programa iii trimestre/2018 · universidade federal do rio grande do sul programa de...

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL

PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ECONOMIA

DISCIPLINA: TEORIA MICROECONÔMICA II

PROF: Giácomo Balbinotto Neto

CONTATO: 3308 31 50 (sala 18B da FCE)

Dia e Horário: segunda-feira das 14:00 às 17:50

E-mail: [email protected]

PROGRAMA – III TRIMESTRE/2018

I would argue that perhaps the most important break with the past – one that leaves open huge

areas for future work –lies in the economics of information. The recognition that information is

imperfect, that obtain information can be costly, that there are important asymmetries of

information, and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of firms and

individuals, has had profound implications for the wisdom inherited from the past, and has

provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to

understand... I wish to argue that information economics has had –directly and indirectly – a

profound effect on how we think about economics today.

Joseph Stiglitz (2000).

The information economics that developed over the past quarter of a century has provided a

rich agend for the next.

Joseph Stiglitz (2000).

For more than two decades, the theory of markets with asymmetric information has been vital

and lively field of economic research. Today, models with imperfect information are

indispensable instruments in the research’s toolbox.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2001.

The economics of information is possibly the area of economic theory that has evolved most

over the past fifteen years... its importance and applications have growth spectacularly.

Macho-Stadler & Pérez-Castillo (1997.

Imperfect Information has to come to occupy a central place in current economic analysis.

Ian Molho (1997).

“The development of the theory of screening (also called the theory of adverse selection or

discrimination) represents a major accomplishment of the economics of information in the last

to decades.

Erick Masking & Jean Tirole (1990)

“The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance in economics in the last

thirty years”

“Today, for many economists, economics is to large extend a matter of incentives: incentives to

work hard, to produce good quality products, to study, to invest, to save, etc. How to design

institutions that provide good incentive for economic agents has become a central question of

economics".

Laffont & Martimort (2002)

“The most rapidly growing area in economic theory in the last decade has been the area of

information economics.”

Hal Varian (1992).

mailto:[email protected]

1. OBJETIVO DA DISCIPLINA

A microeconomia trata do comportamento das unidades econômicas individuais, tais

como consumidores, trabalhadores, investidores, proprietários de terra e empresários.

Ela explica como e porque estas unidades tomam decisões e quais são suas implicações

e conseqüências. Igualmente importante para a microeconomia é analisar como as

unidades econômicas interagem de modo a formar unidades maiores, tais como

mercados. Por meio do estudo do comportamento e interação entre cada tomador de

decisão, a microeconomia revela como operam e se desenvolvem indústrias e mercados,

porque são diferentes entre si, e como são influenciados por políticas governamentais e

pelas instituições que criam à estrutura de incentivos sob as quais os indivíduos agem.

Assim, um dos principais objetivos deste curso é mostrar quais são e como aplicar os

princípios microeconômicos básicos aos problemas reais da economia e quais as

evidências disponíveis que confirmam ou refutam tais teorias. Deste modo, buscamos

proporcionar conhecimentos básicos necessários para identificar, compreender e efetuar

predições sobre o comportamento dos mercados e dos problemas relacionados ao seu

funcionamento bem como a bibliografia fundamental e complementar para que ele

possa avançar no entendimento de cada tópico. Aqui serão vistos como funcionam os

mercados quando existe informação assimétrica entre os agentes econômicos, isto é,

quando uma das partes numa determinada relação ou interação possui mais informação

do que a outra. Nós iremos então analisar os problemas referentes à moral hazard,

seleção adversa, signaling, contratos e sistemas de incentivo.

O objetivo do curso é o de introduzir e apresentar os principais artigos e idéias sobre a

economia da informação assimétrica, bem como as técnicas e instrumentos de análise

teórica que podem ser aplicados a uma variedade de situações na qual, pelo menos um

agentes possuem informação privada, e examinar os tipos de mecanismos que existem

para lidar com os problemas criados por tal informação.

Entre as várias situações examinadas podemos destacar as relações contratuais entre os

acionistas e os gerentes, entre os gerentes e os empregados, a relação entre compradores

e vendedores de carros usados, a sinalização da qualidade de um bem, aplicações à

economia dos recursos humanos, finanças, mercado financeiro e etc. Em todas estas

situações, a existência de informação privada, junto com o comportamento maximizador

de todos os indivíduos, pode levar a falhas de mercado. Tais questões estão na fronteira

da moderna pesquisa microeconômica. Os instrumentos de análise e as implicações dos

diversos modelos estudados e cobertos neste curso lhe permitirão compreender o

funcionamento do mercado e aspectos de determinadas organizações econômicas.

