recommendation 18, “To ensure that the election administration rigorously follows its own regulations for the handling of complaints and appeals, making clear which complaints, appeals body has jurisdiction at which stage.” 20 One interlocutor of the EFM succinctly stated the view that the technology used in 2013 “failed miserably”. 21 EU EOM recommendations 6 and 7 link the importance of effective technology management and with timely and appropriate planning by the IEBC, ensuring a results management process that reports fully disaggregated results in conditions of transparency with access for electoral stakeholders.

15

Participation of civil society and election observers The EFM was informed that there is widespread recognition of the importance of voter education and civic outreach and that these programs could also help to rebuild IEBC credibility in the eyes of the public. The EU EOM recommendation 10 points specifically to a review of IEBC management of civic and voter education and suggests clear partnership with CSOs. The IEBC’s voter education plans are still in the formative stages but the commission’s engagement with electoral stakeholders from civil society could serve as the basis for an earlier start and more systematic collaboration on voter education. The commission also acknowledges that despite a record voter turnout of 88% in 2013, the success of the 2017 elections will depend on a more robust voter education programme with additional time and resources, greater effort to reach special needs groups, and improved monitoring of voter education providers.

Following a stakeholder analysis, the IEBC has committed itself to strengthen partnerships and collaboration with electoral stakeholders, including citizens, political parties, candidates, special interest groups and non-state actors, parliament, judiciary, the ORPP, government ministries, departments and agencies, the media, development partners and election technical assistance providers. The EU-IEBC roundtable conducted during the EFM facilitated the contact of CSOs in a joint platform with the IEBC and other government agencies. Overall, the roundtable appeared to be a positive and promising illustration of the value of stakeholder exchange and to signal continued willingness to engage in more cross-agency coordination and planning. The IEBC chair suggested that in the near term continued stakeholder sessions could be convened every two months, increasing to monthly as the election grows closer.

The IEBC’s strategic plan cites an “election observer verdict of free, fair and credible elections” as a key indicator of its primary objective of managing elections. The domestic election observation platform Election Observation Group (ELOG) described to the EFM their plans to use long term observers to assess the preparations for the 2017 elections, including the voter registration process. While ELOG has some resources at its disposal, early sustaining support from international partners will be critical, not least in ensuring that ELOG delivers this time around on long-term observation of the whole electoral cycle while managing parallel vote tabulation as already experimented in 2013 (EU EOM 2013 recommendations 7 and 8 acknowledge the importance of domestic observers in pre-election processes such as voter registration and post-election tabulation of results).

EFM recommendation

• The IEBC follow up on its commitment to establish an electoral stakeholder’s council with special emphasis on updating participants on specific steps underway that respond to proposed electoral reforms. Risks to the electoral process and IEBC credibility may be mitigated if the IEBC successfully twins a greater commitment to transparency with increased this regular engagement with electoral stakeholders.

• Stakeholder engagement should be linked to a strategic public communications plan and explore ways to integrate the principles of engagement, partnership and transparency in the conduct of all elements of the electoral process (e.g. review of the voter register, promotion of women’s political participation as candidates and voters, code of conduct and other regulations during the election campaign, conduct of polling, counting and tabulation of results).

16

Participation of women Several EU EOM 2013 recommendations encourage strengthening the participation of women as voters and candidates22. A Supreme Court ruling imposed a deadline of August 15, 2015 for legislation and regulatory steps to be taken that will implement the constitutional requirement (art. 90) of no more than two-thirds of an elected body members be of the same gender but no action was taken by parliament. There is an ongoing political debate about the applicability of the criteria of “progressive realization” of this requirement but the need for action was echoed by National Gender and Equality Commission chair at the roundtable.

The government party informed the EFM of its support to increase women’s political representation but did not provide an indication of any legislative plans to give effect to this objective.

In a meeting with several women political leaders, the EFM heard of the many formal and informal challenges facing women political aspirants. Challenges include continuing male attitudes of dominance, that a woman’s proper role is in the home and not public political life, that young women lack female role models and mentors who can help to open the way for them, that party structures and practices (such as evening and weekend meetings) make it more difficult for women to participate in the context of their family responsibilities, and that nominated female Members of the County Assembly have not necessarily embodied since 2013 the change that enhanced gender equality in elected bodies should have delivered (owing in particular to the opaque character of their nomination by political parties).

EFM recommendation

• Elected representatives should ensure the earliest possible adoption of the necessary legislative and regulatory amendments to secure the full implementation of the constitutional provisions for no more than two-thirds gender representation.

• Improved education and training is provided to political parties, candidates and aspirants, especially for parties to give effective support to aspirant women candidates.

V. Electoral support

The donors have provided substantial election support in Kenya through various cycles of elections, with primary focus on the IEBC. This has been undertaken through the establishment of a donor basket fund managed by the implementing partner United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and called now “Strengthening Electoral Processes in Kenya”. In an effort to ensure roles are clarified and actions are coordinated, a donor coordination mechanism taking the form of the Donor Group on Elections (DGE) is meeting now more frequently because of the start of the new electoral cycle, providing opportunity for exchange of information from implementing partners, donors and political counselors.

The current leadership of the IEBC has promised reforms but these commitments remain overshadowed by criticisms of the conduct of the 2013 elections. There is a risk that even well-

22 EU EOM 2013 recommendations 1, 5, and 13.

17

intentioned reform efforts associated with the Strategic Plan (institutional transformation and building public trust and participation) will be met with skepticism from the public and opposition political parties. The electoral support of the donors is aiming to enhance IEBC's credibility, but increased transparency and very regular communication and engagement with a range of electoral actors will be crucial There is already concern among the different partners contributing to the UNDP basket fund that the IEBC might not play as active a role in coordination and planning of donor funds as it has in 2013, due to the use of UNDP procedures (and not national ones like in 2013) for the implementation of the activities of the same fund.

The EU DEL and other donors will continue to closely follow up on the implementation of that programme as well as possible progress related to EU EOM recommendations.

EFM recommendation

• Coordination amongst donors must continue to avoid duplication and increase leverage.

18

Annex 1: List of EU EOM Kenya 2013 recommendations and status of implementation

EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS – STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

No Recommendation Status of implementation

Suggested Actions

Legal framework

1 Increase gender equality in elected posts a) Review the legislative framework in order to provide

appropriate mechanisms for the implementation of the gender-equality principle with respect to the National Assembly and Senate, through legal reform, training and education.

b) Develop sustainable policies to increase the number of elected women, including assistance with regards to campaign financing.

NOT

• Amendment of the Electoral Code and the Political Parties Act, providing a mechanism to fulfil gender quota in the Senate and the National Assembly

• Trainings aimed at preparing women aspirants to vie for an elected post

• Education and outreach campaigns focused on gender equality and women political participation

• Amendment of the Political Parties Act, increasing the amount of resources allocated via political parties fund to gender equality, to reach at least 34% (from current 30% allocated for women and marginalized groups)

• Support the creation of funds and/or policies within political parties, aimed at supporting women candidates

2 To promote equality of opportunity and transparency in

campaigning and reduce the advantage held by wealthier parties and candidates. a) Regulate the amount of money spent by or on behalf

of a candidate or party during an election. IEBC has the responsibility for this under Article 88(4)(i) of the Constitution but it requires a statutory

PARTIAL Campaign Financing Act, 2011 requires regulations for full

• Enactment of a Campaign Financing Act and regulations.

19

framework to make it operational. implementation

3 Timely decisions on the location and registrations within polling stations would enhance operational planning as well as contribute to transparency. a) Clarification of Elections Act regarding deadline to

gazette polling stations. To be carried out preferably at least one month before polling to ensure voters can check in good time.

b) Introduction of a legal limit on the number of voters at any one polling station. 500 would be a reasonable maximum.

NOT

• Implement Elections Act and adopt Election Amendment Bill (2015)

4 To harmonise the national legal framework with international commitments and to better guarantee the right to freedom of expression. a) Legal provisions of National Cohesion and

Integration Act pertaining to hate speech are too broadly defined; their amendment in line with international human rights obligations could decrease the level of self-censorship among journalists.

NOT

• Amendment of the National Cohesions and Integration Act.

Election administration

5 Provision of the means to register and vote for all those eligible. a) Provision of mechanisms to ensure

registration and voting for all eligible citizens, including prisoners and staff on duty on Election Day.

b) Increase inclusivity for marginalised

PARTIAL Mass voter registration launched 15 Feb-15 March 2016

• Voter registration in prisons and provision of means to vote; expansion of registration and voting for the diaspora; system to enable staff on duty to vote on Election Day.

• Better communication with the National Registration Bureau to ensure knowledge of number of citizens with ID cards, as coordination in the lead-up to elections to ensure maximum allocations of ID cards.

• More mobile voter registration teams in marginalised areas and

20

communities. mobile national ID centres in remote areas, civic education targeting marginalised communities, anti-corruption measures targeting public administration officials.