Ao longo do curso serão discutidas também muitas outras aplicações que são derivadas

dos modelos seminais de informação assimétrica.

2. AVALIAÇÃO E PROCEDIMENTOS DIDÁTICOS

A avaliação será baseada no desempenho de duas provas escritas, com conteúdo parcial e um trabalho

final que terá como tópico um dos conteúdos vistos em aula. O trabalho terá a forma de um artigo ou

texto para discussão, com conteúdo máximo de 20 páginas (seguir padrão sugerido pela ANPEC/ANPAD

ou semelhantes).

As datas das provas serão marcadas em datas oportunas. A nota final será obtida da seguinte forma:

provas escritas (0,50) + trabalho escrito (0,50). O trabalho será entregue, impresso, na primeira

semana de aula de 2019 (segunda-feira).

O conceito final será obtido da seguinte tabela de conversão:

CONCEITO GRAU

A 9,1 A 10,0

B 7,6 a 9,0

C 6,0 a 7,5

D < 6,0

E Mais de 25% de faltas

Os livros textos recomendado é o serão de MACHO-STRADLER, Inés e PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, David

(1997) - An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. Oxford, Oxford

University Press (há também uma edição em espanhol disponível na biblioteca), de Ian Molho –The

Economics of Information e Bolton e Dewatripont, Contract Theory.

Contudo, serão igualmente utilizados, de forma complementar, capítulos dos seguintes

livros:

- Copeland, Weeston & Shastry. Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. Boston, Pearson/

Adisson Wesley [caps. 12, 13, [15 e 16] – excepcional livro sobre finanças com aplicações

referentes à teoria da informação assimétrica e teoria da agência. Altamente recomendável,

principalmente, para os interessados em Finanças.

- Ian Molho –The Economics of Information. – Muito didático altamente recomendável.

- Matos. (2001). Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Finance. Ótimo livro com aplicação

de informação assimétrica a finanças, especialmente política de dividendos e estrutura de

capital. Altamente recomendável, principalmente, para os interessados em Finanças.

- Bebczuk (2003) – Información Asimétrica em Mercados Financieros.- apresentação muito

didática dos principias modelos financieros que utilizam à abordagem da assimetria de

informação. Muito didático e altamente recomendável. (há uma edição em inglês).

- Brian Hiller- The Economics of Asymmetric Information – aplicações em finanças.

- Bernard Salanié – The Economics of Contracts – avançado.

- MWG – Microeconomic Theory – avançado, altamente recomendável.

- Cowel - Microeconomics. avançado, altamente recomendável.

- Kreps – A Course in Microeconomia Theory – avançado, altamente recomendável.

- Donald Campbell – Incentives. – aplicações diversas.

- Eric Rasmusen – Games and Information – abordagem com teoria dos jogos e aplicações.

- Phlips – The Economics of Imperfect Information – didático e aplicações

- Brousseau e Glachnat (ed.). The Economics of Contracts: Theory and Applications –

coletânea de artigos sobre teoria dos contratos.

- Laffont e Martimort – The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model – aplicações

diversas. Resumo do estado das artes sobre o tema. Avançado.

- The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics – Allocation, Information and Markets –

artigos sobre economia da informação escritos pelos principais teóricos sobre o tema.

- Stiglitz & Grenwald - Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics. – apresentação de

uma nova abordagem a economia monetária derivada da economia da informação.

-

3. CONTEÚDO PROGRAMÁTICO

3.0 APRESENTAÇÕES DO CURSO E INFORMAÇÕES GERAIS

A importância da Informação na economia. Os tipos de informação. O problema da informação

assimétrica. Antecedentes. Histórico e contexto no qual surge a teoria da informação

assimétrica. Principais conceitos. Principais autores. Introdução à teoria matemática da

informação – a teoria de Shannon (1948). O papel da informação numa economia de mercado

(Hayek, 1945). A busca de Informação e contribuição de Stigler (1961).

Bibliografia:

MS & PC (1997, cap.1); B& D (2005, cap.1); Salanié (1997, cap.1); Stiglitz (1985, 2000, 2002);

Hayek (1945); Stigler (1961); Rasmussen (1994, caps. 2 & 7); L & M (2002, cap.1); Phlips

(1988 caps 1 & 2); www.nobel.se/economics (altamente recomendado, tanto os artigos, as

Nobel lectures e os videos e entrevistas). Notas de aula sobre teoria matemática da informação.