6 Effective use of technology a) Sound preparation to ensure technology serves its

purpose, with evaluation of purpose and usefulness made public in advance of introduction.

NOT IEBC Strategic Plan and Operational Plan commit to this goal

• When technology is opted-for, comprehensive study of the necessary hardware and infrastructure, alongside adequate time for procurement, preparation and deployment of hardware, prior to staff training.

7 The credibility of results would be better safeguarded by ensuring all tallying is transparent, efficient and easily traceable. a) Improve planning, implementation and results

management to address the different steps of the electoral cycle in a sequenced and timely manner

NOT

• Publication of detailed procedures for tallying. • Design of tallying procedures to ensure easy traceability from

polling station results onwards, including for those cases where verification leads to the need to make arithmetic corrections.

• Amendment of the Elections Act to require publication of all election results disaggregated down to polling station level for all elections.

• Amendment of Elections Act to stipulate publication of all results for all elections – not just winners – within a specified deadline.

• Timely training for all staff involved in results processing, with access for observers and party agents.

• Free availability of results at all levels for any interested party, even after the official announcement of results.

• Extra tallying staff where necessary, to avoid errors due to exhaustion.

8 A reliable, accurate and inclusive Voter Register

a) The existing Voter Register and any separate lists

should be consolidated to ensure that all registrations are included in a single register.

PARTIAL Mass voter registration launched 15 Feb-15

• Extension of the stipulated time for voter registration and verification, by amendment of the Elections Act.

• Finalisation of Voter Register at least two months before polling, for the purposes of transparency as well as planning polling stations and distribution of materials.

• Clear explanations of all stages of the voter registration process,

21

March 2016 Revision to key time periods in election calendar pending in Election Amendment Bill, 2015

including processing of data after the close of registration. • Unexplained changes in the Voter Register and unofficial

inclusion of new entries damage the VR’s credibility. • Expansion of the voter verification period to enable both VR

corrections and later, citizen information about where to vote. • Consistent implementation of the provision to verify at polling

station level. • Enable qualified and neutral CSOs to carry out an audit on the

VR, in sufficient time for rectification of serious problems.

9 Ensure equal access to nominated posts for the representatives of marginalised groups. a) Revise IEBC policy with regards to compiling and

publishing party lists of nominated candidates. b) Aim towards a more pro-active, management

oriented approach on the part of the IEBC. c) Develop clear regulations on political party

election of candidates for the nominated lists to ensure equal access is respected.

PARTIAL Justice and Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliament reviewing Election Amendment Bill 2015 to propose amendments to the Elections Act, Political Parties Act, and others.

• Amendment of the Elections Act • Developing regulations on the application of Art. 90 of the

Constitution by the IEBC • Closer cooperation between the IEBC, the political parties and

NGEC from the early stages of the process of compiling the lists of candidates for nominated positions

• Trainings for the political parties on fulfilment of the constitutional principles of affirmative action

10 A well-informed electorate able to choose freely. a) Earlier launching of accessible civic education and

voter information programmes to ensure delivery of timely, impartial information.

PARTIAL IEBC stakeholder engagement launched

• Possible separation of the IEBC’s civic education and voter information aims. It could be useful to accredit CSOs for the former, while retaining implementation of the latter.

• Support and evaluation of the work of CSOs accredited to carry out civic education for the IEBC.

• Production of civic education and voter information materials in vernacular languages.

Election campaign

22

11 A finite period with a specific starting point would limit the early campaigning afforded only by wealthy parties. a) Define the duration of the electoral campaign period to

help level the playing field.

NOT

• Provision of an official election calendar by IEBC in order to ensure fairness in the campaigns (amend .the Elections Act 2011).

12 Well trained and motivated party agents contribute to the transparency of the elections a) Professionalisation of party agents through improved

recruitment procedures, training and commensurate payment.

NOT

• Party agents from all polling areas recruited no later than the date of IEBC’s gazzeting of polling stations. IEBC information support to training party agents

• Adequate security for party agents to ensure they are safe in all areas

• Clarification of procedures for accreditation and identification of party agents at all levels.

13 Increase gender equality in elected posts

a) Develop sustainable policies to increase the number of

elected women, including assistance with regards to campaign financing.

NOT

• Trainings aimed at preparing women aspirants to vie for an elected post

• Education and outreach campaigns focused on gender equality and women political participation

• Amendment of the Political Parties Act, increasing the amount of resources allocated via political parties fund to gender equality, to reach at least 34% (from current 30% allocated for women and marginalized groups)

• Support the creation of funds and/or policies within political parties, aimed at supporting women candidates

Media

14 To better guarantee impartial and diverse coverage by the media owned by all citizens of Kenya. a) In line with the Constitution, which prohibits the state

from interference with editorial decisions of journalists and requires impartial state media offering diversity of views, it is recommended to transform the KBC to Public service broadcasting.

NOT

• Amendment of Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act, or, a new legislation addressing the birth of Public Broadcasting Service.

23

b) It is vital to address the issues of its financial and editorial independence.

15 Access to media for all parties, even those who lack

financial means for paid political advertising, to be able to present their election platforms to voters. a) When free airtime is granted, provide it in a fair

manner, on the basis of transparent and objective criteria. Legal provisions pertaining to free access slots for party political broadcasts could be more clearly defined as to the rights of the parties and candidates in law.

NOT

• Amendment of Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act.

16 To improve conditions for fairness in the licensing process and media accountability. a) For the media regulatory and self-regulatory bodies to

be efficient and respected, their independence from the government and sufficient capacity to operate are key.

b) The media regulatory structure also needs adequate powers to effectively regulate the media sector.

NOT

• Amendment of Media Act and Communications Act.

17 Voters’ awareness of the nature and origin of information they receive through media. Active and creative voter information and civic education campaign in the media. a) To facilitate viewers/readers awareness of the nature of

the paid political advertising during the election campaigns, such materials have to carry some sort of identification, in order to be easily recognised as paid for.

b) Considering the social responsibility of the broadcasters, they could play a more active role in civic

NOT

• To be addressed in the Code of conduct for the media coverage of election.

24

and voter education prior to election and offer free time as well as more favourable rates if charging for airing voter information and/or civic education campaigns materials.

Election dispute resolution

18 To ensure that the election administration rigorously follows its own regulations for the handling of complaints and appeals, making clear which complaints/appeals body has jurisdiction at which stage. a) Implement electoral regulations that ensure decisions

taken by courts and electoral bodies on election disputes are determined promptly and effectively within the timeframe of the electoral process.

PARTIAL

• Amendment to the Elections Act and the IEBC Act

19 To clarify the roles of the various bodies involved in electoral dispute resolution and reduce the risk of causing confusion. There is need for the public to be duly informed of the existence of other bodies and their respective roles in electoral dispute resolution a) The Elections Act needs to establish a clear

demarcation of the respective jurisdictions of the Courts and the electoral bodies. It is recommended to avoid multiple channels for electoral dispute resolution of the same matter which could lead to jurisdictional conflict or abuse.

PARTIAL Some clarification in pending Election Amendment Bill, 2015

• Amendment to the Electoral Act and IEBC Act

20 To provide a single channel for the initiation of prosecutions for electoral offences.

PARTIAL

• Amendment to the Elections Act and the IEBC Act. • Strengthen enforcement mechanisms: prosecution,

investigation, charged in court.

25

a) Strengthen enforcement mechanisms for electoral offences under the Elections Act, 2011. Cases which give rise to criminal prosecution should be conducted only through the ODPP and following the rules and standards prescribed in the law governing criminal proceedings.

21 To ensure the right to have an effective legal remedy in regard to electoral offences and raise the public’s trust in the police in that regard. a) Further training of prosecutors, IEBC staff and police

on election related offences focused on the Elections Act and the National Cohesion Act conducted on a regular basis as well as coordination among the bodies involved.

NOT

• Training on legislation and particularly offences to all bodies involved.

• Outreach activities directed to voters and candidates on how to raise criminal complaints.

26

Annex 2: List of meetings held

SN Date Interlocutor Designation Organisation

Stefano Dejak Ambassador Bruno Pozzi Deputy Head

1. 09.02.16

Heads of Section

Delegation of the European Union to Kenya

2. 09.02.16 EU Ambassadors 3. 09.02.16 Henry Rotich National Treasury Cabinet

Secretary Government of Kenya

4. 09.02.16 Civil society organisations

5. 10.02.16 Justin Muturi Speaker National Assembly Raila Odinga Leader Orange

Democratic Movement

Kalonzo Musyoka Leader Wiper

7. 10.02.16

Moses Wetangula Leader Ford-Kenya 8. 10.02.16 Johnson Arthur Sakaja Chairman The National