3.1 INTRODUÇÃO Á ECONOMIA DA INFORMAÇÃO

Categorias de informação: certa, perfeita, simétrica, completa. Categorias de modelos com

informação assimétrica (Rasmussen, 1994): moral hazard com hidden action; moral hazard

com hidden knowledge, seleção adversa. Sinalização, screening. As implicações econômicas da

existência de informação assimétrica. A teoria dos contratos e incentivos. Algumas aplicações

recentes da teoria da informação assimétrica.

Bibliografia:

Milgron & Roberts (1987), MS & PC (1997, cap.1) ; B & D (2005, cap.1) ; Salanié (1997,

cap.1) ; Stiglitz (2000, 2002) ; Rasmusen (1994, caps. 2 & 7); Phlips (1988, caps 1 & 2);

Mishkin (2000, caps. 2, 9, 10); Arrow (1963, 1985 a) Novaes (1982, cap.3); Espino (1999,

cap.4)

3.2 O PROBLEMA DE SELEÇÃO ADVERSA

Introdução. Definição e caracterização do problema da seleção adversa. Os modelos de seleção

adversa. O problema dos Limões (Akerlof, 1970). O modelo de Wilson (1979). Evidências

empíricas sobre o modelo de Akerlof (1970) e o problema de seleção adversa. Os modelos de

seleção adversa e algumas de suas aplicações: (i) seguros; (ii) mercado de automóveis usados e

outros bens; (iii) certificação.

Bibliografia:

Akerlof (1970) ; Wilson (1979, 1980); Bond (1982); Chezeun & Wimmer (1987); Pratt &

Hoffer (1984), B & D (2005, cap. 9); Molho (1997, cap. Parte I); MWG (1995, cap. 13);

http://www.nobel.se/economics

3.3 SINALIZAÇÃO & FILTRAGEM

Introdução. Definição e caracterização do problema da sinalização e filtragem (screening). O

modelo de Spence (1973) e a educação como um sinal. Pooling equilíbrium (equilíbrio

agregador). Perfect separating signalling equilibrium “(equilíbrio separador”). Aplicações do

modelo de sinalização: (i) a propaganda e marketing e a sinalização da qualidade (Kirmani &

Rao, 2000), (ii) aplicações em finanças: estrutura de capital e política de dividendos e stock

splits; (iii) certificação; (iv) educação. O problema de screening. O modelo de Rothschild &

Stiglitz (1976). Aplicações ao mercado de seguros.

Bibliografia:

Spence (1973, 1974, 2002); Kirmani & Rao (2000); Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976); CWS

(2005,caps. 15, 16); MS & PC (1997, cap.5); MWG (1995, cap. 13); Riley (1988, 2002); Mattos

(2001, II & III); Cho & Kreps (1987); B& D (2005, cap. 2 & 3); Farrel & Rabin (1996); Molho

(1997, cap. Parte II)

3.4 O MODELO-BASE DE MACHO-STADLER & PERES-CASTRILLO – OS

MERCADOS CONTINGENCIAIS

Introdução. Descrição do modelo. A relação bilateral entre os agentes e o problema do principal

e agente. Os contratos com informação simétrica: mecanismos ótimos de pagamento e o nível

ótimo de esforço.

Bibliografia:

MS & PC (1997, cap.2); B & D (2005, cap.1)

3.5 O MODELO DE MORAL-HAZARD E A TEORIA DOS CONTRATOS E

INCENTIVOS

Introdução. Definição e caracterização do problema de moral hazard. Moral hazard, incentivos

e contratos. A escolha dos níveis de esforço. A solução usando a abordagem de primeira ordem

e os problemas dela decorrentes. Moral hazard com informação oculta. Representação

geométrica do problema de moral hazard. Aplicações do modelo de moral hazard: (i)

incentivos para administradores e o problema do agente-principal, (ii) a teoria da agência; (iii)

salários-eficiência (efficiency wages) e o caso da Ford Motors Company, (iv) os torneios de

promoção (tournaments) e (v) regulação por incentivos.

Bibliografia:

MS & PC (1997, cap.3); Molho (1997, cap. Parte III); MWG (1995, cap,14); Rickets (1986);

Lafont (1999,caps. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8); Lazear & Rosen (1988); Cutler & Zeckhauser (2000);

Holmstron & Milgron (1991), Jensen & Meckling (1976), Sappington (1994)

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