Alliance 9. 10.02.16 Ekwee Eturo Speaker Senate 10. 10.02.16 Women

community and political leaders

Isaack Hassan Chairman 11. 11.02.16 Lilian Mahiri Zaja Albert Bwire Abdullah Sharawe Yusuf Nzibo Thomas Letangule Exra Chiloba Betty Sungura Heads of Department

Commissioners CEO Deputy CEO

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

12. 11.02.16 Women Political Representation Enhanced (WOPRE)

13. 12.02.16 Heads of Mission European Union Member States

14. 12.02.16 Tom Wolf Research Analyst IPSOS Public Affairs

15. 12.02.16 Monica Juma Principal Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

27

Annex 3: List of EU-IEBC roundtable participants

11 February 2016, Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya

No. Name Organization Designation 1 Alojz Peterle EU Member of European Parliament 2 Delphine Skowron EU Election Desk 3 Olli Pirkanniemi EU Kenya Desk 4 Eldrige Adolfo

EU Conflict Prevention Peacebuilding and

Mediation Instruments 5 Linda McAvan EU 6 Agustín Diaz de Mera

Garcia Consuegra EU

7 Enrique Guerrero Salom EU 8 Juan Fernando Lopez

Aguilar EU

9 Renaud Raphael Savignat EU 10 Jesper Haglund EU 11 Dag Sourander EU 12 Deirdre Dalton EU 13 Isabel Clara Payno-Jimenez-

Ugarte EU

14 Emelio Jesús Soto Estevez EU 15 Stefano Dejak EU Ambassador 16 Mr. Uwe Wissenbach, EU 17 Erik Dhaenens EU 18 David Pottie Independent expert 19 Paolo Raffone Independent expert 20 Dianella Moretti- Proske EU 21 Julien Vanchriessche EU Trainee 22 Diquella Puoske EU 23 Winfred Lichuma National Gender

Equality Commission Chairperson

24 Marie Suenstrup Denmark First Secretary 25 Ezra Chiloba IEBC CEO 26 Tabitha Onyinge Association of Media

Women in Kenya Vice Chairperson

27 Cheryl Yungi EISA Senior Programme Associate 28 S.A Kodhek Commission on

Administrative Justice, Office of the Ombudsman

Legal Officer

29 Lilian Mahiri IEBC Vice chair 30 Sheila Ngotia UNDP Head of Programme 31 Okero Otieno UNDP Project Manager 32 Ruth Kulundu IEBC Regional Election Coordinator 33 Kimani Muyai High Commission of SDO

28

Canada 34 Moses Kanagi TNT Head of Agencies 35 Decimah Mmayi IEBC D/RSD 36 Rasi Masudi IEBC Director 37 Joan Onyango Kenya Law Reform

Commission Legal Research Office

38 Mary Wairagu Attorney General's Office

Deputy Chief State Council

39 Juliet Murimi Office of the Registrar of Political Parties

Manager, Political Parties

40 Alexander Robinson US Embassy 41 Beatrice Karago Ministry of Foreign

Affairs Senior Assistant Director Foreign Services

43 Dr. Nelson Makanda National Council of Churches Kenya

Deputy General Secretary

44 Judith Kiboye Judiciary Administrative Manager 45 Aimee Ongeso Kituo cha sheria Project Manager 46 David Jourdan Embassy of Norway First Secretary 47 Joshua Changwony Constitution and

Reform Education Consortium

Deputy Executive Secretary/ Programs Coordinator

48 Elizabeth Kirema Institute for Education in Democracy

Director of Education

49 Ahmed Isaack Hassan IEBC Chairman 50 Albert Bwire IEBC Commissioner 51 Eng. Abdullahi Sharawe IEBC Commissioner 52 Amb. Yusuf Nzibo IEBC Commissioner 53 Ms. Betty Sungura IEBC Deputy CEO, Operations 54 Chandra Sekaran US Embassy Political Officer 55 Ms. Praxedes Tororey IEBC Director, Legal Affairs 56 Ms. Tabitha Mutemi IEBC Manager, Corporate Communications

29

Annex 4: List of acronyms BVR – Biometric Voter Registration CORD – Coalition for Reforms and Democracy CSO – Civil Society Organisation DP- Deputy President EFM – Electoral Follow-up Mission ELOG – Elections Observation Group EOM – Election Observation Mission EVID – Electronic Voter Information Device ICC – International Criminal Court IEBC – Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commission JLAC – Justice and Legal Affairs Committee JSC – Judicial Service Commission MVR – Mass Voter Registration NPSC – National Police Service Commission ORPP – Office of the Registrar of Political Parties UNDP – United Nations Development Programme